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1. Introduction 
 
Tulkarm, as one of sixteen Governorates in the West Bank, is not in the focus of the 
media or research, when it comes to the Middle-East conflict or the daily life in the oPt. 
Tulkarm, with social problems in the refugee camps and a relatively high 
unemployment rate is located at the periphery of the West Bank (UNEP 2003:17). On 
this account and because I was able to work in Tulkarm as a human rights observer I 
want to focus the research for my diploma thesis on this area. The main component of 
my thesis will be analyses of various difficulties, which have arisen in the Tulkarm 
Governorate since the construction of the Separation Barrier, with the combination of 
quantitative and qualitative research. 
 
The interest and the importance of the research lie also in a broader view of the current 
geopolitical situation in the world. Because of the specific development of history and 
the geopolitical importance of the Middle East is this conflict one of the most 
internationalized conflicts in the 20th century (Tocci 2005:4). It is also famous for its 
long lasting peace process, which can be defined as “[…] a sustained effort to negotiate 
a lasting solution to a protracted conflict between states and/or nonstate groups” (Boaz 
Atzili 2008:185f quoted by Pearlman 2009:80). In 2000 at Camp David the final 
deadlock of the peace process was reached, because Ehud Barak and Yassir Arafat could 
not agree on the final negotiations. The status of the city of Jerusalem and the “right to 
return” were the central controversial issues. The visit of Ariel Sharon at the Temple 
Mount triggered the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which let to numerous suicide attacks 
in public places in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa and other Israeli towns. The Government 
of Israel responded with blockades in the oPt, concerted killings of military leaders of 
the Hamas and Fatah and the construction of the Separation Barrier. The Barrier 
emerged as effective concerning the number of suicide attacks (Schmiedinger 
2006:246f). The peace negotiations only started again after the death of Arafat and a 
new shift in the process seemed to appear last September. The demand and the desire 
for an independent Palestinian state which had appeared prior to the request of the UN 
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Security Council on 23 September 2011 in New York became stronger and stronger. 
Obama's "Speech to the Nation" and Netanyahu's response to it, does not seem to 
increase the hope for an early resolution of the conflict. The situation of the peace 
process has not improved since September 2011; the conditions agreed upon in the Oslo 
Accords are still valid and have an influence on the current daily life of people living in 
the West Bank. The West Bank in general was divided into three zones - Area A, B, and 
C- in the Oslo Interim Agreement in 1995. The security, authority, administrative 
arrangements, land administration and civilian affairs were divided between the Israeli 
Government and the PA. Around 227 separate areas are located in Area A or B, and both 
are surrounded by Area C. Approximately 60 percent of the West Bank is Area C, where 
the Israeli Government, implemented by the Israeli military force, is responsible for the 
full control over this area. The most important key infrastructure of the West Bank lies 
in Area C and in addition, it is the only Area, which has contiguous geographical zones. 
The planned gradual transfer of the control in Area C to the PA has not been 
accomplished yet (NRC 2010:20). This process led to a complicated system, where 
different laws apply in various places in the Governorate of Tulkarm. On this account it 
is absolutely necessary to look into the history of the peace process as well as well as 
into the question which law is applicable in the West Bank. Furthermore, the economic 
transformation and the specific architecture of the Israeli settlements, including the 
ongoing water issue cannot be ignored in answering my research questions. 
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1. 1. Research Questions 
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to look into and critically appraise the transformation of 
movement and access of land and employment in Greater Tulkarm, which is influenced 
by a variety of factors such as the Separation Barrier, agricultural gates, roadblocks etc. 
and analyze the current situation of residents of Tulkarm living in it. 
 
In particular I will try to identify the numbers of pass overs and difficulties with the 
permission system at the Deir Al-Ghusun Gate to access agricultural land in the Seam 
Zone. Another focus will be a number of villages as Nazlat Isa, which has been divided 
by the Separation Barrier since 2003 and the village of Shufa, which is close to Avre 
Havez settlement and was not able to use the main road to Tulkarm, due to a roadblock. 
The research questions focus on this aim and are as follows:  
 
How did the construction of the Separation Barrier influence the access and movement 
of people in the Tulkarm Governorate? 
 
1.2. Research Hypotheses 
 
 
In my thesis I focus on answering the following hypotheses: 
 
 The number of border crossings of farmers, women and children at the Deir Al-Ghusun gate has 
tended to decrease since 2007. 
 
 Since 2005 people have had to pass less obstacles within the Governorate of Tulkarm to lead 
their daily life. 
 
 The so called “normalization” process is one key factor, that the permission system at 
agricultural gates is widely accepted; it also has a huge negative impact on the income of the 
farmers. 
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 The construction of the Separation Barrier had a great negative socio-economic impact on 
certain villages as Jubara or Nazlat Isa. In Nazlat Isa it led to a shift as one of the economic 
centers of the Governorate to the town of Tulkarm. 
 
 
1.3. Structure and content of the thesis 
 
The changes in geography and infrastructure in Tulkarm are closely tied to the history 
of the Middle East conflict. The aim is to get a better understanding how geographic 
and political forces (for instance by implementing special legal systems) affect the 
economic development and the ‘daily life’ of people to have access and ability of 
movement around Tulkarm. In the second section I will present the methodology that 
will be used in the thesis. The geographic dimension and the political/institutional 
dimension are both essential and linked to each other and will be discussed in the third 
section of the thesis. The question of the impact of culture on economic growth, as well 
as the impact of terrorist attacks on the economy are contrary issues which are being 
widely discussed at the moment, due to the visit and speech of Romney in Jerusalem in 
July. Therefore I will use different theories as a framework to tempt it in my analysis. 
Different aspects and approaches of center, periphery and inner periphery will be 
discussed, as well as the influence of culture on economic growth, the impact of 
terrorism on income and the international division of labor. 
 
 An integral part will be the literature work in my thesis. At the beginning of the fourth 
section I will focus on the history and development of the Peace Process in the conflict, 
starting from the Six Days War 1967. In the following I will, however, focus on the 
Oslo Accords I (1993) and II (1995) and the development thereafter to the present 
status. A huge part of the literature work will be the fifth section „Law applicable in the 
West Bank”. International Law and International Humanitarian Law will also be 
represented. Therefore I will also focus on the Area C and specific problems like 
Demolition, Settlements, Building Permits, and Stop Work Permits etc. The economic 
situation of the oPt is pictured in the sixth section, to get a better view on the whole 
standing. Moreover the water issue and the specific architecture of settlements in the 
West Bank are an integral part to answer my research questions, because these themes 
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are linked to the issues of movement and access of people and land and will be 
presented in the seventh section. Expert interviews will be incorporated in the whole 
thesis, but mainly in section 8: Restriction of Movement and Access in the Tulkarm 
Governorate. The linear regression will be used as a case study in section 8.2.2. Deir Al-
Ghusun Gate - Analysis of the collected data 2007-2011. Questionnaires will be 
incorporated in the whole section 8. 
 
 
1.4. State of the Art 
 
The Middle East conflict is a widely reviewed topic that is not just analyzed in various 
media, but also in many studies with different emphasis. The historical analysis, 
especially around the year of 1948, is partially very controversial; see New Historians 
vs. traditional Israeli historians (see Pappe 2007, Segev 2005). Also, there are many 
studies that broach the issue of the Middle East conflict itself (see Shlaim 2000, Wright 
2008, Zerdal, Eldar 2009, Pollak 2000). The impact of the occupation of the West Bank 
is picked out as a central theme by numerous international and national organizations. 
The transformation of the living conditions of the Palestinians and the influence on the 
daily life since the construction of the Separation Barrier is primarily analyzed by 
UNOCHA and ICRC (see UNOCHA, ICRC). One of the most disputed issues around 
the Middle East conflict is the international law. Huge amount of publications are 
focusing on this issue. I will use mostly primary resources, e.g. the Conventions 
themselves (cf. Geneva Conventions etc.). The international law also contains the 
International humanitarian Law (IHL). The main sources of IHL are the Hague 
Convention IV (Regulations) 1907, the four Geneva Conventions 1949 (I-IV GC), two 
Additional Protocols 1977 (I-II AP) and the Customary International Law. The core of 
the IHL is the four Geneva Conventions 1949. IHL also referred to as the laws of war/of 
armed conflict is a collection of laws whose fundamental purpose is to alleviate human 
suffering in any kind of armed conflicts (Diakonia 2011) In order to explain the 
Customary International Law I have to use secondary sources and explanatory notes 
(see Diakonia 2011). 
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An important theme in my thesis will be the specific architecture in the West Bank. Rafi 
Weizman published a number of books and papers, which I will use to explain the 
specific infrastructure of the settlement Avre Havez around Tulkarm. Rotbard points out 
in the preface of “A Civilian Occupation“, that “the work of Israeli architects is at the very core 
of the political issues: There is nothing innocent about regarding architecture as an autonomous 
process. Since the shaping of the physical reality takes place on different scales, such as the 
political, the urban and the architectural, architecture is no less ´political´ than ´urban´“(Rafi, 
Weizman 2003:15). He raises the question of the role of politics within architecture and the 
role of architecture within politics (Rafi, Weizman 2003:16). 
 
On the other hand the governorate of Tulkarm is located on the outskirts of the West 
Bank and the political contention. The research in this area refers to a large extent to 
environmental problems and various illnesses, including asthma and cancer (see Qasem 
2001, UNEP 2003, etc.).  
 
The water situation in the Middle East is given a lot of attention in general. Many 
escalating environmental threats like “[…] problems of scarcity of water resources and 
land, rapid population growth, long-lasting refugee situation, climate change, 
desertification and land degradation“[...] exist in the oPt (UNEP 2003:6). On this 
account most analyses include the whole West Bank or pick out a few case studies, 
instead of focusing on Tulkarm as a region. 
 
Furthermore, there is an emphasis on the behavior of children and teenagers in schools 
in current Palestinian university research (see An-Najar University Journals 
http://scholar.najah.edu/journals/humanities). UNOCHA analyzed the impact of the 
Separation Barrier in the Tulkarm Area in several publications. Furthermore, they have 
published a lot of case studies concerning certain villages in the Seam Zone and villages 
with agriculture land (see UNOCHA 2007, 2010).  
 
 
However, my specific research question places the focus on the city of Tulkarm, and the 
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villages of Deir Al-Ghusun, Shufa etc., which was not analyzed to an extent. The 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics has an extensive data collection, though. 
Although there are numerous accounting records of border crossings and the permission 
system of the individual gates and checkpoints, there has not yet been made a linear 
regression for the Deir Al-Ghusun gate between the years 2007-2011.  
 
This is due to the lack of resources within the international and national organization. 
EAPPI is the only organization in the West Bank since 2007 that has an ordered 
collection of data on a daily/weekly basis for this CP (see www.eappi.org). While the 
general data were always used by UNOCHA and ICRC, however, due to the high 
number of gates and checkpoints, no analysis has been made for this individual location 
in Tulkarm in more detail over years. 
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2. Methodological Approach 
 
The field of research is limited to the Tulkarm Governorate, with special focus on the 
city of Tulkarm, the village of Jubara, Nazlat Isa, Shufa and Deir Al- Ghusun. Due to 
my work as a human rights observer with EAPPI in Tulkarm, I am able to use the data 
collection of all monitored checkpoints and agricultural gates in the governorate. 
Furthermore I conducted expert interviews and use a questionnaire to get information 
about movement and access of people, living in the Governorate of Tulkarm.  
 
 
2.1. Linear Regression - Deir Al- Ghusun Gate 
 
The aim is to prove the decrease of pass overs of famers from the area of Attil and Deir 
Al-Ghusun since the fall of 2007. The analysis is based on the assumption that the 
number of commuters on the Deir Al-Ghusun gate corresponds to the number of those 
who have permission for that gate. I will consider seasonal fluctuations, like the olive 
harvest, and major weather conditions, mainly in winter time. The analysis of the Deir 
al-Ghusun Gates was selected because - apart from an annual summer break of about 
four weeks and once missing value in February - a record since 2007, weekly data is 
present. This is due to the fact that this gate is easy to achieve, from the town of 
Tulkarm and has the best opening times compared to the northern gate as Quaffin or 
Zeita etc.  
 
Therefore with the help of a simple linear regression, the number of farmers, women 
and children, who passed the agricultural Gate Deir Al-Ghusun between October 2007 
and October 2011, will be analyzed. The analysis is based on actual records of the 
EAPPI, which were carried out by the team based in Tulkarm on different weekdays. 
EAPPI is a program in Israel and Palestine under the auspices of the World Council of 
Churches. It has set itself the goal to accompany Palestinians and Israelis in their non-
violent use to end the occupation. It supports a just peace based on international law and 
relevant United Nations resolutions. One of the main principles of EAPPI is the 
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fundamental impartiality, but it seeks to clear violations of human rights and compliance 
with international humanitarian law (see www.eappi.org). 
 
A problem in the collection of the material is that the data were not always recorded on 
the same day. For my calculations I used - if any - one value per calendar week, in many 
cases this was a Wednesday. I always go back to my analysis based on the assumption 
that the number of commuters on the Deir Al-Ghusun gate corresponds to the number of 
those who have "permission" for that gate. The Deir Al-Ghusun gate opens momentarily 
3 times a week and is open for 45 minutes in the morning at 06:00 till 06:45 am. 
 
I put the number of border crossings for each of the categories overall, men, women and 
children in the dependency of the time. In principle, the regression analysis is 
considered as "the relationship between two or more metric scaled features” (Benesch 
2008:115). A distinction is made between the dependent variable Y, which is in this 
case, the number of border crossings, and the independent variable X, which represents 
the time in calendar weeks. The number of border crossings thus depends on the size 
effect term (Benesch 2008: 115). Other factors, such as the number of allocated permits 
by the DCO were not observed in this case. The attempt to apply the time-series 
analysis in order to clean up the trend for seasonal fluctuations, failed because no 
statistically seasonal fluctuation was detected. This is probably related with the 
recurrent missing values for individual months. In addition to simple linear regression, 
the data were also compared monthly and for the overall categories, men, women and 
children with the help of radar charts to illustrate the anticipated seasonal fluctuations 
graphically. The data was not always available during the month of February and June, 
July and August. Therefore the arithmetic mean of the month before and the following 
month was used. This data construction enhances the distortion of the results due to the 
missing values. 
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2.2. Questionnaires- Movement and Access in Tulkarm 
 
In addition to the time series analysis I distributed 180 questionnaires in Arabic 
language in Tulkarm City, Shufa, Nazlat Isa, Shweika, Deir Al-Ghusun and Atill about 
movement and access possibilities of people. I received 160 questionnaires back and 
was able to use 153 of them due to failures. The focus of the questions is on duration 
and obstacles in connection with going to work, or school and spending one’s free time. 
The questionnaires were translated in Austria into English. The questionnaire and the 
data matrix are attached in the end of the document. The purpose of the questionnaires 
is to show the length of time and possibilities to fulfill daily needs and duties in the 
Tulkarm region. The analysis will not be representative. First of all the access to consult 
women that hold a job in rural areas in Tulkarm is limited. Just 30 out of 153 
questionnaires were filled out by women. The age range varies from 13 till 70 years old. 
3,4% of the people are between 13 - and 19 years old, 20,9% of the people are in their 
20s; 17,6% are in their 30s; 18,3% are in their 40s; 23,5% are in their 50s; 7,8% are in 
their 60s; 1,3% are in their 70s and 7,2% didn´t fill in their age. The primary exclusion 
of younger people is due to the fact, that they are not involved in the working process. 
The general access to all people in the selected areas is circumscribed and the period of 
time of the research was also narrowed. Some categories couldn´t be used for the 
analysis due to the small numbers. This has to be taken into consideration.   
 
The field of profession of the polled people is diversified. The category ‘driver’ is the 
highest one with 18 people working in this area, followed by the category ‘trader’ with 
13 people, ‘farmer’ with 10 people. 3 people considered themselves as completely 
unemployed. 5 people are working for international organizations and 4 people are 
employed by governmental institutions. 114 people are married and the average number 
of family members are 6, 6 and the median is 6
1
. 
  
  
                                                                
1 Personal status: 22 people = not married, 1 person = widowed 16 people = no answer;/ average number of family 
members: n=150, 3 people = no answer  
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2.3. Expert interviews 
 
To get a better understanding and insight into the situation in Tulkarm, I decided to hold 
expert interviews with 12 people, which are used mainly in section 8 to give a better 
understanding of the complicated situation of the research filed. Experts have a high 
insight and a specific knowledge. Meusel and Nagler define an expert as a “[…] person 
who has privileged access to information about groups of persons or decision 
processes” (Audenhove 2007:6). In my research field most persons are not involved in 
decision processes, but were able to give me a deeper insight into different groups and 
processes. Experts are not neutral and part of the social debate and the interview setting 
influences the obtained information. Furthermore are the effects on interaction very 
high. Systemizing expert interviews are used for information, which is not accessible 
otherwise, and allow the interviewee to answer extensively (Audenhove 2007:6ff) Basis 
for the evaluation work are transcribed interviews, with a first round of evaluation 
process. This process will include the selection of keywords from the questions (guided 
by theory) and inductive terminology which can be seen as new thematic aspects, 
arising from the interviewees (see Witzel 1996). Then the development of case-specific 
main topics and systematic contrasting through case comparison will follow (see Witzel 
2000:8 et al.). The interviews will be used to gain a deeper insight into the different 
topics throughout this thesis. A weakness of my interviews is that the interviewees are 
apart from two people, Palestinians, who are living in Tulkarm Governorate. A broader 
approach, including the various Israeli as well as Palestinian perspectives, would have 
been preferable. Due to the limited time and research field this approach could not be 
conducted. Some interviews were held with the help of translator. Most people will not 
be named in this thesis. I assure however, that the names of the interview partners could 
be given to the academic institutions of Vienna University under strict data protection 
clauses upon request.  
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The following general questions were used as a general guideline within the interviews. 
The interviewed people come from a different background and different villages within 
the Palestinian society. Therefore the questions were held very open and are seen as 
general point of reference. The interview with Yehuda Shaul focused on a different 
issue, mainly how the Israeli society deals with the organization “Breaking the Silence” 
and will be implemented in my thesis in the general analysis. It is important to mention 
that the questions were not just processed through the general guideline, because this 
would not have been useful for the complexity of the issue. Instead I took my personal 
background and experience into consideration. The following issues were the focus in 
my interviews:  
What are the main obstacles in Tulkarm City/villages today? What was the situation before the second 
intifada like? What was the situation during the second intifada like? What was the situation after the 
second Intifada like? What was the economic center in Tulkarm Area before the second Intifada? How 
has the economic situation changed since 2002? How did the Separation Barrier influence the social and 
cultural situation? How has the movement of people changed since the construction of the Separation 
Barrier? How has the infrastructure changed since 2002? Who are the main actors in the change? What 
is the role of the PA? What is the role of the Israeli Government? Has the access to resources changed? If 
yes, how? How has the daily life of people changed since 2002? Do the people have a chance to change 
their living space? If yes, how? Who are the strong social actors in the Tulkarm region? What is the role 
of international Organizations? What is the role of local Organizations? What is the role of Israeli 
Organizations? Are there any networks, which try to influence the political landscape in Tulkarm? 
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3. Theoretical Approach 
  
The following section shows the theoretical inputs which are important for the 
different aspects of this thesis and will be discussed closer through the different 
sections in this thesis. Characteristics of peripheral areas play an important role 
since Tulkarm lies in the periphery of the West Bank and (Israel), not just in 
geographical terms. Therefore, aspects of the development of regions in the 
periphery are central factors, when it comes to the transformation and the 
development of Greater Tulkarm in the last decade. Different concepts of “inner 
colony” and later on “inner periphery” are possible frameworks to draw a picture 
of the current situation in the Governorate of Tulkarm. As pointed out in his essay 
in 2008, Raphael Reuveny even calls the State of Israel the last colonialist in the 
oPt since 1967. Averages of 3,272 people have been passing into Israel with a 
work permit through the Tayba (Ephraim) checkpoint in Tulkarm
2
 (EAPPI 
2012c:6). Therefore some aspects of the theory of the international division of 
labor have to be addressed in this thesis. Terrorism tied with economic growth is 
an issue, when it comes to the Palestinian – Israeli conflict, especially when we 
discuss the transformation of access and movement due to the construction of the 
Separation Barrier in Greater Tulkarm. The economic freedom in a region related 
to growth and culture is a factor which is being widely discussed in Israel and oPt 
at the moment.  
  
  
                                                                
2 between 4:00–7:00 am on Sundays and Thursdays 
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3.1. Characteristics of peripheral areas 
  
“The mutual dependence of center and periphery has reached a level of highest complexity. 
Structural divestitures seem more difficult than ever. A functionalization of spaces brought 
about by characteristics attributed to them necessitates a hierarchy of spatial organization. 
What "spatial structure" is the current spatial planning and regional policy now faced with?” 
(Heintel 1999:1, translation of the author)3. 
 
 
The terms of center-periphery in the 20
th
 Century were largely affected by 
representatives of the World System theory, including Immanuel Wallerstein and Johann 
Galtung. The World System theory, as a multidisciplinary and macro-scale approach is 
“[…] a knowledge movement elaborated since the 1970s and is a critique of dominant 
modes of analysis in the nineteenth-century social sciences” (Wallerstein 2004:1). 
Three aspects are quite important. First the basic units of a social analysis are not 
nation-states but world-systems. Second “[n]either nomothetic nor idiographic 
epistemologies permit useful  analyses of social reality;”  and third  “[…] [t]he existing 
disciplinary boundaries within the social sciences no longer make any intellectual 
sense” (Wallerstein 2004:1). Wallerstein defines a world-system (with a hyphen) as 
opposed to a simple world system. 
“[…] but a system that is a world and which can be, most often has been, located in an area less 
than the entire globe. World-systems analysis argues that the units of social reality within which 
we operate, whose rules constrain us, are for the most part such world-systems (other than the 
now extinct, small minisystems that once existed on the earth).  World-system analysis argues that 
there have been thus far only two varieties of world-systems: world-economies and world empires. 
A world-empire (examples, the Roman Empire, Han China) is large bureaucratic structures with a 
single political center and an axial division of labor, but multiple cultures. A world-economy is a 
large axial division of labor with multiple political centers and multiple cultures. In English, the 
hyphen is essential to indicate these concepts. "World system" without a hyphen suggests that there 
has been only one world-system in the history of the world”. (Wallerstein 2004:13). 
 
                                                                
3 Original Quote: „Die wechselseitigen Abhängigkeiten von Zentren und Peripherien haben einen Grad höchster 
Komplexität erreicht. Strukturelle Entflechtungen scheinen schwieriger denn je. Eine Funktionalisierung von Räumen 
durch die ihnen zugesprochenen bestimmten Eigenschaften bedingt eine Hierarchisierung räumlicher Organisation. 
Mit welcher „Raumstruktur“ ist nun die gegenwärtige Raumordnung und Regionalpolitik konfrontiert?“ (Heintel 
1999:1). 
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One of the first theoreticians, who developed a center-periphery model, was Raúl 
Prebisch in the 50s. Regions 1 are the centers, or developed countries and regions 
2, which are known as peripherals are developing countries. Industrial countries 
produce mainly manufactured goods whereas developing countries exploit raw 
materials. He believes that in developing countries, the income elasticity of 
demand for industrial goods is relatively high (the coefficient of elasticity is 
greater than 1), while in developed countries the demand for food and raw 
materials is not income elastic (Schätzl 1996:182). The term center-periphery was 
also used by neoclassical approaches apart from the World System theory. 
Common to both is that the center and periphery are considered a necessary 
component in a capitalist development. In general centers and peripheries are tied 
to each other and have a relationship in our traditional way of thinking. It usually 
depends on the context how components and complex parts are put into the 
general framework of center-periphery. Peripheries can be characterized by the 
following characteristics to get a better understanding of the broad variety of 
usage: Basically, there is a hierarchical structure between centers and peripherals 
that can manifest at different kind of levels. A possibility to structure and 
differentiate center and periphery is through a procedural perspective. For the 
collection of contradictory developments a number of indicators are drawn from 
different fields like income disparities, the number of Internet connections, 
unemployment, health care, etc. The activity density in centers is higher than in 
the periphery with regard to mobility, phone calls, etc. The factor of speed plays 
an essential role in enabling development or hindering it and is becoming a factor 
of regional development, for instance delayed developments in segments of the 
labor market, health care, communications and economic integration in national 
networks. Innovations, flexibility (especially of the labor market) are factors, 
which have to be included. At the economic level the outflow of profits from the 
periphery to the center is a key component to analyze. In the political sphere, 
dependencies, decision-making structures and the distribution of power is 
analyzed, where the periphery must often follow the decisions of the center. In the 
socio-cultural field the center is predominant and tries to transfer its conduct and 
cultural values to the center. The residents of the periphery are thus caught 
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between their own identity based culture and the “culture of the center”. Different 
reaction can occur, which can lead to apathy, resignation and traditionalism. 
Ultimately, the term peripheral is a banal geographical dimension, insofar as the 
distance and geography of regions are markings as peripherals. The importance of 
this aspect tends to decrease since the world seems to get smaller due to new 
technologies and opportunities to travel. The dependencies described above are 
expressed in the reality of daily life for residents of peripheries and their 
economic situation. Consequently, the peripheral status of various regions can be 
read in statistics. However, a problem of perception in the analysis of the 
relationship between center-periphery is evident, due to the complexity of the 
single segments and side issues which are not incorporated properly into the 
analysis (Heintel 1999:1ff, Novy 2007b:70ff).  
"The various forms of integration or exclusion of spatial units in a flexible hierarchy of the global 
economy bring a modified ratio of the ´center´ and 'periphery'- both at global, national and 
regional level. The concentric space structure of industrial cities is increasingly superimposed by 
a fragmented usage pattern which is both characterized by a concentration- and deconsolidation 
process and leads to differently sized centers and peripheries. The figuration of center and 
periphery has to be rethought and presented today” (Prigge et al. 1996, 131 quoted by Heintel 
1999:3).4 
 
A crucial factor at this point is the incorporation in the world market. 
Furthermore, center and peripheral structures have always been linked to a 
hierarchy of organizational structures. Hierarchy appears as something essential or 
simple needed to be able to develop large organizations (Heintel 1999:4ff).  
Faßmann points out that centers and peripheries can have a hierarchy within, as 
well as peripheral regions have their own local centers. A ranking order of 
different centers and peripheries emerges. Hence the definition of a center or a 
periphery has to be seen as relative and not absolute (Faßmann 1990:6). The 
internal hierarchy of the West Bank, as it is also found in other peripheries, 
                                                                
4 Original Quote: „Die unterschiedlichen Formen der Integration beziehungsweise Exklusion von Raumeinheiten in 
die flexible Hierarchie der Globalökonomie bewirken ein verändertes Verhältnis von ‚Zentrum‘ und ‚Peripherie‘ – 
sowohl auf globaler wie auf nationaler und regionaler Ebene. Die konzentrische Raumstruktur der industriellen 
Metropolen wird zunehmend von einem fragmentierten Nutzungsmuster überlagert, das gleichermaßen durch 
Konzentrations- wie Dekonzentrationsprozesse gekennzeichnet ist und zu unterschiedlich dimensionierten Zentren 
und Peripherien führt. Die Figuration von Zentrum und Peripherie muss heute neu gedacht und dargestellt werden“ 
IN: Prigge, Walter et. al. (1996) Globalisierung und Regionalisierung; Zur Auflösung Frankfurts in die Region. IN: 
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 21. Jg., No. 2, pp. 129-138. 
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becomes easier to understand in this case. Heintel (1999:4) also addresses the 
problematic issue around borders, because regions, which are located close to 
borders, often get indicated as classical peripheral regions. Territorial disparities 
tend to appear in border regions, which can also be found in the Governorate of 
Tulkarm, which borders the Separation Barrier and the State of Israel. 
 
3.1.1. “Inner Colonies” and “Inner Peripheries” 
 
The “newer” concept of “inner peripheries” stems from the context of the debate 
over the differentiation between center and periphery. Nolte (2001) uses the term 
in the context of the regional differentiation in Europe and gives a number of 
examples, how the concept was used in Europe over time. Michael Hechter 
(1975) for instance denominated the Celtic region of Britain as an inner periphery. 
The central element of the historic picture was developed in the process of the 
creation of the center and therefore the peripheral characteristic of this region was 
not descended. With this analysis Hechter transferred the critique of the 
dependence theories on the liberal development politics, to the internal structures 
of the western European national states (Nolte 2001:7). Even the representatives 
of the dependence theories argued, that underdevelopment had to be developed 
first, because the backwardness was constructed by the success of capitalism 
(Frank, André Gunder 1969 quoted by Nolte 2001:7). 
  
In the 1980s a broad range of regional movements arose, which were divided 
within. A part of these regional movements were using the arguments of the 
inwards turned critique of the dependence theorists and developed the concept of 
“inner colonialism”. Another part of the regional movements combined the claim 
of regional autonomy with the reduction of the large administration in the center 
to develop regional authorities. The response of the old political elite to the 
emerging regional movements was the institutionalization of the policy field 
“regional policy”. Today the national state is still important in Europe, but the 
European Union, which also uses the policy field “regional policy”, is acting 
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above the level of the national state on the layer of regions. On that account 
questions concerning the inner colonialism, new nations, political heteronomy by 
the center etc. were an important issue of the political and historical debate in the 
whole postwar period, but especially in the 60s. Nolte raised the question, why 
there was a need with the already existing research and interpretation approaches 
like “inner colonialism” etc. to add the new concept of inner peripheries. On the 
one hand objections to the old concepts emerged, because the analogy of the 
concept of internal colonialism to real colonialism is historically quite impossible. 
Colonies in the Western European sense had a separate legal status from the 
mother country. Most inhabitants of an “inner colony” had the same rights as the 
center, though (Nolte 2001:7ff). 
 “The concept being used in a neo-Marxist sense (as in the debate over the relationship between 
colonies and the development of capitalism on a global level) made an accurate interpretation of 
the "unequal exchange" (i.e. the instrument of exploitation) between the centers and the inner 
colonies in terms of economic history highly problematic. It cannot be proved by a mere 
description of the roles in the inter-regional division of labor because there are also profits from 
the sole export of raw materials – the question therefore, remains how the share of surplus value 
or extra profits from the relationships between the center and the inner periphery can be 
determined” (Nolte 2001:10, translation of the author5). 
 
Then again research focusing on the economic history usually does not approach more 
than a few years, often in the context of industrialization. The advantage of using the 
concept of periphery or “inner periphery” is that there is a possibility to combine 
different fields of research and that it is open to all fields of human activities e.g. 
religion, international and interregional division of labor, functions of the military etc. 
The concept of “inner peripheries” offers the possibility to define the relationship 
between the centers and “inner peripheries” as well as subsystems and the roles of 
different actors. “Inner peripheries” can be defined as regions, where the conditions are 
organized, so that people in other regions benefit from it. To get a clearer picture certain 
fields should be dwelled upon. The field of politics is easier to demonstrate, as for 
                                                                
5 Original Quote: „Wurde das Konzept im neomarxistischen Sinn gebraucht, ergab sich auch hier (wie in der Debatte 
über das Verhältnis von Kolonien und Entstehung des Kapitalismus auf globaler Ebene) das Problem, den 
"ungleichen Tausch" (also das Instrument der Ausbeutung) zwischen den Zentren und den inneren Kolonien 
wirtschaftshistorisch präzise zu fassen. Eine bloße Darstellung der Rollen in der interregionalen Arbeitsteilung leistet 
diesen Nachweis noch nicht, da auch am Export von Rohstoffen verdient werden kann - die Frage bleibt, wie der 
Anteil der Mehrwertes bzw. von Extraprofiten aus den Beziehungen zwischen Zentrum und innere Peripherie 
bestimmt werden kann.“(Nolte 2001:10). 
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instance, heteronomy over persons from other regions, which is defined as the center, 
uneven tax collection or refund etc. The field of religion, as for instance institutional 
religious leadership in the center, or the field of regional identity as well as social 
structures can be more difficult to illustrate (Nolte 2001:13ff). 
 
Nolte (2001:28) points out that the concept of “inner peripheries” has its limits, 
especially when the society, of which the periphery is a part of, is as a whole defined 
through state borders. Borders do not only separate one State from another, but run 
within countries or cities, and they separate the people linked with the new networks 
and the short comer residents of a city or a state   (Löw et al. 2008:73). This becomes 
quite difficult to achieve, when it comes to the oPt. There are clear borders for the 
Governorate of Tulkarm in the West Bank. State borders as for the state of “Palestine” 
do not exist, and therefore only the ceasefire line of 1948 could be used for the analysis. 
In addition the Israeli settlements need to be included, when it comes to the 
determination of possible state borders. Regional economics on the other hand are a 
sub-discipline in economics that deal with regions, which are understood as rooms, 
which are not nations and need no fixed state border (Novy 2007a:227). The concept of 
center-periphery is still useful, when it comes to the Governorate of Tulkarm. A great 
potential for conflict lies in the emergence of new spatial hierarchies.  
 
On the other hand Reuveny (2008) still uses a colonial framework to place the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in a historical comparative setting. He argues that the conflict has 
too often been analyzed as unique in his nature. He doesn´t give much attention to 
several important factors in the conflict as Jerusalem, refugees, economic relations, 
water and territorial swaps in his analysis. Reuveny states, that according to the 
historical pattern East Jerusalem will be the capital city of Palestine and the 
“decolonization” will lead to peace (Reuveny 2008:326ff).  
“Facing the prospect of an endless conflict, Israel will probably decide eventually to decolonize and 
leave the Territories, as essentially all colonial rulers have left their colonies, evacuating most if not all of 
the settlements it has built there since 1967. The Palestinians will then establish their own independent 
state. Whether this outcome happens sooner rather than later will depend primarily on the timing and 
intensity of the next Palestinian uprising should the colonial status quo continue an on the position of the 
United States”. […] But history is not simply a random process. It can also provide us with valuable 
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guidance about the likely future. Israel will probably decide to decolonize, consigning its unfortunate 
status as the last colonialist into a well-deserved final resting place in the annals of history” (Reuveny 
2008:359).  
 
 
3.2. The Newer International Division of Labor and the  
Informal Labor Sector 
 
The 21st century is not only characterized by a large number of movements of 
skilled workers but also a huge number of unskilled workers, not just across 
countries but even across continents. Due to the structural changes of the world 
economy companies had to reorganize their whole production on a worldwide 
scale with the help of the relocation of the production to new industrial places, as 
well as with the help of rationalization mostly in industrial countries (Fröbel et 
al.1981). Even more so, a big amount of skilled intensive jobs is outsourced from 
developed to developing countries and skilled workers move from developing to 
developed countries. These two developments are linked to each other, as the 
globalization process leads to a reconfiguration of the international and national 
division of labor. Two parts lie behind the theory of the New Division of Labor. 
The global division of labour separated the global labor force into a periphery and 
center (or core) and focused on highly sophisticated production tasks. Jobs got 
lost in the center, because the production was relocated into the periphery. 
Transnational corporations gained in importance (Hutchinson 2004:3ff). Fröbel et 
al. (1981) defined this as a crisis for the industrial countries and also a way to 
export-oriented manufactures in developing countries. Governments are not able 
to turn away the unemployment rate in the developed countries. Relocation would 
not stop, if political instability arose in certain developing countries. Hutchinson 
(2004:5) criticized Fröbel et al, because they have overseen some aspects in their 
analysis, for instance the independent development of the Asian Tigers. He claims 
that he overestimated the importance of cheap labour, generalized the low-skill 
nature of outsourcing and made an incomplete comprehension of the implication 
of the new technological process.  
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The term informal sector was marked during the 1970s, when development 
theoreticians had to admit that the worldwide establishment of the formal sector 
was not successful.  The pattern of the developed industrial countries, which were 
adapted after the models of the modernization theorist, was not applicable. The 
International Labor Organisation used the term “informal” for an expression of 
backwardness and lack of modernization. Development programs were the cure 
for the problem, especially for the dependency theorists. The old dependence on 
the West and the gap could only be broken up by enforcing this development. The 
neoliberal approach was completely different. They placed the conventional 
development theories at the top and propagated informalisation as a way of 
development (Komlosy 2007:210). Not the informal sector should be formalized, 
but government structures as well as arrangements that were considered 
bureaucratic and corrupt, should be degraded (De Soto 1992 quoted by Komlosy 
2007:210). All the interpretations lack on the fact, that the informal sector cannot 
be isolated, and has to be put in combination with other working relationships. 
The informal sector actually has a broad variety in developing countries, for 
instance migratory labor, part time jobs, subcontracting, work on the streets, 
different services like street acrobatics, food stalls, etc. (Komlosy 2007:211). A 
high number of Palestinians from the region of Tulkarm are working in the 
agricultural and construction field in Israel. Their number has decreased since the 
2
nd Intifada and workers from other countries have replaced the Palestinians.  
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3.3. Terrorism and the impact on income 
 
Blomberg et al. (2011:383ff) are raising the question what effects terrorist attacks 
have on society or especially on trust levels and if the changes in trust lead to an 
effect on income. He defines trust as the “[…] general feeling of how trustworthy 
a given person feels other strangers are […]” and it is actually difficult to 
measure (Blomberg et al. 2011:384).  They merged the World Value Survey with 
ITERATE and Penn World Table to create a micro-level database. The average 
annual values 1990-2007 for Israel, which were used in this article are: Income 
(average across individuals and over time) 21,711; Trust (pooled average) 23 
percent; Terrorism: 1, 00; Age: 42, 2; Education: 32 percent; Children: 0.00; 
Unemployment: 10 percent
6
. Israel is placed in the lower middle part in trust 
level
7
. The figures for the oPt were not included in the research. They found out 
that generally speaking war and terrorism have a negative impact on income. The 
impact of trust “[…] is positive and statistically significant in explaining income. 
[…][They] do not, however, see a drastic change in the economic significance 
when including […]” the impact of trust, “[…] but the increase in magnitude of 
the impact of terrorism […]” (Blomberg et al. 2011:396). Furthermore a large 
number of articles have focused on the effects of economy growth related to 
terrorism since 9/11. For example Gaibulloev et al claimed in 2009, that every 
terrorist attack causes a 1,5 percent decline in “[…] annual growth as a good 
measure of generalized trust […]” per one million people (Blomberg et al. 
2011:384f). In literature terrorist attacks are often linked to economic damages on 
different levels. The effect on tourism, investment composition, savings and 
consumption behavior, defense and the security industry are just a number of 
channels of economic growth which can be influenced by attacks. 
 
 
                                                                
6 High income levels strongly correspond to high trust levels 
7 Trust level highest/lowest: Peru 8 percent, Zimbabwe 12 percent, Sweden 66 percent, Finland 58 percent 
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“Terrorism strikes at the foundation of the distinctive, Western form of civilization – namely, our 
unprecedented ability to trust one another […] Terrorism’s random acts of destruction, because 
they are targeted at nobody in particular, make everybody feel unsafe. Consequently, they make us 
apprehensive, wary – distrustful. Every Arab- looking passenger on your flight sets off personal 
alarm bells. So did every piece of mail from a stranger during the anthrax attacks. [...] Terrorism 
thus leverages its acts of physical destruction into large contagions of economic and social 
disruption (Lindsey 2002). 
The feeling of being safe is closely tied to the concept of trust. Safety as a social 
construct is a term which has a number of varieties and cannot be defined in an 
objective way. A social construct, because it focuses more on designedly assumed 
social certainties than on adamant social conditions. Official conditions, e.g. the 
statistics over the number of terror attacks or the number of victims do not 
influence the public perception of safety to a large extent. Social certainties such 
as for instance reliability, security of status, protection of danger etc. are closely 
tied to the societal attribution of meaning and are essential for the individual and 
the collective sense of security. Scientifically, there is no exact definition of the 
term security. Security is often used for the instrumentalisation of political power 
(Six 2007:6ff).   
 
Another Index, which is also related to the feeling of trust in general, is the Happy 
Planet Index, because it also includes the factor of experienced well-being, which 
is measured by the question ‘Ladder of Life’ from the Gallup World Poll. The 
Happy Planet Index shows how countries produce a long, sustainable and happy 
life for their inhabitants. Unfortunately, no data is available for the oPt. Israel 
ranks 15 off 151 analyzed countries and has a score of 55.2. “Israel's HPI score 
reflects high life expectancy and high levels of experienced well-being, but is 
brought down by a very high ecological footprint [...]. The overall index scores 
rank countries based on their efficiency, how many long and happy lives each 
produces per unit of environmental output” (Happy Planet Index 2012)8. The 
three components life expectancy, experienced well-being and Ecological 
                                                                
8 Other statistics: GDP per capita ($PPP): 28,573 (around 0.6 the USA's), Population: 7.6 million (#91 of 151), Land 
area (square km): 21.6 thousand (#135 of 151) , Population density (people per square km): 352 (#16 of 151), 
Governance Ranking (WGI): #41, Experienced well-being 7.4, Ranked #10 of 151, Life expectancy 81.6, Ranked #7 
of 151, Ecological Footprint, 4.0, Ranked #103 of 151 
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Footprint are measured and put into a traffic-light score. Green stands for good 
performance, amber for middling and red for a bad performance. The Index does 
not measure human rights abuses within a country, which is quite essential when 
it comes to minority rights within a nation. Nevertheless, the Index gives a good 
overview of sustainable well-being (Happy Planet Index 2012)
9
. 
 
3.4. Economic freedom and culture and growth 
 
Economic freedom is also a factor which influences the possibility of growth:  
“[S]ince the time of Adam Smith, if not before, economists and economic historians have argued 
that the freedom to choose and supply resources, competition in business, trade with others and 
secure property rights are central ingredients for economic progress” (De Haan et al. 2000:3 
quoted by Williamson et al. 2010:314).  
 
Culture on the other hand is not widely discussed when it comes to economic 
growth literature or defined as a constant. Therefore, the inclusion of the culture is 
a relatively new development in theoretical and empirical studies. Williamson et 
al. (2010:313ff) analyzes how economic freedom and culture impact economic 
growth. This issue has been discussed very critically this summer in Israel and the 
international media in the wake of the visit and statement of the Republican US 
presidential candidate Romney in Jerusalem (see chapter 6). The definition of 
culture has four central categories, which are trust, respect, individual self-
determination, and obedience. Self-determination is central, in terms of the daily 
economic success and behavior of Palestinians, because it is a measure which 
defines “the amount of control a person feels to have in their individual choices”. 
The impact of culture on economic growth is seen as substitutable or 
complementary in theoretical research. In their article Williamson et al. 
(2010:313) describe economic freedom, culture and growth and state  that “[…] 
economic freedom is more important than culture for growth outcomes, 
suggesting substitutability between the two” and “[…] culture is important for 
                                                                
9 “These scores are combined to an expanded six-color traffic light for the overall HPI score, where, to achieve bright 
green – the best of the six colors, a country would have to perform well on all three individual components” (Happy 
Planet Index 2012). 
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growth when economic freedom is absent, diminishing in significance once 
economic freedom is established”. Nevertheless economic institutions such as 
private property or rule of law are essential for the development of a region or 
economic growth. North (1990:3) defines Institutions as “[…] the rules of game in 
a society, or more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction”. Formal and informal institutions are necessary for economic growth. 
Formal institutions can be seen as codified structures as well as written rules. 
Informal institutions on the other hand include norms, culture, which is influenced 
by social customs, and values. The lack of some formal institutions is still in 
existence. 
“It is also evident from the analysis presented in this article that Islamic culture is not a 
development blockade; on the contrary. Membership in the Islamic Conference has – ceteris 
paribus – a very positive effect on political democracy, on life expectancy, and on our indicators of 
the Kyoto process and the eco-social market economy. Far from being a “religion of the Middle 
Ages” Islam has an important message for the 21st Century. It is to be hoped that socially 
progressive forces in the MENA countries will achieve a better monetary distribution of incomes 
and a better gender distribution of work in the societies concerned in the future” (Tausch 
2005:103). 
 
Yuchtman, on the other hand, who analyzed the political attitudes in the Muslim 
world with an empirical analysis in two stages, demonstrated that religion 
emerges much more as a shape of attitudes in the Muslim world than in the West. 
He claims that Islam is at the moment not very encouraging of liberal-supportive 
ideas. Yuchtman suggests that democratic ideas have to receive legitimation on 
the basis of Koran and Islamic traditions and “[…] as long as the influence of 
religion continues to be pervasive in the Muslim world, the adoption of liberal 
values in this world will depend upon a liberal transformation within Islam“ 
(Yuchtman 2010:32). 
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3.5. Definitions 
 
In this section I will give definitions of some important terms that will be used 
throughout the thesis. 
 
3.5.1. Occupied Territory 
 
The term “Occupied Territory” or short oPt (Occupied Palestinian Territory) is 
used on a frequent basis in this thesis. Therefore I will use the definition of EDA 
for this important term:  
„An occupied territory is one that is actually placed under the authority of a foreign armed force 
even if the occupation meets with no armed resistance. International humanitarian law applies in 
all such situations regardless of whether or not the occupation is lawful. It governs the rights of 
the local population and the obligations of an occupying force. The latter is responsible for 
ensuring public order and security while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force. 
Furthermore, the occupying force must ensure that the local population has access to food and 
medical care“(EDA 2009:32). 
 
3.5.2. Separation Barrier 
 
The term of Separation Barrier for the Israeli West Bank Barrier will be used 
throughout the thesis. A number of different definitions in English are used for the 
Barrier depending on the political or ideological background. “The Barrier 
consists of concrete walls, fences, ditches, razor wire, groomed sand paths, an 
electronic monitoring system, patrol roads, and a buffer zone” (UNOCHA 
2012b:1). A lot of Palestinians call the barrier “Apartheid Wall” or simply “The 
Wall”. On the other hand the Israeli government often describes it as a “security 
fence” or “anti–terrorist fence”. The ICJ uses in his advisory opinion of 2003 the 
following term: “The construction of the wall being built by Israel […]” (ICJ 
2004). The term “wall” will not be accurate in the Tulkarm Area, because some 
parts of the Separation Barrier consist of a fence. Therefore, the term of 
Separation Barrier is the most suitable one without taking a political side. 
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4. Israel-Palestinian Peace Process 
  
“A peace process is a sustained effort to negotiate a lasting solution to a protracted conflict between 
states and/or nonstate groups” (Boaz Atzili 2008:185f quoted by Pearlman 2009:80). 
  
The role of a Palestinian state for the population is closely tied to the concept of a 
nation state or associated with a national identity. "Although undoubtedly, Palestinian 
identity involves unique and specific elements, it can be fully understood only in the 
context of sequence of other histories, a sequence of other narratives"   (Khalidi 
2009:9). Identity is to some extent the relationship between the self and the other. This 
definition of the relationship of the self and the other is quite characteristic of many 
peoples in the Middle East and certainly also in other countries in the world. 
Palestinians, however, have never achieved a form of national independence in their 
area. Therefore it was not possible for them to create their own space, where they were 
in full control and complete confidence. The lack of sovereignty denied the Palestinians 
full control over various state mechanisms traditionally used to build a national identity, 
such as education, museums, archeology, postmarks, coins, etc. (Khalidi 2009:9ff).  
 
In a global view point the question of the conflict of Israel and Palestine has always 
“[…] maintained a uniquely divisive character” (Bamyeh 2003:668). Bamyeh 
(2003:669) identifies widespread ignorance as the reason for this state of affairs, “[the] 
perceived moral ambiguity of the question of Palestine”- Israelis as well as Palestinians 
have legitimate national and historical claims, which produce ideological cleavages; the 
influence of the media; and “[…]a widespread style of ethical judgment typified by a 
‘zero-sum’ logic` […]”. Bamyeh (2003:670) addresses an important point, which is 
highly sensitive: As soon as someone shows sympathy for the Palestinian cause, this 
“[….] must in some way come at the expense of sympathy for Jewish suffering in 
modern history”. “The Holocaust is a defining factor in Jewish and Israeli identity”, to 
quote Arno Tausch (2012:4) “[…] and Arab research and opinion, after so many 
decades, must start to confront its legacy and significance”. Because of this reason it is 
important that a clear distinction is made between the critics of the Israeli Occupation in 
the oPt and critics of the State of Israel itself. As Avraham Burg (2012) states in the 
Neue Zürcher Newspaper: “Jedem Israeli sollte seit langem klar sein, dass alles 
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innerhalb der Grünen Linie zum demokratischen und rechtmäßigen Israel gehört. Und 
alles ausserhalb dieser Linie ist etwas anderes: undemokratisch und unrechtmässig. 
Nicht unser”.  Bamyeh (2003:670) raises important questions, which need to be worked 
on in Israel/Palestine as well as outside of the conflict region:   
“How do we establish both complexity and clarity in our ethical judgment? How do we forge radical 
outlines with human concerns? How do we overcome the dead-end of nationalist politics? How do we 
end the horrors attendant to politicized religion and politicize mythology?” 
  
4.1. The emergence of the conflict 
 
“In Israel, the conflict emerged as an identity-based conflict, as  the Zionist endeavor to construct a 
Jewish state in the Holy Land was resisted by the predominantly Arab and Muslim worlds, including the 
local Palestinian population (both Muslim and Christian) living under the British mandate“ (Tocci 
2005:2). 
 
The declaration of the state of Israel in 1948 led to a number of unresolved issues 
between the state of Israel and the Palestinian people, like e.g. borders, Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank, the city of Jerusalem, mutual recognition, security, water 
rights and freedom of movement. The “right of return” of the Palestinian people is a key 
issue which has complicated all peace negotiations since then. Even more so, the 
unresolved issue of the Palestinian refugees after 1948 gave the Arab states an excuse 
for their refusal of the recognition of the state of Israel. The refugee problem is linked to 
the problem of repatriation and restitution (of them), which is rather complicated due to 
the fact that the Israeli Government took over 94 percent of the abandoned Palestinian 
property. The decline in population numbers of Palestinians and a high rate of 
immigration by (European) Jews to Israel in the first four years after the declaration of 
the state led to doubling the population of the Israeli state (Gelvin 2005:165ff).  
  
Wright, an American foreign affairs analyst, explains the tactics and goals of Palestinian 
politics since the so-called Nakba of 1948 as a four stage path. Palestinians were ruled 
by other Arabs for a generation. The first shift of power started in the mid-1960s, 
because the traditional leaders lost their power to a movement, which was more modern 
and secular. A disordered leadership also emerged in the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, 
which focused on local affairs and the Palestinians in the region developed diverse and 
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independent institutions to get by themselves (Wright 2008:30f). The Six-Day War 
began on June 5, 1967 and represents a point of inflection in the history of the State of 
Israel, its neighbors and the Palestinian people (PRIME 2006:84). It made it possible for 
“religious Zionism” to rise up as an idea: The war was seen as the beginning of 
redemption and many religious/orthodox/whatever Israelis believed that salvation was 
at hand (Shlaim 2000:549).  The Six-Day War and the subsequent occupation of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip added the distinctive territorial aspect and the question of 
the Israeli settlements to the conflict. This issue has been central in the negotiations 
since the Oslo Accords. After the war, UN Security Council Resolution 242 was passed 
as general regulations for a peace agreement, which were restated in resolution 338 after 
the Yom Kippur War 1974. The resolution 242, was (is) based on two principles:       
  
"Evacuation of Israeli forces from territories occupied as part of the last dispute; "Cancellation of any 
claim or state of warfare and respect and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every country of the region" (Braverman, N. G. 1981 quoted by PRIME 2006:80). 
 
The interpretation of the Resolution is still not solved between the different groups of 
the conflict, because “[….] [a]according to the Israeli version, the wording there is 
‘withdrawal from territories’ but according to the Palestinian version, it is ‘withdrawal 
from the territories’” (PRIME 2006:80). 
  
The second stage or shift of power within Palestinian politics was after the invasion of 
Israel in Lebanon in 1982 (Wright 2008:30). “It was the biggest defeat for the 
Palestinians since 1948. Almost three decades after Fatah´s creation and almost two 
decades after the PLO was founded, the exiled Palestinian leadership had achieved 
virtually nothing” (Wright 2008:32). The PLO lost its role as a regional player and was 
expulsed from Lebanon to Tunisia (Pearlman 2009:96).  The creation of an internal 
power vacuum in Palestinian politics led to the rise of an alternative leadership inside 
the oPt. The rising unemployment rate, poverty and high birth rates combined with the 
tensions with Israel led to the first intifada, which marked the shift of power from 
outside forces to the home grown Palestinian leadership that developed inside the oPt. 
“The intifada […] produced two phenomena. It introduced political Islam as a 
mobilizing force. It also produced a new young guard of nationalists who posed a 
challenge to the dominance of the PLO´s old guard in exile” (Shikaki quoted by Wright 
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2008:32).  Palestinians inside the oPt and outside of the territories, or even the PLO 
elite moved into two different directions. On the one hand, due to the close ties with 
Israel, which a lot of Palestinians experienced inside the oPt, they accepted the right to 
exist of the state of Israel and a two-state solution. On the other (hand), the Palestinians 
outside of the territories, who are mainly refugees, wanted the return of all of the Israeli 
territory. Arafat had no other choice in 1988 than to recognize Israel’s right to exist and 
to renounce terrorism. 
  
The intifada lasted until the peace talks in Madrid (Wright 2008:33ff). In 1991 the 
Madrid Conference was an effort of Spain, the US and the USSR to start a peace 
process in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Because of Israeli demands, the PLO was not 
allowed to attend the Conference. Instead, a delegation of the oPt represented the 
Palestinian people (Pearlman 2009:97). 
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4.2. Oslo I (1993) 
  
From an international point of view, when the Labour Party won the general election in 
1992 they were under the impression that there was not much difference in foreign 
policy thinking between Likud and Labour. The Arab-Israeli conflict was handled as an 
interstate conflict and there was broad support for the denial of the right of self-
determination of Palestinians. Rabin, as the first Israeli born prime minister, was very 
much focused on Israel`s security connected with a general suspicion of the Arabs. He 
didn´t want to negotiate with all groups simultaneously, as it was agreed in the 
Conference of Madrid. “One peace at a time” was a hallmark in his worldview (Shlaim 
2000:503f). “The idea behind this approach was to break up the united Arab front, to 
negotiate with each party separately, and to pay the lowest possible price in terms of 
territory for each bilateral agreement” (Shlaim 2000:504). Then again Simon Peres 
was appointed by Rabin as foreign minister. Rabin thought, Peres was a perfect choice 
to represent Israel in a multilateral forum after the Madrid conference. In his view the 
security aspect was not just a military concern, but also comprised economical, 
psychological and political elements. He was an official supporter of the interim 
agreement, and even believed in the idea of the full handover of the West Bank and 
Gaza to the Palestinians (Shlaim 2000:504f). 
  
In the early 1990s Arafat gained more power due to the killings of his contenders Khalil 
al- Wazir and Saleh Khalaf. The gap between the PLO as an institution and Arafat as its 
‘guru’ blurred more and more over time (Pearlman 2009:96, Sayigh 1997:30f). “His 
jealous grip on power prevented rational planning, minimized learning from 
experience, and impeded coordination of resource” (Sayigh 1997:31). He returned from 
exile in 1994 to the Muqata, and autocratically ruled the new Palestinian Authority for 
the next decade as the Palestine Liberation Organization had done before. Fatah, at the 
center of the patronage system in the oPt, was at this time in charge of all branches of 
government, as well as the private sector, security positions and monopolies on 
moneymaking imports (Wright 2008:26ff). Notwithstanding his important role, Arafat´s 
leading role was challenged for several internal reasons. As mentioned above one threat 
for Arafat was the generation of nationalist activists and the delegation at the Madrid 
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Conference. The secret talks in Oslo brought a way to assure his sole authority and 
indicated a measure of foreign recognition of the PLO as the representative of the 
Palestinian people. The ambition for peace and the struggle for complete hegemony 
over the Palestinian struggle were interwoven by the PLO (Pearlman 2009:96ff). Arafat 
“[…] inherited structures created by others […]”, during the Intifada or while 
assuming the leadership of the PLO in 1969, “[…] which he then fragmented and 
duplicated to an astonishing degree, reshaping their form and function to his purpose” 
(Sayigh 1997:31). 
  
The difference between all the peace negotiations before and the Oslo negotiations is, 
“[...] the Oslo format brought together Israelis and Palestinians in face-to-face 
negotiations for the first time” (Gelvin 2005:228). The purpose was to be a base for 
ultimate negotiations and relations including the “final status issues” between the two 
parties. Initially, almost 60 percent of Israelis agreed with the Oslo Accords because of 
their weariness of the intifada and the general optimism of the post-Cold War world. 
The expanding settlements and the oPt proved to be more of a strain in the course of 
time and the Gulf War demonstrated the overestimation of the defensive value of the 
territories. A small number of Israeli citizens followed a perception of a “post-Zionist” 
state, which would put Israel into a better position on the global market and promote 
peace in the region. Rabin, of the Labour Party, was also elected in 1992, by virtue of a 
large part of the people being able to see the new circumstances of this period. On the 
other hand, the PLO saw a bleak image of the future: There were constant challenges 
from in and outside and they had little control of the popular intifada (Gelvin 
2005:230f). Furthermore “the disintegration of the Soviet Union had eliminated the 
PLO´s most important diplomatic patron, and Arafat`s diplomatic bungling did little to 
endear him to Moscow […]” (Gelvin 2005:31). A high number of Russian Jews 
immigrated to Israel. The settlement expansions in the occupied territories constituted 
the housing for these people. The new immigrants replaced Palestinian workers and, 
even more degrading for the PLO, the Arab Gulf states put an end to the financial aid 
they had sent to the Palestinians before (Gelvin 2005:31f). 
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Oslo I includes two separate protocols, two letters of recognition between the PLO and 
the Government of Israel, and the Declaration of Principle on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangement of 1993 between Israel and Palestinians. The letters of recognition from 
the Israeli side did not include the recognition of the right of a state for the Palestinians. 
“Furthermore, by recognizing Israel, Palestinians conceded that close to 80 percent of 
historic Palestine- the territory within the pre-1967 boundaries of Israel-would forever 
remain off the bargaining table” (Gelvin 2005:233). This led to frustration among the 
opponents of the Oslo Agreement and to resentments towards new territorial 
concessions in further peace negotiations (Gelvin 2005:233). The Accords launched the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) and created a small new pre –state. Its power was limited to 
policing and municipal services in small parts of the West Bank and Gaza (Wright 
2008:34). As a whole the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements was bound by a strict timetable, mainly for the purpose of negotiations. 
Unfortunately the Declaration didn’t constitute a proper treaty. 
  
In 1994, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was signed, including more specific details about 
the Palestinian autonomy. Within two months after the agreement, the Israeli military 
was supposed to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho with a processing time of two months 
until completion. Arafat and Rabin faced heavy criticism by a strong opposition, 
consisting of hardliners from both sides. The Gaza –Jericho Agreement was seen as the 
end of the Greater Israel and the beachhead for an independent Palestinian state. The 
withdrawal of the military was distracted, as a consequence of the attack of the 
extremist settler Dr. Goldstein in Hebron in 1994 (Shlaim 2000:524). 
  
Binyamin Netanyahu, at this time the leader of the Likud, was already strongly opposed 
to the Accords and predicted a revocation as soon as Likud would come into power 
again. Within Palestinian society the accord led too fierce opposition, from 
organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) or the 
Hawatmeh within the PLO. Hamas and the Islamic Jihad opposed the idea of an 
agreement with the state of Israel in general (Shlaim 2000:516ff). Prominent 
Palestinians like Farouk Kaddoumi, Mahmoud Darwisch and Edward Said opposed the 
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accords, either because of their content or Arafat’s autocratic style (Shlaim 2000:522). 
The accord had important consequences for the conflict between Israel and the Arab 
states, as the Arab League had originally been established to support the struggle for an 
independent state of Palestine. There was no reason for the Arab League anymore to 
reject the status of the Israeli state, because even the PLO recognized Israel. The 
behavior changed completely in the Middle East (Shlaim 2000:520). 
  
The promise that the Declaration of Principle would set in motion a series of actions to 
achieve a set result, in other words to end the Israeli authority over the Palestinians in 
the oPt, was not adhered to. Important pillars or issues within the negotiation process, 
such as the right of return, refugees, the borders of the Palestinian entity, Jewish 
settlements or the status of Jerusalem, hadn’t been addressed to avoid the failure of the 
accord   (Shlaim 2000:516f). “Both sides took a calculated risk, realizing that a great 
deal would depend on how the experiment in Palestinian self-government worked out in 
practice” (Shlaim 2000:517). 
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4.3. Oslo II (1995) 
 
The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, better known as Oslo II, 
was a follow-up to Oslo I, included a number of key aspects of the conflict and 
incorporated and superseded various agreements. It was signed by Rabin and Arafat in 
the presence of Egyptian president Mubarak, US president Bill Clinton and King 
Hussein of Jordan. “It provided for elections to a Palestinian council, the transfer of 
legislative authority to this council, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the 
Palestinian centers of population, and the division of the West Bank […]” (Shlaim 
2000:527f). The Interim Agreement was also the basis for further peace talks and 
treaties such as the Hebron Protocol, the Wye River Memorandum and the Road Map 
for Peace. Both sides were disappointed with the outcome of the negotiations and the 
resulting Interim Agreement. With 61 votes in favor and 59 votes against Oslo II the 
Knesset ratified the Accords (Shlaim 2000:528f). 
 
4.3.1. Division of the West Bank after the Oslo Interim Agreement 
  
The 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement divided the West Bank into three zones: Area A, 
Area B, and Area C. The security, authority, administrative arrangements, land 
administration and civilian affairs were divided between the Israeli Government and the 
Palestinian Authority. The status of East Jerusalem was not defined in this agreement. It 
should have been an issue in the final status agreement. Around 227 separate areas are 
Area A or B, and both are surrounded by Area C (NRC 2010:20).   „The majority of the 
Palestinians have been deeply distressed by the division, and they hold out hope that 
Palestinian nationalism will, in the end, reunite both territories under on 
flag“(Schanzer 2008:153). 
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4.3.1.1. Area A 
  
Approximately 17, 2% of the West Bank area is Area A. This includes all major 
Palestinian cities or population centers, where the PA has the full jurisdiction over 
security and civilian affairs, planning and land administration (NRC 2010:20). 
  
4.3.1.2. Area B 
  
Around 22, 8% of the West Bank is Area B, where security is controlled by the IDF and 
the PA together. Civilian affairs, land administration and planning are in the 
responsibility of the PA (NRC 2010:20). “In reality, security is, for the most part, 
controlled exclusively by the Israeli military forces” (NRC 2010:20). 
  
 
4.3.1.3. Area C 
  
Approximately 60% of the West Bank is Area C, where the Israeli Government has the 
full responsibility and authority over the area, with their policies implemented by the 
Israeli military. An estimated 70% of Area C is appropriated for Israeli settlements or 
for the Israeli military. This, however, includes nature reserves and a ‘buffer zone’ 
around the Separation Barrier. The most important key infrastructure of the West Bank 
lies in Area C and in addition to it, it is the only Area, which has contiguous 
geographical zones (NRC 2010:20). The final peace agreement within five years, agreed 
to at the Oslo Accords negotiations has not been reached. The planned gradual transfer 
of the control in Area C to the PA has not been accomplished yet (NRC 2010:20).  In 
fact, the Israeli military is still in control of Area C. Approximately 150,000 Palestinian 
people are living in Area C and around 271 Palestinian communities have their build –
up area with more than 50 percent of their land in this area (UNOCHA 2010a:1). 
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4.3.2. Final status negotiations 
  
The final status negotiations were planned to start in May 1996. Unfortunately Prime 
Minister Rabin was assassinated before by a religious extremist at the largest peace 
demonstration since 1993 (Shlaim 2000:547). Yigal Amir, the murderer, was a follower 
of the set of beliefs, that “[…] [t]he Yewish people, the chosen people, are the rightful 
owner of the promised land, the Land of Israel. The Palestinians are aliens in this land 
and, like all other Arabs, a sworn enemy” (Shlaim 2000:549).  Shimon Peres became 
prime minister and minister of defense. The rise of Netanyahu in 1996 led to a shift in 
the Oslo process to a work-to-rule approach; and a break with the Labor´s approach. 
Rabin`s followers also lost the election in 1996 as a result of the Hamas suicide 
bombers, because the attacks indicated a failure of Rabin´s policies of engagement 
(Shlaim 2000: 564ff).  
  
Today unfortunately we have to admit that the Oslo Accords “[…] failed to lead to 
peace” (Waage 2008:54). Seen from a Palestinian viewpoint the fragmentation of the 
West Bank, the disconnectedness of Gaza and the West Bank, and the steep increase of 
Israeli settlement activity are one side of the effects on the Palestinians of the Oslo 
Accords (Pearlman 2009:98). The construction of the Separation Barrier, and a 
“draconian closure regime”, as Waage (2008:54) calls it, are the others. During the six-
year period after Oslo, Palestinian extremists killed more Israelis in attacks than the six-
year period before. By putting power in the hands of Arafat and the PLO/Fatah, the 
Oslo Accords threatened the existence of Islamist groups in Palestinian society. To 
them the Accords were intolerable as a whole, due to the fact that large parts of what 
they perceive to be ‘historical Palestine’ were ceded to the state of Israel. The attacks 
served also as an instrument to ensure a new role within the new Palestinian political 
mindset of power system (Pearlman 2009:99f). 
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4.4. Camp David Summit (2000) 
 
Under pressure of US President Clinton, Arafat came to Camp David in July 2000, 
which was nicknamed as the Jerusalem summit by the former Israeli foreign minister 
Shlomo Ben-Ami (Sher 2006:61). Before the negotiations the parties approved a 
complete gag order during the whole summit, because the participants should be able to 
get the chance to speak as open as possible. All sensitive and open questions were 
discussed (Hadi 2001:49f). At that meeting, Barak offered great concessions at the 
meetings; he even had described himself previously as unimaginable and was often not 
recognized by the international media to its real extent later on: A deal for a permanent 
status, which could have been the basis for an independent Palestinian state, which 
would have included around 90 percent of the West Bank in the end. The withdrawal 
from the most settlements as well as the connection highway for the West Bank and 
Gaza was added in the Israeli concessions for peace. He also included parts of the 
expanded city limits of Jerusalem in his offer and a comprehensive solution for the long 
lasting refugee problem. Israel should express the regret of suffering of the refugees, 
take some refugees to Israel and contribute to the financial compensation. The majority 
of the refugees would have been rehabilitated in their home countries or would have 
been resettled in the future Palestinian state. A maximum of 100,000 refugees would 
have been able to return to the state of Israel.  The Palestinian would have to give up the 
full right of return instead (Heller 2001:36ff, Sher 2006:61ff).  
 
“Israelis correctly argued that a return of four million people would fundamentally alter the 
demographics of Israel, jeopardizing Israel's Jewish character and its existence – an understandable 
desire of the State in view of the terrible Jewish sufferings over the years since the destruction of the 
Temple in the year 70 - as a whole. A much larger number of Jewish refugees had fled or were expelled 
from Arab countries since 1948, and were never compensated” (Tausch 2012:5).  
 
Worth mentioning is also the high amount of compensation for property lost which 
would have been installed for the Palestinian refugees. The city of Jerusalem was 
another key element of the negotiations. As Gilead Sher (2006:61) stated in his book 
“The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations”: “Jerusalem, for example, is clearly not a 
Palestinian issue, but an issue that focuses the entire attention of the Muslim and Arab 
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world”.  Before the negotiation started Barak pointed out the little negotiation space 
concerning the status of Jerusalem.  
 
“We want to allow them free access to the Temple Mount and special status on the Mount. We also need a 
wider definition of Jerusalem that includes territory that belongs to us and them. In this enlarged area, the 
capital of Israel will be established. It will be the biggest and strongest Jerusalem ever, with the largest 
Jewish majority. The Arab capital will be in Al-Quds. Certain areas will be subject to special 
arrangement, although still under Israeli sovereignty. […] We have to look for solutions, rather than 
being dogmatic” (Sher 2006:67).  
 
These concessions went too far for some of Barak's partners in the "Peace Coalition". In 
the summer of 2000 the Shas, the National Religious Party and the immigrant party 
Yisrael Be'Aliyah left the coalition and this resulted in the loss of the parliamentary 
majority from Barak. For the Palestinian negotiation members the concessions were not 
enough though (Heller 2001 36ff). Arafat responded on a statement from the secretary of 
state, when she told him during the Camp David negotiations, that he will have a state: 
“I already have a state. […] If Barak does not want to recognize this now, I do not care 
if it is recognized even in twenty years. Our situation is like the one in South Africa, the 
whole world supports me” (Sher 2006:67). 
 
Nigel Parry (2002) criticized the media coverage during the Camp David negotiations. 
He claims that many politicians and journalist only reproduced the Israeli perspective of 
being generous in the negotiations and failed to give a clear picture of the Palestinian 
perspective.  
“To conclude, the actual amount of land in Israel’s offer was far from “generous” in Palestinian eyes, its 
implementation would have compounded the current problems with freedom of movement, and it also did 
not meet the minimum requirements of UN Security Council Resolutions or international legal precepts 
concerning the disposition of territories occupied during war”. (Parry 2002). 
 
Some people involved in the peace negotiations also thought, that Camp David was too 
early.  
“Both Palestinians and Israelis need a peace for the generations, not a peace of short-term conveniences. 
What we learned at Camp David is that the kind of real peace both sides need will require a little more 
time, a little more effort and a little more pain. But we continue to believe that it is worth the time, effort, 
and yes, even the pain”(Erekat 2000). 
 
Clinton and Barak wanted to push the negotiations, also because the legislative period 
of their elected position came to an end. The peace efforts failed in Camp David to lead 
to results and this paved the way to the third power shift within the Palestinian politics. 
Arafat constrained the terms, which Ehud Barak, as the Israeli Prime Minister, 
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proposed. The Negotiations Affairs Department of the PLO (2000) stated after the 
failing of the Camp David negotiations:  
“Palestinians entered the peace process on the understanding that (1) it would deliver concrete 
improvements to their lives during the interim period, (2) that the interim period would be relatively short 
in duration - i.e., five years, and (3) that a permanent agreement would implement United Nations 
Resolutions 242 and 338. But the peace process delivered none of these things. Instead, Palestinians 
suffered more burdensome restrictions on their movement and a serious decline in their economic 
situation. […] In sum, Palestinians simply did not experience any "progress" in terms of their daily lives. 
[…]However, what decisively undermined Palestinian support for the peace process was the way Israel 
presented its proposal. Prior to entering into the first negotiations on permanent status issues, Prime 
Minister Barak publicly and repeatedly threatened Palestinians that his "offer" would be Israel's best and 
final offer and if not accepted, Israel would seriously consider "unilateral separation" (a euphemism for 
imposing a settlement rather than negotiating one). Palestinians felt that they had been betrayed by Israel 
who had committed itself at the beginning of the Oslo process to ending its occupation of Palestinian 
lands in accordance with UN Resolutions 242 and 338”. 
Robert Malley (2001), who wrote “Fictions about the failure of Camp David” stated that 
there was no “[…] lack of foresight or vision on the part of Ehud Barak. He had uncommon political 
courage as well. But the measure of Israel's concessions ought not be how far it has moved from its own 
starting point; it must be how far it has moved toward a fair solution. […]The Palestinians did not meet 
their historic responsibilities at the summit either. I suspect they will long regret their failure to respond to 
President Clinton -- at Camp David and later on -- with more forthcoming and comprehensive ideas of 
their own”. 
 
The failure of the negotiations was the beginning of the eruption of the second intifada, 
which was more sophisticated and a bloody wheel of violence. Suicide bombings 
targeted Israeli civilians in cafes, hotels, shopping malls and bus stations. On the other 
hand, Israel reacted harshly against the Palestinian street fighters and governmental 
sites. A big part of the Palestinian territory was reoccupied. Another big obstacle for the 
resumption of peace talks was the beginning of the construction of the Separation 
Barrier in 2002. The disintegration process of the PA started, because there was no 
possibility to travel from the Gaza strip to the headquarters of the lawmakers in 
Ramallah in the West Bank (Wright 2008:35ff). Already in 2002 led the Intifada to a 
setback in economic activity in Israel, especially in the tourism sector. The economic 
activities in the oPt were almost disrupted completely and the unemployment rate rose 
over 40 percent. Asseburg called it even mass poverty, because at least one third of the 
population lived below the poverty line. The legitimacy of the PA within the Palestinian 
population declined since the outbreak of the Intifada. More than 85 percent of the 
Palestinians wanted to continue with the Intifada in 2002, and around 70 percent 
accepted the use of military or violent methods. Only 40 percent believed in a two state 
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solution. On the other hand more than 70 percent of the Israelis in the survey found that 
the reoccupation of Area A would be an appropriate instrument to defeat the Intifada. 
Only 40 percent believed in the possibility of a peaceful solution. The conflict on both 
sites was more seen as a struggle for existence than a conflict over the occupation of the 
oPt in 1967 (Assenburg 2002:141ff). 
 
4.5. Road Map for Peace 
  
The Road Map for Peace, which was launched in July 2002 and handed over in April 
2003 by the Quartet (the US, the UN, the EU and Russia), adumbrates the general 
principles for a resolution to the conflict in the Middle East. The call for an independent 
Palestinian state and for a new Prime Minister was included in the Road Map. The 
Quartet called for the end of the violence and terror attacks and an acceptance by both 
parties of the goal that the Road Map would lead to: a negotiated settlement. The 
institution building and the normalization of the daily life of the Palestinians was also a 
core element of the road map (BBC 2003).  
 
“The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967, 
based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 
and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince 
Abdullah - endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit - calling for acceptance of Israel as a neighbour 
living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a vital element 
of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and 
Lebanese-Israeli tracks” (The Quartet quoted by BBC 2003). 
  
The initiative was called off, because Arafat was not willing to give up or did not end 
the ongoing outrage against the state and the civilians of Israel. Daily life in the oPt 
became more difficult, due to the high rate of unemployment and lawlessness (Wright 
2008:36f).   
 
On the other hand Anwar Darkazally (2003) pointed out, that “[…] ‘The Road Map is 
the only game in town’ is a popular phrase at the moment, and although both 
Palestinians and Israelis are saying it, only the Palestinians are playing it”. Israel 
brought out 14 reservations and conditions to obviate the substantive provisions of the 
Road Map for peace and therefore only agreed to some of the steps which were outlined 
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in the document.  According to Darkazally Israel didn´t accept to the final steps to a 
independent Palestinian state: “In this peace process it seems that Sharon is keener on 
negotiating the process than the peace. Each of the reservations entitles the Israeli 
government to selectively fulfill the aspects of the Road Map it likes, when and if it 
chooses to” (Darkazally 2003). 
 
 
Furthermore the fragmentation of the Fatah was increasing and “[…] [a]s order broke 
down, Hamas increasingly filled the political space. During this third shift in power, the 
Islamic party moved from the margins to the mainstream” (Wright 2008:37). Hamas, an 
acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, established an immense network 
during the 1990s and opened up schools, hospitals, organizations, as a parallel civil 
society. At this time Hamas got the chance to deliver basic needs to the civilians, 
because the PA failed to fulfill their functions. Hamas opposed the peace process in 
general, boycotted the PA and didn’t run in the 1996 parliamentary and 2005 
presidential elections (Wright 2008:37ff). A survey held in the oPt in 2004 showed that 
87 percent of the Palestinians thought that Arafat’s government was corrupt (Wright 
2008:26). Therefore Arafat`s death, “[…] symbolized the gradual – and ongoing – passage of the 
old guard of leaders who emerged between the 1960s and the 1980s and then hung on to power for 
decades. That early generation of leaders may have started out with popular ideology or nationalist zeal, 
but they all ended up corrupt, ineffective, or autocratic- and often all three” (Wright 2008:28). 
Mahmoud Abbas, who took over the position of Arafat tried to integrate Hamas into the 
process of Palestinian institution building, because he was not able to maintain order in 
the oPt or even negotiate with Israel without an understanding with 2his islamist 
challengers” (Wright 2008:45).  
  
During the Beirut Summer in 2002 there was another attempt for peace negotiations 
from Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which was called Arab Peace Initiative. 
The difference between the Road Map for Peace is that it called for the borders before 
1967. During the Riyadh Summer in 2007 the agreement was renewed once again. 
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4.6. 2006 presidential and legislative elections in the oPt 
  
January 25 of 2006 was an important day for the Arab world and a chancy experiment 
for the Middle East. Palestinians rejected the status quo in a peaceful and democratic 
election, which was the most exhaustively monitored election ever held in the region 
(Wright 2008:19ff). Before the election, Hamas discussed within the organization, if the 
“politicization” of Hamas was desired, or if they wanted to retain their mission of being 
a resistance organization (Brown 2007:5). Hamas won 44 percent of the votes and 56 
percent of the seats in the legislature. A mistake of the party of Fatah was that they were 
running with too many candidates (Wright 2008: 48). Regardless of how peaceful the 
election won by Hamas had been, parts of the world didn’t accept the movement to 
govern the PA and imposed severe sanctions (Brown 2007:2). A large amount of donor 
money or foreign aid was frozen and Israel retained around 55 million dollars per month 
in Palestinian tax revenue. This revenue was essential to pay governmental employees 
including teachers, police and utility workers. This led to an immediate crisis within 
Hamas and a political vacuum (Wright 2008:57). Brown (2007:1) explains that the 
responsibility for the chaos after the election within Palestinian society lay with Fatah,  
as much if not more than with Hamas. He also blames America for deepening the chaos:  
 
“Assistant Secretary of State David Welch did admit that the GDP in the West Bank and Gaza has 
dropped 40 percent in the past seven years, over 60 percent of Palestinian households live below the 
poverty line, meaning they survive on less than $2.40 per day, and 50 percent of Palestinians rely on food 
assistance to feed their families” (Brown 2007:1). 
 
The International Crisis Group (2007:31) described the efforts of pushing away Hamas 
as counterproductive, because they even gained sustainable support in the year after the 
election from Islamist groups. Even the Palestinians decried the international boycott as 
an unfair measure; they still recognized the ineffective response of Hamas (Brown 
2007:5). In reaction to the elections, Fatah chose to become the opposition in the 
Palestinian political system and prevented the formation of a national unity government. 
Initially it seemed that Fatah would peacefully hand over power to Hamas, but this 
progress changed over time, as the defeated organization. Mahmoud Abbas tried to 
immediately put the party back into power using different methods at a political level. 
At the top of attacks against each other’s leadership, Hamas and Fatah forces began 
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violent attacks in Gaza (Brown 2007:6). Abbas hired Haniyya as prime minister and 
formed an emergency government in the West Bank without Hamas participation 
(Wright 2010:62). Abbas was mainly supported by the Arab League, the European 
Union and the US. Hamas, on the other hand rejected the government set up by Abbas 
as illegitimate, and did not give up their control over Gaza (Brown 2007:6ff). “In 
eighteen months, the two largest Palestinian parties had destroyed the euphoria of the 
Arabs’ most democratic election ever, anywhere” (Wright 2010:63).  No party has 
reached a political monopoly in the two territories: “[…]Fatah had gained politically in 
Gaza as life deteriorated under Hamas rule, while Hamas had made gains in the West 
Bank because Fatah still refused to clean up its act” (Wright 2010:63).  As the 
International Crisis Group (2007:2) recommended after the Saudi-mediated Mecca 
Agreement: “Without a Hamas-Fatah power-sharing agreement and as long as the 
Islamists feel marginalized, unable to govern and in an existential struggle for survival, 
there can be no sustainable diplomacy.” The Operation Cast Lead in Gaza by the IDF 
took place in the winter of 2008/2009 and let too many civilian casualties on both sites. 
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4.7. Application for UN membership 2011 
  
Despite positive assessments of the developments in the past few years, some experts 
remain critical of a possible application by the Palestinians for full UN membership. 
The International Crisis Group (2011) for example, considered the Palestinian efforts to 
join the UN a show of collective mismanagement. "Palestinian leaders, in a mix of 
ignorance, internal divisions and brinkmanship, oversold what they could achieve at the 
world body and are now scrambling to avoid further loss of domestic credibility" (Crisis 
Group 2011). On the other hand the EU has always stressed its principles, and its 
strategic objectives in the Middle East conflict around two inter-related pillars (see 
Tocci 2005:3ff):  “The first pillar has been the need to respect the collective rights of 
the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples. […] The second pillar of EU goals has been the 
importance of respecting human rights, democracy and international humanitarian 
law“(Tocci 2005:5). Of course, self-interest is the main reason for the positions and 
behaviors of the important players in the international community. 
  
PA Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (2011) himself, however, in his speech on the 23th 
September in front of the UN General Assembly stressed the fact, that the Palestinians 
in various Reports from the UN, World Bank, Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, IMF and 
AHLC have been positively commented on, giving them reason to expect a positive 
reaction to a UN membership bid.  The right of self-determination as a matter of course 
to him was very important in his speech. An application for the "state non-member with 
observer status” was not an option for him (see Abbas 2011). The criteria for being 
considered a real state are important, however, " [...] for disseminating and imposing 
uniform ‘national’ criteria of identity” (Khalidi 2009:10). The PA has become in 
natural control of some these aspects. However, many of these are also still under Israeli 
control. Of course this is closely related to the concept of self-determination, which 
Abbas addressed in his speech before the UN General Assembly. The city of Jerusalem 
plays a central role in the process of nation building, because the city has always been 
the geographical, spiritual, administrative and political center of the oPt (Khalidi 
2009:13). The individual elements of a so-called “Palestinian identity” have throughout 
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history shifted of course,  with some points being added and others losing their 
importance with the passage of time (Khalidi 2009: 18f). 
  
Seen from a Palestinian viewpoint Israel dramatized the impact of the Palestinian bid 
for UN membership and tried by different methods, such as withholding tax money 
from the Palestinian Authority, to stop the Palestinians from submitting their request. 
Basically, the UN request was supported by the Palestinians. According to a survey by 
Near East Consulting, which was held on September 18th 2011, it came to a backlash a 
week before the application to the UN. In principle 84 percent of respondents supported 
the application. 87 percent believed that the United States would react negatively to the 
request and even 90 percent believed that Israel would change the terms and conditions 
to some agreements between the two parties to the Palestinians in the West Bank. " In 
general, 57 percent of the respondents expect that recognition of a Palestinian state will 
succeed, while 43 percent think that the Palestinian quest for recognition by the United 
Nations will fail" (Maannews 2011). Prior to application, there was speculation whether 
Abbas may not apply for full membership in the UN after all. However, he confirmed 
his intentions with the following words: “I call upon Mr. Secretary-General to expedite 
transmittal of our request to the Security Council, and I call upon the distinguished 
members of the Security Council to vote in favor of our full membership. I also call 
upon the States that did not recognize the State of Palestine as yet to do so“(Abbas 
2011). A reaction connecting the uprisings in neighboring countries of the oPt or 
explicitly in the West Bank was barely noticeable among the population. The protest 
actions on the 21
th
 of September could not mobilize masses within the West Bank. The 
Palestinian "Non-Violent" tactics in demonstrations, however, led to irritation with the 
Israeli military in general.  
"The power of non-violent protest and civil disobedience is undeniable, and the more and more the 
Palestinians adopt these tactics, the more they want to leave Israel no choice but to end its effective 
control over the West Bank or risk total isolation " (Nismann 2011). 
  
Iceland was the first Western European country, which acknowledged on the 29
th
 of 
November 2009 Palestine as an independent state within the limits in 1967. The vote 
was symbolically held at the UN Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People (Der 
Standard 2011). Currently, 132 of the 193 UN-recognized countries acknowledge the 
Palestinian state.  
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4.8. Present Status 
  
The International Crisis Group (2012:1) rises at the beginning of their new report 
concerning the Middle East Peace Process the question, if anybody still believes in the 
Middle East Peace Process? According to the International Crisis Group (2012) is the 
peace process dead, for a number of reasons, but there are hardly workable alternatives. 
The promoted idea of a two-state solution is even buried by the people, which promoted 
it the most (see Hackl 2012). Seen from a Israeli viewpoint the status quo is suitable for 
the Palestinian elite, as they enjoy relatively high comfort in their daily life in the West 
Bank and another reason for maintaining the peace process is “[…] the conviction that 
halting it risks creating a vacuum that would be filled with despair and chaos” (Crisis 
Group 2012:1). For a glimpse the application for the UN membership seemed to be a 
shift in strategy, but this possible alternative way lost his strength after the refusal of the 
international support for statehood at the General Assembly. Abbas refused to engage in 
negotiation with Israel; unless they would freeze the expansion of the settlements and 
the reconciliation agreement with Hamas didn´t have the hoped outcome either. The 
fear of a cut off in US aid and the tax clearance revenue in case of a positive 
development at the UN statehood process is equally frightening to the PA, as the 
possible negative consequences of a joint government with the Hamas. The rupture of 
the PA could also lead to financial problems for the public employees and retaliatory 
actions from Israel (Crisisgroup 2012:1f). The need to find alternatives to the classical 
peace negotiations and a two state solution are absolutely necessary. “What should be 
explored is a novel approach to a negotiated two-state solution that seeks to heighten 
incentives for reaching a deal and disincentives for sticking with the status quo, while 
offering a different type of third-party mediation” (Crisisgroup 2012:2). The 
Crisisgroup points out four untended areas which should be addressed for a future 
alternative path: New issues, new constituencies, new Palestinian strategy and a new 
international architecture. The withdrawal of state of Israel from the oPt as a sufficient 
basis for Peace negotiations is no longer valid. The demand for the right of return of the 
Palestinian refugees will be realistically not more than symbolic numbers (see Hackl 
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2012). Furthermore the peace process has to leave its narrow path and move on to an 
inclusive approach with more actors. A new Palestinian strategy is badly needed and the 
international bodies need to address the major changes in the Middle East (Crisisgroup 
2012:2). All actors involved in the process for peace need to find a sustained social 
contract. Otherwise this could avenge the long term. The primarily important is a 
process of reconciliation concerning history and identity. What a well-founded 
European perspective, oriented towards peace between the state of Israel with a Jewish 
character and its neighbors could maintain is that on the one hand the absence of an 
official Israeli recognition of the so called ‘Nakba’ is not contributing to a long lasting 
peace and on the other hand the absent recognition of the entire painful trajectory of 
Jewish history ever since the year 70 and the Jewish character of the state of Israel is 
also not helping to progress the peace process. The author of this thesis would argue 
that the central "catastrophe" in the Palestinian-Arab national memory must be balanced 
with the national historiography of the Israeli state (following Hackl 2012). 
 
 
 “Whatever steps ultimately are taken, it has become plain almost twenty years after this peace process 
was launched that none of the parties – neither those immediately implicated nor those purportedly 
working on a solution – is honest about its own convictions. It is time to acknowledge what has not 
worked – and to look for something different” (Crisisgroup 2012:37). 
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5. Law applying in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
  
Today the legal system in the West Bank is a very complicated system, because a 
number of different laws apply in different areas in the West Bank. International Law 
and International Humanitarian Law plays an important role in this area, since there is a 
conflict between the state of Israel and the Palestinians. The Israeli civil law is 
applicable for the settlers living in the West Bank and on the other side Martial Law is 
important for the Palestinians (NRC 2010:20f).  
 
“[…] Israeli military law is applied to Palestinians, except in East Jerusalem, which was officially 
annexed to Israel. As a result, two separate legal systems and sets of rights are applied by the same 
authority in the same area, depending on the national origin of the persons, discriminating against 
Palestinians” (UNOCHA 2012:2). 
 
Military Order No. 2 of 1967 issued by the Israeli Military Commander appointed 
martial law following the occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza. The 
Military Order “[…] provided for the abolition of any law in force in the oPt at the time 
where such laws conflict with any military orders issued by the occupying power. Israel 
annexed East Jerusalem and accordingly applies Israeli civil law in that area” (NRC 
2010:20). According to the Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (2009:3) “[t]his 
strategy ended with the confiscation of more than 2910 km2 (51%) of the West Bank 
geographic area as to ʺstate propertyʺ lands”. The knowledge of the different legal 
systems, especially concerning housing, land and property, applying in this area 
becomes particularly important, when difficulties like house demolitions occur. The 
question of obtaining a building permit for Palestinians is as important as the Legal 
Response to Stop Work Orders, Demolition Orders or Land Seizure Orders. 
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5.1. International Law 
  
„International law is a combination of rules and customs governing the relations 
between states in different fields, such as the law of the sea, space law, trade law, 
territorial boundaries of states, and diplomatic relations“(Diakonia 2011). The 
ambition is to protect and amplify the well-being of people and it is a basis for peace 
and stability throughout the world. Globalization led to more intensive and complex 
relations between the different countries and nations. The consent of states is the 
foundation pillar of international law. A State is obligated to fulfill just those rules of 
international law, which it has agreed on before, because of the principle of the 
“Sovereignty of States“. However the prohibition of genocide for example is “ius 
cogens“. This means that the peremptory norms of the international law apply to all 
States without any exception (EDA 2009:37f). The sources for the international law as 
the International Court of Justice shall apply, states in its Statute Article 38: 
international conventions; international custom; the general principles of law; “[…] 
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law“(ICJ 1946). 
  
Customary international law implies that States adapt certain behavior in persuasion 
that they enforce an obligation. Two components are really important for the 
development of the customary law: “[...] the systematic recurrence of the same pattern 
of behavior by States, and the conviction of these States that they are acting in 
conformity with a rule of international law (and not on the basis of ethics or civility)“ 
(EDA 2009:35).  
  
Treaties, which may also be called conventions, pacts, memorandum of understanding, 
statues or protocols, are agreements between sovereign states or between one or more 
States and an International Organization (see Diakonia 2011). States have to sign and 
ratify them to become legally binding. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relation, 
as a successful example of such treaties, has almost universal acceptance. The success is 
partial thought, because the law making by multilateral treaties has demerits and is also 
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burdensome and interminable. There are several stages of the difficult law making 
process. The arduousness is that one single state can undermine the effectiveness of a 
treaty, because a treaty is only binding those states, which also have given explicit 
consent. A state can ratify a treaty, but still use a reservation to it (Schreuer 2000: 4f). 
“A reservation is a unilateral statement by a state whereby it purports to exclude or 
modify the legal effect on certain provisions of a treaty in their application to that 
particular state“(Schreuer 2000:5).  Furthermore difficulties arise through the 
interpretation and application through different language versions of the treaties. 
“Thereby the multilateral law-making treaty is thus far from being considered as an 
effective instrument of international legislation” (Schreuer 2000:5). Generally the 
different sources of international law often correlate with each other (Schreuer 
2000:19). 
  
5.1.1. International Humanitarian Law 
  
The international law also contains the International humanitarian Law, also called IHL. 
The main sources of IHL are the Hague Convention IV (Regulations) 1907, the Fourth 
Geneva Convention 1949 (I-IV GC), two Additional Protocols 1977 (I-II AP) and the 
Customary International Law. The core of the IHL is the Fourth Geneva Convention 
1949. 
 
 “The law of occupation is codified in articles 42 to 56 of the Hague Regulations annexed to the 1907 
Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the 1949 Fourth 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War” (HPCR 2004b:3).  
 
In 1951 Israel ratified the Geneva Convention. Therefore the Fourth Geneva 
Convention is de jure applicable to the oPt for a lot of opinion maker. The controversial 
discussion about the application will be illustrated in the next chapter (see 
Diakonia2011). “[…] IHL also referred to as the laws of war/of armed conflict is a 
collection of rules whose fundamental purpose to alleviate human suffering in armed 
conflicts“ (Diakonia 2011) Within the IHL you apart between the combatants, who are 
in fact involved in the fighting and who are not. The aim is to guard the persons from 
harm, when they are no longer engaged in the conflict. Additionally the means and 
methods of warfare get limited. It  
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“[…] applies to armed conflicts, whether they are international or internal armed conflicts. IHL does not 
apply in internal disturbances or tensions. Internal disturbances are riots, demonstrations, and isolated, 
sporadic acts of violence, that take place inside a territory of a state“(Diakonia 2011).  
 
The ICC Statute and the Additional Protocol I was not signed by the government of 
Israel and is therefore not applicable to the oPt. “Certain provisions might be applicable 
as customary international law” (HPCR 2004:4). 
  
Due to the fact that IHL regulations also imply occupations, and the sources of IHL, 
consists a legal obligation by the state practice, “[t]his policy brief addresses both the 
application of the law of occupation and the law on the conduct of hostilities as it 
relates to Israeli incursions and Palestinian attacks“(IHLRI 2008). The basic principles 
of the laws of occupation, or the law itself is one of the oldest and most developed 
sectors of the IHL and holds a practical definition of occupation. Within the IHL the 
legality or illegality of the invasion is beside the point (HPCR 2004a:2f). 
  
The three Primary Principles of International Humanitarian Law are distinction, 
proportionality and military necessity, which provide basic guidance. There must be 
made a difference between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives, which must be the intended target of the party. Civilian 
lives have to be secured. Therefore attacks are not allowed if the loss is not in relation to 
the direct military advantage. The accomplishment of the military purpose for the action 
is only supported till the use of basic or necessary military force (see IHLRI 2009).  
 
“Other fundamental IHL principles include the duty to take precautions to spare the civilian population 
before and during an attack; the prohibition against infliction of unnecessary suffering or destruction, or 
of superfluous injury; and the prohibition against engaging in indiscriminate attacks” (IHLRI 2009).  
  
The differences between IHL and Human rights are that the Human rights are applicable 
in war and peace and some rights can be limited for retaining the public order. 
Nevertheless the fundamental human rights cannot be restricted. On the other hand 
some 'humanitarian benefits' can be straightened in the IHL, if there is a real military 
necessity (Diakonia 2011). 
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5.1.2. IHL and International Human Rights Law in the OPT 
 
For more than 30 years an intensive discussion has been going on within the 
international community concerning the applicability of the Geneva Conventions 1949 
to the oPt by Israel. Israel doesn’t stand alone when it comes to the objection to the 
applicability de jure of the Fourth Geneva Convention to occupied territories, because 
they are often afraid that the acceptance will have a negative aftermath for the 
occupying powers which would include more than protection of the occupied 
population as it is regulated now in the law. Israel’s argument goes back to the time 
before 1967 before the occupation of the territories. Gaza and the West Bank were 
occupied by Egypt and Jordan. Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention would not 
apply to the oPt (HPCR 2004b:2ff).  Israel claims, that  
 
“the first two paragraphs of common Article 2 […]must be read separately[...] with the result that the 
Geneva Conventions apply under paragraph 1 to armed conflicts in general, with the exception of 
situations of occupation. Under paragraph 2, the Conventions also apply to situations of occupation, but 
only when the territory occupied is that of another High Contracting Party” (HPCR 2004b:3). 
 
As a result the Israeli interpretation opposed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention to the oPt, because the oPt were not part of a High Contracting Party before 
1967, because Israel never accepted the sovereignty of Gaza and the West Bank by 
Egypt and Jordan (Benvenisti 1993:108ff). On this account the two territories are seen 
by the “missing sovereign” argument of Israel as a status sui generis (HPCR 2004b:4f). 
Benvenisti (1993:110) referred to Israel’s argument relating to the applicability of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention  “[…] compared with the only implicit rejection of the 
Hague Regulations` applicability and […] the recognition of the Hague Regulations by 
the Israeli Supreme Court […]” as curious. The Hague Regulations are accepted as 
customary international law by the Government of Israel. This is due to the fact that the 
Hague Regulations assure governmental interests overall where the Fourth Geneva 
Convention addresses the interest of individuals (Benvenisti 1993:108ff). Overall  
”[…]Israel argues that there are no legitimate sovereigns to whom it could return the 
territory” and in reference to the Fourth Geneva Convention is not considering 
themselves as an Occupying Power, but still apply the “humanitarian provisions” parts 
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of the Convention (HPCR 2004b:4). The Position of the Supreme Court of Israel is not 
so clear as the Government regarding the sui generis status of the West Bank and Gaza 
argues that the government is tied by the customary “Laws of War” (which refers to the 
Hague Regulations), because Israel is still in control of the oPt. A lot of international 
organizations and countries are opposing Israel’s opinion and the ICJ decided in 2004 
that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to the oPt and they point out the Right 
of Self-Determination of the Palestinian People as Recognized by the United Nations 
(HPCR 2004b:4ff). 
  
The implication of the IHL in the oPt got affected by the installment of the Oslo 
Agreements for a number of reasons and is argued in a variety of ways. Watson argues 
that the Accords  
 
“[…]have formal attributes of binding instruments; they are styled ‘agreements’  and ‘protocols’; they 
are structured like treaties, and they contain mandatory rather than permissive language. […] It appears, 
then, that the Oslo Accords are legally binding international agreements” (Watson 2000:101). 
 
The PA was established and has to be seen as an administrative authority and the West 
Bank was divided into three areas with different administration competence. Another 
relevant factor is the mutual recognition of the two sides. The application of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulation in the different areas is an issue of 
international debate (HPCR 2004b:9). The Oslo Accords and the following transfer of 
authority to the PA in Area A and B “[…] may have reduced, but did not extinguish, the 
scope of Israel’s obligations under the laws of occupation” (HPCR 2004b:10). 
 
The second Intifada also led to discussions about the implications of the IHL in the oPt, 
no matter if the IHL was applicable in Area A and B, which were under PA control 
during the Oslo Process. Out of this reason the IDF´s so called “incursions” in Area A 
and B trigger the application of IHL (HPCR 2004b:10). 
  
Concerning the international human rights, Israel also states that they are not applicable 
in the oPt. The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the 
construction of a wall in the oPt, as well as the Human Rights Committee and the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural think, that the international human rights 
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actually do apply. The Supreme Court of Israel has indeed applied international human 
rights in various cases in the oPt. This may vary though, depending on the extent of 
Israel’s effective control over the areas in the oPt. Due to the treaty reporting system of 
the UN, the PA can´t be held responsible for human rights violations, because it is 
limited to state parties. On this account there is a need for a framework for the 
accountability of human rights violations in the oPt (HPCR 2007: 2ff). IHL and 
international human rights are often compared and interact with each other. The 
Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research states that in case of 
the coexistence of IHL and IHRL in the oPt, there is a need for building a framework by 
scholars:  
 
“In situations where IHRL provides greater detail to fill gaps in IHL, or where one body of law influences 
the application of the other, practitioners may push forward and strengthen the legal methodologies 
illustrated here to create a more meaningful and robust system of legal protection and enforcement for 
civilians living in occupied territory”(HPCR 2007:13). 
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5.2. Application of IHL to specific policies in Israel  
and the oPt 
 
In the following section I want to focus on specific issues, which are currently under 
critical discussion as settlements and settlers and the Separation Barrier. 
 
 
5.2.1. Settlements and Settlers 
  
After 1967 Israeli settlements got established which are seen as illegal by International 
Organizations. “Settlements […], are areas within the oPt inhabited by civilians of 
Israeli nationality. This includes those that have been authorized by the Government of 
Israel (the majority), and those not so authorized (the minority)” (HPCR 2009:2). In 
2010 more than 310, 000 settlers were living in the West Bank (see CIA 2012). The 
relationship between the government of Israel and the people living in the oPt, also 
refugees and stateless people is regulated by the law of occupation. Article 42 to 56 of 
The Hague Regulations and the Articles 27 to 34 and 47 to 135 of the 1949 Fourth 
Geneva Convention and specific provisions are particularly important for the law of 
occupation. According to Paragraph 6 of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
migration of Israeli citizens is allowed, but Israel is not allowed to contribute to this 
migration process in any sense. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations does not regulate 
the issue specifically, but is important in the context of the basic demographic structure 
in the oPt. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention regulates the prohibition of 
demolition of private property (not including military necessity) (HPCR 2009:2f).  
  
According to UNOCHA (2012:2) settlements are illegal under international law and this 
decision has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice, the High Contracting 
Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and the United Nations Security Council. The 
government of Israel argues, that the Settlements in the oPt are legal in using a different 
interpretation of Article 49. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted: 
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“The provisions of the Geneva Convention regarding forced population transfer to occupied sovereign 
territory cannot be viewed as prohibiting the voluntary return of individuals to the towns and villages 
from which they, or their ancestors, had been ousted […]. It should be emphasized that the movement of 
individuals to the territory is entirely voluntary […]” (HPCR 2009:5). 
 
Therefore they distinguish between voluntary migration of individuals into the oPt and 
their contribution, even this interpretation is criticized by various organizations and 
states. The security argument was used by the Israeli Government in the 1970s to justify 
the construction of settlements on private land, especially in the Jordan Valley. The 
Israeli High Court of Justice justified these actions under Article 52 of the Hague 
Regulations. The payment of compensation for the land and the military need is thought 
necessary. 1979 was the first time that the Israeli High Court of Justice declared a 
settlement illegal, due to the missing military needs. Afterwards state land was used to 
construct new settlements, and for this purpose a lot of land was declared as state land 
by the Israeli government. This led to a number of problems concerning the land 
ownership till today (HPCR 2009:5ff). Around 40 percent of the land, on which 
settlements have been built in the West Bank, is owned privately by Palestinians and 
around 3,400 buildings are constructed in the settlements that are also in private 
property of Palestinians. Just a small number of the settlement land was actually 
purchased by the Jewish Community and more than 50 percent of the settlement land 
has been declared as “state land” (Peace Now 2006:4). ”‘Survey lands’ are areas whose 
ownership has yet to be determined and on which development is not legal, yet 5,7 % of 
settlement territory is ‘survey land’ and 2,5 % of the ‘settlement blocs’ are on ‘survey 
lands’ “ (Peace Now 2006:4). 
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5.2.2. The Separation Barrier 
   
Approximately, the length of the total Separation Barrier by the end of 2011 is 708 km.  
“When completed, some 85%, of the route will run inside the West Bank, rather than 
along the Green Line, isolating some 9.4% of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem” 
(UNOCHA 2012:1). Around 15, 000 Palestinians are estimated to enter Israel daily 
illegally without a working permit (UNOCHA 2012a:1). The construction of the 
Separation Barrier got approved by the Israeli Government of 2002. The aim of the 
construction of the Barrier was to prevent a number of suicide bombings by Palestinians 
in Israel. In 2011 around 62 percent of the Separation Barrier was completed and 
around 80 percent of it is located inside the West Bank and not on the Green Line 
(UNOCHA 2011a:1). Checkpoint and agricultural gates are included in the Separation 
Barrier to allow Palestinian People to cross into Israel or to be able to access their land 
in the Seam Zone.  By the expansion of the settlements in the West Bank, more 
Palestinian towns got isolated as enclaves. The number of checkpoints, "flying 
checkpoints", roadblocks, earth mounts, road gates, etc., limits the movement of the 
Palestinian population. In March 2010, UNOCHA counted a total of 505 obstacles 
within the West Bank. Compared to the last years the number has plummeted though. 
The freedom of movement within the cities has improved in the recent years. Access to 
Jerusalem, however, remains very limited (UNOCHA 2010a:4f).  
 
To appraise the legal situation of the Separation Barrier within the IHL it is necessary to 
distinguish between the route of the Barrier built on the Green Line and the route built 
within the West Bank. First of all it is important to mention that it is absolutely allowed 
to build a Separation Barrier on internationally recognized borders under international 
law. The construction of the Separation Barrier is related to laws which apply to the 
Government of Israel as the occupier. For example, Article 46 of the Hague Laws 
regulates the confiscation of private property or Article 23 of The Hague Regulations 
and Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions is related to the destruction and 
seizure of property. This will be discussed closer at the end of this chapter. Particularly 
important to mention in this context are Articles 55 and 56 of the Fourth Geneva 
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Convention though, since they are related to the access to food and medical care for the 
people living in the oPt (HPCR 2004:4ff). 
  
The Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research exemplified five tests 
which address the concept of military necessity concerning the Separation Barrier and 
IHL in the oPt. Article 52 of the Hague Regulations implies the legal concept of 
military necessity. “The concept of military necessity acknowledges that even under the 
laws of war, winning the war or battle is a legitimate consideration, though it must be 
put alongside other considerations of IHL” (Diakonia 2011). Therefore this concept 
constitutes an exception considering the IHL, but the armed forces still do not have 
complete freedom. The first test asks if the measures violate an absolute prohibition 
contained in IHL. Torture is always forbidden and can`t be justified by military 
necessity. The second test is about the question whether the occupying power will face 
an actual state of necessity. Furthermore, they raise the question if the measures taken 
are a sufficient and effective response to the existing threat. The fourth test raises the 
question if a military advantage gained by the measure outweighs the damage done to 
the population. The last tests deals with the right measures, after reviewing all interests 
by the proper authority. The failure of one of the cumulative tests disables the use of 
military necessity by the government of Israel as a legal justification. The Government 
of Israel argues that the construction of the Separation Barrier is in accordance with the 
customary IHL, because the construction is dictated my military necessity and the 
situation in the oPt since the Intifada is an armed conflict. The government assumes that 
suicide attacks created a state of necessity. This assumption goes back to the opinion of 
the Israeli High Court that the military necessity also includes the security of the state 
itself. For this reason the construction of the Separation Barrier is a legitimate answer to 
the threat of suicide attacks. Moreover, the construction is defined as a multi stage 
project and the government of Israel has given the Palestinian people opportunities to 
address the harm and the right to appeal to the High Court of Israel. They also define 
the Separation Barrier as a temporary security measure and for this reason can´t be seen 
as a permanent change in the status of the oPt and the harm, which is caused is 
proportionate and lawful under the IHL. The definition of an armed conflict led to the 
denial of the applicability of the ICCPR and the ICESCR in the oPt by the Government 
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of Israel. This assumption includes the opinion that international human rights are not 
relevant in the case of an armed conflict, because they only protect in time of peace 
their own citizen (only IHL applies) (HPCR 2004:6ff). 
  
Just a few days before the ICJ published its advisory opinion on the construction of the 
Separation Barrier the Israel High Court of Justice announced its view in Beit Sourik 
Village Council v. Israel. The Court stated that the IDF had to reroute the wall due to 
negative consequences for the Palestinians and invalidated orders for the construction of 
parts of the Separation Barrier. The Court also worked on the question, whether the 
route of the Separation Barrier was accepted under the aspect of military necessity, 
proportionality between the Separation Barrier (means) and the security of Israel (ends). 
The Court decided the proportion between the means and ends was reasonable, but 
certain sections of the Separation Barrier would violate the third part of the test (balance 
between security and harm to the Palestinian population (Watson 2005:19ff). 
  
On the other hand there are a number of arguments against the construction of the 
Separation Barrier, which according to the ICRC and the ICR is illegal. In its advisory 
opinion on the construction of the Separation Barrier in the oPt in 2004, which is 
nonbinding, the ICR states the following: 
 
“The Court has reached the conclusion that the construction of the wall by Israel in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory is contrary to international law […]. Illegal actions and unilateral decisions have 
been taken on al1 sides, whereas, in the Court's view, this tragic situation can be brought to an end only 
through implementation in good faith of al1 relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular 
resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)” (ICJ 2004:200f). 
  
Moreover, a number of international organizations do not see the Intifada more than a 
civil disturbance than as an armed conflict under IHL. The construction of the 
Separation Barrier is not valid by the concept of military necessity, because it fails a 
number of tests, which were mentioned above, as “[…] imposing a disproportionate 
hardship on the Palestinian population” (HPCR 2004:11). Moreover the Separation 
Barrier is not seen as a non-permanent structure. The discussion, whether the situation 
is an armed conflict or not is not important, because the West Bank seen as an occupied 
territory remains under the law of occupation. Therefore the concept of military 
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necessity is only applicable within the law of occupation.  Furthermore the negative 
effects on the daily life of Palestinians are criticized, as well as the protection of the 
Israeli settlements in the West Bank through the construction of the Separation Barrier. 
There is one single argument, which both sides agree on, that the Government of Israel 
has a right to defend itself against suicide bombers by erecting a separation structure on 
the internationally recognized borders of Israel (HPRC 2004:11ff). 
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5.3. Housing, Land and Property in Area C 
  
The different powers, the Ottomans, the British, the Jordanians, and the Israelis, ruling 
the region in the 19
th 
and 20
th 
centuries, influenced the legal and administrative system 
in the West Bank. During the Ottomans just a small part of the land was formally 
registered. The British began with the process of registering the land to special owners 
and the Jordanians continued with this process, within the framework called “land 
settlement” (NRC 2010:23) “Since 1967, Israel has made use of Ottoman legislation 
dating back to the middle of the 19 th century in order to declare land to be ‘State 
Land’. According to that law, all lands are considered ‘State Land’ unless proven 
otherwise“(Peace Now 2006:8).  
 
If for instance a Palestinian wants to formally register a private property, he has to 
cultivate the land at least for ten years. When the not registered land is cultivated and 
paid taxes for, this person will be considered as the owner of the land. It can become 
‘State Land’, or in another sense, property of the Ottoman State, if the land is not 
cultivated for three successive years. The state of Israel stopped the registration process, 
which the other powers before implied, due to the injunction No. 291/1968, announced 
by the military governor in the oPt. The official purpose was to assure the owners of the 
land. Unfortunately a huge area of agricultural land was left unregistered and was 
declared as `State Land` later on. Due to the occupation in 1967, a lot of Palestinians 
changed their principal source of income from farming in the West Bank to work in 
Israel (Peace Now 2006:8f). “This situation paved the way for the ‘Custodian of 
Government Property in the Area of Judea and Samaria`, to declare large parts of the 
uncultivated land as ‘state land’, utilizing the Ottoman law” (Peace Now 2006:8). 
“Jewish land” and “survey land” are other categories of land in the West Bank 
established by the Israeli Government. Survey land is an expression for Palestinian land, 
whose ownership is controversial and the title of the land is demanded by the state of 
Israel. Even the development of this land is not allowed by both sides, has the 
construction of the settlements continued (Peace Now 2006:12). In conclusion the Civil 
Administration of the Israeli Government divides the land of the West Bank into four 
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categories: State land; private Palestinian land, survey land and Jewish land. Privately 
owned Palestinian land is 
  
“[l]and that was registered and recognized as private property before 1986, at a time, when the process 
of land registration was still open and available to Palestinians, or cultivated land which is recognized by 
Israel as private land according to the Ottoman law” (Peace Now 2006: 9). 
 
The Civil Administration is responsible now for all security and civil matter in Area C 
and the Military Commander is in charge of the Civil Administration, concerning land 
registration, land confiscation and allocation, general administration, planning and land 
requisition. The ICA runs nine joint Israeli-Palestinian District Coordination Offices 
(DCOs), of which one is located in Tulkarm. 
  
Land registration is particularly important to the Palestinian people, because it states the 
proof of ownership of the highest order.  According to the Civil Administration this 
state proved ownership land doesn´t have to be cultivated as opposed to the unregistered 
land. The Ottoman kushans is as well accepted as prove of ownership. A lot of people in 
the West Bank do not have kushans, and even if they possess one, it is still difficult to 
ascertain the borders of the privately owned land. At Bel El at the Land Registry Office 
the “first time registration of real estate” takes place, which means a long and elaborate 
process. To register the land you need to prove the legal ownership as well as 
cultivation and possession. A number of documents have to be submitted and the costs 
for all the expenses including the lawyer have to be covered by the applicant. In terms 
of a rejection there is a chance to appeal at the Military Appeals Committee, which can 
take several years. For these reasons this land registration process is not a realistic and 
affordable way for Palestinians to prove their ownership of land. Instead settlers or 
Israeli settlements use this registration process quite frequently, if they purchase land 
from Palestinian owners (NRC 2012:23, Btselem 2010:45f). The Israeli Military 
Government in the West Bank has used a variety of methods to obtain land in the oPt as 
requisition orders, expropriation of “absentees” land, closed zones and declaration of 
state land (NRC 2010:23f). In the following sections I will illustrate some important and 
lively debated issues and possible legal responses for Palestinian people like land 
seizure, building permits, stop work and demolition orders, as well as demolition itself.  
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5.3.1. Land seizure 
  
Land seizure orders are orders, which are supposed to last only a short while. The 
ownership of the land stays with the original owner, but the military holds the control of 
the land for a certain period of time. At the end the control of the lands returns back to 
the original owner or the seizure order has to be renewed (Peace Now 2006:9, NRC 
2010:49).Two Articles, one in the Hague Regulations and one in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention are particular important when it comes to the issue of land seizure. Article 
23(g) of the Hague Regulations states, that it is forbidden “[…] to destroy or seize the 
enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of war” (ICRC 2005a). Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states  
 
“destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively 
to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative 
organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military 
operations” (ICHR 2005b).  
 
The seizure of Palestinian land is justified by the Government of Israel with military 
necessary. The Supreme Court of Israel added that seizures are allowed under IHL for 
the military purposes, as long as compensation is paid for the owner of the land (Watson 
2005:20). 
  
It is important to remember, that a central part for the State to get private land in the 
West Bank is the “seizure for military purposes. A high number of settlements, 
established before 1979, were built on seized land. The Elon More case in 1979 
changed this practice officially (Peace Now 2006:9). “[…] The State was forced to 
cease using ‘seizure for military purposes’ as a means of taking over privately-owned 
Palestinian land for the construction of settlements” (Peace Now 2006:10). 32 percent 
of the land of the settlements after the year 1979 is still private Palestinian land, but 
mainly without seizure orders (Peace Now 2006:20). To install the bypass road system 
after the Oslo Accords, the seizure injunctions for military purposes was used again and 
additionally seizure orders have been issued for secure zones around the settlements and 
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the Separation Barrier. The construction of the settlements still continues on privately 
Palestinian land or on established settlements without any legal basis (Peace Now 
2006:11). 
  
To be able to challenge a seizure order as a Palestinian owner, applicants have to submit 
an objection to the DCO itself or the Legal Advisory Bureau at Bel El, usually within 
seven days by the owner itself, the village council or a affected person. The proof of 
ownership is needs, as well as the taxation deed (when the land is not registered), an 
inheritance deed, a survey map for the location of the land, a copy of the ID and a copy 
of the seizure order (NRC 2010:49f). 
 
  
5.3.2. Building Permits in Area C 
  
Construction and planning in the West Bank was regulated by the Jordanian Planning 
Law No. 76 of 1966, which intended a permit for almost every construction. This law 
was modified by the Israeli military order in 1971. For the Palestinian people, living in 
the West Bank, it is nearly beyond the bounds of possibility to get a building permit in 
Area C. The planned construction is often not consistent with the existing plans in Area 
C, which are Special Partial Outline Plans from the ICA and the Regional Outline Plans 
from the time of the British Mandatory period (UNOCHA 2009d:5ff). 
  
This building permit is thought necessary to be able to build new homes, new water 
supplies, schools or any type of permanent structure on a legal basis (NRC 2010:63). In 
44 percent of the West Bank or approximately 70 percent of Area C building it is not 
allowed for Palestinians, as it is restricted mostly for Israeli settlements or the Israeli 
military and was declared as state land and closed areas for training, nature reserves, 
military basis and a buffer zone around the Separation Barrier. Other restrictions 
aggravate obtaining a building permit in the remaining 30 percent of Area C (around 18 
percent of the West Bank). That means in order to build legally as a Palestinian, it is 
necessary to build on the only one percent of Area C, which is approved by the ICA. 
Most of this available land is already built up area. This leads to the problem, that there 
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is often no other possibility for Palestinians, living in Area C than building their new 
houses illegally and this leads to the risk of a demolition order for their constructions 
(UNOCHA 2009d:1ff). On the other hand the PA also lacks the capacity and the ability 
in building an efficient system of land registration as well as the use of the technology 
of remote sensing and geographic information tools (ARIC 2005:5). The Palestinian 
communities are not involved in the planning and zoning process, which goes back to 
the military order in 1971 (UNOCHA 2009d:11). 
  
At best the application for a building permit should be submitted before the construction 
work of the new permanent building, but it is also possible to obtain a building permit 
after the start of the construction work, or even upon receipt of a stop work order from 
the ICA. In the Tulkarm Governorate the application for the building permit has to be 
submitted to the organization and planning offices under Civil Administration of 
Tulkarm and will be allocated to the Planning and Licensing Subcommittee in the ICA. 
The application fee is about 400 NIS and the applicant needs to submit a number of 
documents like the proof of ownership or taxation deed, inheritance deed, survey map 
for the location, a copy of the ID, a copy of the received order (in case of a stop working 
order), a photograph of the construction and a letter from the village council and an 
acceptance declaration from all heirs is helpful. The reasons for the rejection of a 
building permit are numerous as the construction is situated in a closed military zone or 
in a prohibited area. It can be delivery of false information, continuing construction 
after the receipt of a stop work order or if the construction doesn´t follow the original 
plan etc. If Palestinians decide to build a new permanent construction without obtaining 
a building permit from the Civil Administration, they risk to receive a stop work order 
or demolition order, which will be discussed in the next section (Btselem 2010:48ff, 
NRC 2010:31ff). 
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5.3.3. Stop work and demolition orders in Area C 
  
If a construction is built without permission in Area C, it is possible that people receive 
a stop work order as a first step from the Inspection Subcommittee at Bet El issued by 
an inspector of the Inspection Unit. This stop work order forbids any further 
construction on the building and the owner is supposed to attend a hearing at Bet El. 
The next step after the stop work order is the demolition order, in case the objection to 
the stop work order was not successful or no objection was submitted. The first step, 
when receiving a stop work order, should be to apply for a building permit, usually 
within 14 days (see above). After the rejection of the building permit the applicant 
should appeal against the rejection. In most cases the appeal will be rejected again. For 
this reason the Palestinian applicant has another few options to prevent a demolition of 
the construction. The first possible change is to plea for mercy with included 
humanitarian grounds. Another option is a petition to the Israeli High Court of Justice 
or a plan for a change of the land from agricultural to residential use (NRC 2010:39ff). 
Unfortunately the number of demolitions in East Jerusalem and the West Bank are 
rising, which will be discussed more closely in the next section. 
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5.3.4. Demolition 
  
According to the Israeli military order in 2007 concerning the Buildings Planning Law 
(Amendment No. 19) (Judea and Samaria) (No. 1585), “[…] [b]uilding without a 
permit is also a criminal offence under Israeli military orders, punishable by a fine or 
prison sentence, though this appears not to be enforced currently” (UNOCHA 
2009d:13). In 2011 almost 1,100 Palestinians were displaced due to demolitions and 
622 structures (222 homes, 170 animal shelters, two classrooms, two mosques) and 46 
rainwater cisterns and pools were destroyed. For the demolition of structures this is a 
rise of 80 percent to 2010. Vulnerable farming and herding communities in Area C are 
affected at the most (90 percent) (UNOCHA 2012c:1f). Displacement and demolitions 
have serious humanitarian consequences for the Palestinian families and the high risk 
communities are often the ones, which live under the poverty line. The current situation 
in Area C causes challenges to humanitarian assistance; the area has even been 
identified as a priority in the international humanitarian community. It is challenging to 
set up and run projects like the construction of schools, medical clinics or water 
infrastructure (UNOCHA 2009d:12ff).  The World Bank even claims, that the ICA 
“[…] is seen by donors as a major constraint” and the missing coordination between 
the many donors leads to fragmented presented projects. A fieldworker confirmed the 
difficult situation in an interview with the World Bank: “[i]n Tulkarm, the water 
connection was damaged, the Civil Administration would not give approval to repair it. 
Water had to be trucked in […]” (World Bank 2009:54). 
  
UNOCHA (2009:16ff) is concerned about the impact of the planning practice of the 
ICA in Area C on Palestinian communities, which also influences the Palestinian people 
living in Area A and B, because of the rise of the population and the resulting need for 
construction space. The organization suggests a gradual transfer of the Area C to the 
Palestinians, as it was agreed upon in the Oslo Accords. 
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6. The Palestinian economy in the West Bank 
after the second Intifada 
                      
From a certain Palestinian viewpoint, the dynamics within the Palestinian politics at the 
moment actually assists the arguments and strategies of the Israeli Government. 
Important aspects in the West Bank such as restriction of violence, "good governance" 
and democratization are still not solved. Criticism of the Palestinian Authority comes 
from an increasing part of the population. "Segments of the population resented the 
leadership for having failed to deliver peace, democracy and better standards of living” 
(Tocci 2005:8). The widespread corruption, inefficiency and authoritarianism of the PA 
are always in the crossfire of criticism. Especially in the last weeks a number of public 
transport strikes were held all over the West Bank due to the rising costs of living 
including fuels (see Maannews 2012a) 
 
The second intifada starting in September 2000 had huge negative consequences on the 
economic situation in the oPt, which is closely tied to the Israeli economy, including 
huge economic disparities. In 2005 the GNI per capita in Israel was around eighteen 
times higher than in the West Bank and Gaza (World Bank 2009:4). The slowdown of 
the Israeli economy caused also a slowdown in the oPt. Both sides suffered a drop in the 
tourism sector. The bad economic situation of Israel leads to redundancies of Palestinian 
workers employed in Israeli industry, agriculture and services. One of the main reasons 
for the economic decline in the oPt has been the Israeli policy of closures and curfews. 
The movement of vehicles and also people were strictly limited by a lot of closures at 
checkpoints and roadblocks. This also affected the movement of goods between Israel 
and the Occupied Territories (UNEP 2003:17f). 
 
The labor market in the West Bank is functioning under occupation. There is controlled 
boarder passage to the neighboring country of Jordan and a long boarder to Israel, 
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where the mobility of goods and persons is comparatively not difficult. East Jerusalem 
has a full access to the Israeli labor market and is therefore almost part of the Israeli 
economy. In general, the Palestinian labor market is also closely tied to Israel. A high 
unemployment rate in the West Bank is therefore negatively associated with the 
employment rate in Israel (Shabaneh 2006:5). The international division of labor also 
plays a role in Israel/West Bank. A huge number of Palestinian workers got replaced 
with other nationalities during the second Intifada. A lot of cheap foreign workers, 
mainly from Asia are employed in the construction and agriculture sector in Israel.  On 
the other hand a lot of Israelis are not satisfied with their job situation and their salary in 
comparison with their living situation and spending for daily needs.  
 
During the years of 2001-2004 the unemployment rate was very high in the oPt, with an 
average of 31, 2 percent in 2002. Another problem is the huge wage gap between jobs in 
Israel and domestic jobs in the West Bank. The taxation system is not well- functioning 
and the market in general is less developed. „The Palestinian labour market is 
considerably less developed and less organized, formal and informal sectors are not 
well defined“ (Shabaneh 2006:5).  
 
 
Table 1: ILO (2012): Laborsta International Labour Database: Unemployment Rate Israel/oPT 
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6.1. Fayyad’s two- year program: 
"Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing a State," 
  
In response to internal and external pressure a process of reforms was set in motion in 
2002, which had the goal of "good governance" and strengthening democracy. Even the 
death of Arafat created space to transform the Palestinian policy. At the beginning of 
Abbas’ presidential term, the success was felt significantly at diverse fronts (Tocci 
2005:8ff). The political transformation had a huge impact on the economic situation in 
the oPt. Since the election victory of Hamas in 2006, they have become an important 
political force, especially in Gaza. The struggle for Gaza in June 2007 ended the 
coalition government between Fatah and Hamas and a bisection of Palestinian 
territories followed. "The majority of the Palestinians have been deeply distressed by 
the division, and they hold out hope that Palestinian nationalism will, in the end, reunite 
both territories under one flag“(Schanzer 2008:153). In June 2007, Abbas appointed 
Salam Fayyad as the new prime minister, and replaced Ismail Haniyya. Despite the lack 
of democratic legitimacy through an election process, you can certainly speak of a sort 
of "Fayyadism" in the West Bank. 
  
 
The two-year program "Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing a State," was 
declared in August 2009 under his government, which includes the following national 
objectives: Ending the occupation; Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state; 
protection of refugees and their rights; ensuring the release of prisoners; ensuring 
human development; economic independence and national prosperity; promoting 
national unity; equality and social justice for all citizens; foundations of good 
governance; protection and safety and building positive regional and international 
relations "(Palestinian National Authority:2009). The two-year program therefore 
focuses on the possibilities of building a state taking into consideration the occupation. 
For example, the planning of an airport in Area C refers to the Declaration of 
Independence 1988. Fayyad argued that the Oslo Accords have no clear line with regard 
to the political rights and the specific rules of statehood (Journal of Palestine Studies, 
2009: 59). This point is clearly contradicted by the Israeli side because any unilateral 
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declaration of a Palestinian state, "[...] would contravene the principle of a negotiated 
solution between Israel and its Arab neighbors, as enshrined in the UN Security 
Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 [...]”  (MESI 2009). The efforts in Area 
C in particular, e.g. planning an airport in the Jordan Valley under Israeli civil and 
security administration legitimate Fayyad, as a reason of the not clearly defined 
guidelines in the Oslo Accords and the Israeli violations of international law (Journal of 
Palestine Studies 200:68 f). To this line of argument must be added that "[...] a 
unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood would also free Israel from the 
restrictions and obligations it accepted under the Oslo agreements, with all that implies, 
and would further complicate the Middle East peace process "(MESI 2009).  Moreover 
the Israeli argument of the "defensible borders" plays an important role in the structure 
building in Area C, as the Jordan Valley takes a large part of it (see UNOCHA 2011a). 
The planned economic progress will be influenced very strongly by the Israeli 
occupation. Building structures, especially in Area A and B, is a risk, because the 
effective management can only be enforced in these zones. Dr. Mohammad Mustafa, 
CEO of the PIF is of the opinion that the reason for the restraint positive economic 
development is the Israeli occupation in the West Bank. However, the economic growth 
in the West Bank may also arise from foreign donors, as mentioned above. Mustafa 
mainly sees the structure of the education sector as an important future market and 
argues for an independent construction of the tourism sector. He is also clearly against 
import substitution, because first the structure of domestic markets has to be built up 
(Journal of Palestine Studies 2010:42 ff). Although Mustafa basically argues for 
Fayyad's two-year plan. "What we need, in addition to the government’s plan to build 
institutions and to modernize and rationalize expenditures, is a program to launch the 
process of sustainable growth as speedily as possible” (Journal of Palestine Studies 
2010:47). In his opinion institution building alone is not enough, but must be 
supplemented with a process of sustainable growth. Therefore Mustafa and Fayyad are 
clearly against Netanyahu’s Economic plan and his proposal of "economic peace" 
(Ahren 2008). An agreement within the policy framework is needed. This should turn 
into a sovereign Palestinian state and lead to a complete control of checkpoints, borders 
and economy. This line of argument is traceable in the view of the numerous 
checkpoints, agriculture gates, flying checkpoints and settlements. A combination of 
82 
 
Fayyad's plan of institution building, simultaneous focus on economic development and 
combating corruption seems to make sense. Seen from a Palestinian perspective, as 
Khalidi states: 
 
"Moreover, the past decades of Israeli-Palestinian economic relations have shown that no Palestinian 
economic development strategy can be effective as long as the Israeli occupation policy of asymmetric 
containment is not dismantled through ending occupation and achieving sovereignty and national rights 
"(Khalidi, Samour 2011:17). 
 
The World Bank report that was published in April 2011, certainly speaks of a positive 
development over the past two years in the West Bank. In the opinion of the World 
Bank the economic growth in the West Bank is also accredited by the international 
donors. There was also a determination of the reduction in the unemployment rate 
(World Bank 2011:7 ff). International organizations repeatedly addressed the potential 
of the private sector: "Sustainable growth will require the unleashing of the private 
sector's potential, including its ability to trade" (World Bank 2011:7). In recent years, 
improvements in the West Bank, however, have been clearly visible. A construction 
boom in urban areas was developed, car shows were performed, international hotels and 
trendy restaurants were built. These are all signs of a vibrant economy (Khalidi, Samour 
2011:8 ff).  
 
"The statehood plan, as well as the 2008 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) 
incorporates it, faithfully reflect the economic policy agenda set forth in the so-called ‘post-Washington 
Consensus’ (PWC) orthodoxy advanced by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), the World Bank Group 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), since the 1990s“(Khalidi, Samour 2011:9).  
 
Despite all, these efforts inside the West Bank couldn`t obtain to reach a sovereign state 
within the 1967 borders. Therefore Fayyad’s estimation with respect to the two-year 
plan and its time compliance was not adhered to, despite enormous improvements in the 
West Bank. His words in 2009 appear empty in relation to the current situation: “If a 
plan is not tied to a timetable, it will simply be wishful thinking” (Journal of Palestine 
Studies 2009:60).  
  
From a whole different perspective and according to Barry Rubin (2012d:30ff), director 
of the GLORIA Center, is the peace process also dead. There is no window of 
opportunity at the moment and in the foreseeable future for any successful peace 
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negotiations. He blames the economic situation in the West Bank mainly on the 
performance of the PA, as they used the received aid money as a “[…] political pay-off 
to buy patronage” (Rubin 2012a:2). In his point of view Israeli actions against 
Palestinian economy like roadblocks or checkpoints are a direct response to violent 
confrontation and terrorism. The PA is not able to provide jobs for a big part of the 
population and to build good institutions. According to Rubin Fayyad is totally 
powerless in political terms. “From a cynical Western leadership standpoint it can be 
said that at least the funding keeps things relatively quiet in the face of lots of other 
troublesome issues in the region” (Rubin 2012a:2).  Rubin’s reaction to Romney’s 
statement concerning the gap between Israeli and Palestinian economic success, was 
quite different from other negative media reactions. Romney, who visited Jerusalem for 
the US presidential election campaign in July, stated "As I come here and I look out over 
this city and consider the accomplishments of the people of this nation, I recognize the 
power of at least culture and a few other things".  
Moreover, Romney added, "As you come here and you see the [gross domestic product] per capita, 
for instance, in Israel, which is about $21,000, and compare that with the GDP per capita just across the 
areas managed by the Palestinian Authority, which is more like $10,000 per capita, you notice such a 
dramatically stark difference in economic vitality" (Sherwood 2012). 
 
The numbers given by Romney are not valid according to the World Bank, because 
Israel's per-capita GDP was about $31,000 in 2011, while the West Bank’s and Gaza's 
was around $1,500 (following Sherwood 2012). Romney was criticized of being racist 
and not including the occupation of the oPt in his statement. In response to the criticism 
of Romney Ruben (2012b:4) stated, thereby basically blaming the PA: “The main 
problem is not Israel, or capitalism, or a racial group meanly oppressing someone else, 
but on bad and undemocratic governance along with demagogic leaders encouraging 
their followers to adopt behavior not conducive with progress and prosperity”. Rubin 
(2012c:2ff) sees the problem within the Palestinian economy in the leadership`s refusal 
to make peace with Israel, the unequal status of women within the oPT, corruption and 
incompetence of the PA. He claims that the Palestinian economy is advancing under 
occupation, especially when compared to other non-oil rich countries in the region.  
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The concept of trust and feeling safe, usually in terms of terrorism attacks and the 
influence on income was found in a few interviews on the Palestinian site. They argued 
that the absence of trust or feeling safe concerning the future leads to a different 
behavior in money spending.  
“In my point of view before the second Intifada is the same after the 2. Intifada […]. It becomes a little 
bit better the economic situation, but still people believe it is temporary.  […] anytime it can be closed, 
anytime everything can be stopped, personally for individuals or for the whole city, for the whole 
community, the same in the villages, […]they can work now, because they should collect money, they are 
in hurry, to feel in hurry, because nothing in the future is guaranteed. That is the situation, nothing 
guaranteed in the future” (Interview 5). 
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6.2. The economic situation and infrastructure 
in the Governorate of Tulkarm 
  
The number of registered live births in 2011 in Tulkarm Governorate conducted a total 
of 4,221 births (still birth 7) and the number of registered deaths was a total of 561, with 
approximately around 168,973 inhabitants in total (PHIC 2011:30ff).  Three hospitals 
(163 hospital beds in total) are located in the Governorate of Tulkarm, 144 schools, 50 
kindergartens. The unemployment rate in 2010 was approximately 13,7 percent with a 
participation rate of labor force (aged 15 years and above) of 43,2 percent. According to 
the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2011:62) 10,9 percent of the population in 
Tulkarm was considered as poor in 2010. The number of licensed vehicles was 11, 257 
in 2009. The values of import are rising in the Governorate compared to recent years 
and reached around 152, 6 million US$ in 2009 (Export fall compared to recent years, 
8, 4 million US$ in 2009). In 2009 there was a deficit in the trade balance of 144.2 
million US$ (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2009:98).  
  
Generally speaking the economy in Tulkarm lies on two shoulders, the industry and 
agriculture (Interview 1). As Abdul Karim Dalba points out:  
 
“[…]it depends usually on agriculture and workers… and ah it is not an industrial zone for people .the 
main problem is the unemployment and […]the expenses of planting let’s say, which is not enough for 
people to living and also this is the main economic situation, and also because it is cut near by the green 
line and near by the sea, so it is supposed to be like an  rab tourist city or at least passing treading 
through to the world but it becomes like far away or cut from the sea from the air... the transportation to 
Israel and also cut from the economic from the south or in the capital. So the main problems of Tulkarm 
people is unemployment, and there is no things, you can see it, there are no hotels in Tulkarm, there is no 
big restaurants, any things that people can love it, even. People who lives in Tulkarm maybe they are 
obliged to live here now, but the main problem is people like to immigrate, even inside Palestine or to 
other countries. That’s what the situation becomes here in Tulkarm. And the villages around is the same, 
[…] agriculture,  the wall issues, the chemical factory, […]the west side is the main source for 
agriculture and for being free, for feeling free, and they seem it was not enough reason. So the depend 
more on other cites, in Nablus, in Hebron in other places for their goods to come here. So there is no big 
business in Tulkarm, there are just branches for big businesses” (Interview 5). 
 
Stone-cutting facilities, building material factories, two olive mills, garages, one 
slaughterhouse, and five gas stations are the main industrial income. Complementary 
are tile and ready-made cement factories, food processing facilities, several chemical 
workshops and a petrochemical plant owned by Israel. The area of lands is around 246 
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square kilometers with a number of agricultural holdings of 8,147 (during the 
agricultural year of 2009/2010). The fertile soil and the practical climate contribute to 
the rain-fed farming and irrigated agriculture. Cauliflower, corn and Bush Okra are 
cultivated on privately-owned land and there are a number of small-scale farms with 
goats, sheep and chickens (HWE 2008:13, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
2009:98). Tulkarm has 2 semi-professional soccer teams; Thaqafi Tulkarm and 
MarkezShabab Tulkarm, which play a role in the free time activities of the people. The 
theme park “Megaland”, located in Tulkarm, is the biggest one in the West Bank. A lot 
of people from all over the West Bank are coming to Tulkarm to go to the swimming 
pools or the Megaland. The town of Tulkarm doesn´t benefit from these attractions, 
though. 
 
“[…] It doesn´t affect Tulkarm city. I see it, that people who come to the Megaland or the swimming 
pools, they just come for this place and leave. They don´t show up in the city […]”. “The city is not an 
attractive city.[…] Before 2002 most of the people come to Tulkarm […], especially the 48ers […], it was 
easy. […] But now it is difficult, people are not willing to go. […] Even when they allowed Palestinians 
from 48 to come to Tulkarm, through Eynab […]. People from Tayba, after the opened Nablus, they 
preferred to go to Nablus, not to Tulkarm.[…] They were not coming passing Tulkarm. […] Now it is a 
little bit better […] but all the traders have also branches in other cities, because they feel unsecure in 
Tulkarm.[…] People just like to leave. No real big public projects happened in the Municipality […]. The 
development of Tulkarm is very slowly.[…]There is no plan for a new hospital, or a new building for al 
Quds Open University, even there was a plan in 1995.[…] Everything is going very slowly, the business 
and the government, […] They can´t guarantee Tulkarm as a city the development, because of the wall. 
People loose even the trust in peace, and it will be over. Even the future of this terminal, it would be the 
main entrance for the West Bank, nothing is guaranteed” (Interview 5). 
 
 
According to the interviewees the corruption of the PA, the fact that there are  no 
upcoming elections in Tulkarm, and the smuggling of Israeli goods, support the process 
that the planned projects for the town are actually not getting implemented (Interview 
4,5,2). Unemployment is named as the most difficult factor for the development of 
Tulkarm by almost all of my interviewees.  
 
“[…] Tulkarm Area is very close to Israel; and since 1967[…], most of Palestinians used to go to Israel. I 
think the Israeli Authority encouraged the Palestinian in that time to go to Israel […] to make their 
economical life better and that of Israel. After establishing the wall, they cut of all the roads, which led to 
Israel and there is no way for any Palestinian to go to Israel. After 2005 the Israeli Authority allowed the 
Palestinian worker to start working. Now around 4,000-4,500 persons are allowed to go to Israel. I think, 
in the past, before the wall, there is around 20,000 Palestinian working inside Israel, male and females 
[…] from Tulkarm area. I think this is the major problem, the employment. There are no changes for all 
workers to […] find work. […]This is reflection the social and the economical life. […] And now you find 
a lot of people, who are just sitting in the café, smoking […] (Interview 4). 
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According to some interviewees the economic situation has also changed the social life 
in Tulkarm or the situation of women within the families: 
 “[…] The women situation changed. Sometimes I feel the changing make also a conflict in the same 
family. […] The people here, are not used, to this changing, or let´s say the husband or the men. They 
don´t accept, that the women have power. But this is reality, because also the women get their power, not 
just of those women organization, but of the economic situation. […] The women can work anything, let´s 
say, the minimum they can clean houses. They gain money. […] For instance today, a woman, came to 
our office, and cleaned the office. So I asked her, what is your husband doing? She said, he is sitting at 
home. I said: Why? Is he sick? She said: No! He wants to work in Israel and he can`t. He stopped 
working and searching for work and is staying at home. And I am working. So who will control the 
house? So it is not like before, that women will always say yes, yes and the men control everything. This is 
the economic power. So for me, the Palestinian women have the change to have a work, even the educated 
or the uneducated women. They have a power now, it is better than before. I mean there is no equality, but 
it is better than before […] (Interview 6). 
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7. Architecture, Infrastructure and Water Resources 
in the West Bank 
 
Many escalating environmental threats like „ […] problems of scarcity of water 
resources and land, rapid population growth, long-lasting refugee situation, climate 
change, desertification and land degradation“[...] exist in the oPt (UNEP 2003:6). 
These problems are linked with several reasons. Seen from an Palestinian perspective 
the specific architecture of Israeli settlements as well as the general water situation in 
the region contribute to a certain extent to some issues. In this section I give an 
overview over the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and the Palestinian population 
centers in the West Bank with the focus on Tulkarm Governorate, the town of Tulkarm 
and the villages around. The water and environmental situation in the West Bank and in 
Tulkarm will be illustrated as well as the influence of the Israeli industrial zone in the 
region of Tulkarm.  
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7.1. Israeli Settlements 
71 of the 150 Israeli settlements and over 85% of the total population of settlers live on 
the ‘Israeli’ side of the Separation Barrier (UNOCHA 2012b:1). Most settlements are 
connected to each other and to Israel. Along three strips, Eastern Strip; Mountain Strip 
and Western Hill Strip; the Israeli settlements were established with a very elaborate 
network of roads. “This network cuts across the areas that were handed over to 
Palestinian control, creating territorial islands of Areas A, which are under full 
Palestinian control, and Areas B, whose civil affairs are under Palestinian control” 
(Btselem 2010:12). 
At large settlements can be defined by their boundaries, functions and factors, which 
determine the land of the settlements and include the possibilities of Palestinians to 
reach their parts of the land: “[...] build up areas; open areas that have been developed; areas 
fenced in by a partial or complete perimeter fence, perimeter lighting; ring roads that were built around 
the settlements“(Peace Now 2006:13). In this connection architecture and its influence and 
impact on the landscape of the Israeli Settlements is particularly interesting and should 
not be omitted when we talk about the influence of settlements on the peace process or 
the daily life of the Palestinians in the West Bank. Rotbard points out in the preface to 
„A Civilian Occupation“, that „the work of Israeli architects is at the very core of the political 
issues: There is nothing innocent about regarding architecture as an autonomous process. Since the 
shaping of the physical reality takes place on different scales, such as the political, the urban and the 
architectural, architecture is no less ´political´ than ´urban´“(Rafi, Weizman 2003:15). He raises the 
question of the role of politics within architecture and the role of architecture within 
politics (Rafi, Weizman 2003:16). 
From the perspective of Weizmann settlement expansions are problematic due to 
various reasons. First of all they harm the Arab- Jewish relationship, because they block 
or influence a future territorial exchange in a peace agreement. Furthermore, it deepens 
the discrimination against the Bedouins in the south. They often got expelled from their 
land to move into planned towns. The main argument used in this debate was that the 
provision for modern service cannot be provided in too small settlement units. The state 
of Israel actually provides now modern service in new Jewish settlements which are far 
smaller than the Bedouin villages (Weizmann 2003:33f). “Clearly, their alienation from 
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the state will deepen, damaging Arab-Jewish relations even further” (Weizmann 
2003:34). The overall security of Israel stands at risk, because the new settlements are a 
heavy security burden. Deepening social disparities are another problematic aspect in 
the expanding settlement plans. The so-called “settlement mentality” is named as a 
factor to contributing to the national goals. In reality the new settlements often become 
a place for poverty, alienation and unemployment in the periphery of Israel and are 
contributing to the increase of the social gap between center and periphery or in other 
words between more affluent(usually Ashkenazi) and deprived groups(usually Mizrahi). 
The huge amount of public waste such as water, roads, electricity, housing etc. which is 
also caused by the construction of new settlements, demand excessive investment 
(Weizmann 2003:34ff). Since 1976 150 settlements have been established in the West 
Bank (including East Jerusalem) as well as approximately 100 outposts, which are 
erected by settlers with the official authorization of the Government of Israel. 
UNOCHA (2012c:1, Zertal et al. 2007) estimates a settler population of around 500,000 
and “[…] its rate of growth during the past decade stood at a yearly average of 5.3% 
(excluding East Jerusalem), compared to 1.8% by the Israeli population as-a-whole”. 
The total area controlled by Israeli settlements was 42, 8 percent of the West Bank in 
2010, which is around 2,399,824 dunums (Btselem 2010:11).  
Avnei Hefetz, the settlement, which is the closest to Tulkarm and borders the village of 
Shufa. The settlement and the Palestinian village of Shufa, with special focus on the 
roadblock between the main street into these two villages and to the town of Tulkarm 
will be discussed closer in section eight.  
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7.2. Palestinian population centers 
Palestinian population centers such as Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron, Bethlehem or 
Tulkarm are located in Area A and are therefore as mentioned before under civil and 
security administration of the PA. The fast growing Palestinian population lives mostly 
in urban areas. These population centers are divided into separate areas and therefore 
not connected with each other. This obstacle was quite significant during the second 
intifada, because the transportation and connection between these centers was limited. 
Access to basic services like education, health or even water supply was difficult. The 
situation has improved in the last few years, and obstacles like roadblocks and 
checkpoints have been removed, but the period between the years 2010 and 2011 
showed no evidential improvements in terms of movement restrictions. The period 
between July 2010 and June 2011 was characterized by the absence of significant 
changes in the system of movement restrictions implemented by the Israeli authorities 
within the West Bank territory to address security concerns. 522 obstacles, e.g. 
checkpoints and roadblocks etc. were documented by UNOCHA, with an increase of 
four percent in 2010.  
“[N]ine of the ten governorates main cities have one or more of their historical entrances currently 
blocked, resulting in traffic congestion and frequent delays through those entrances that are open. Access 
to the main traffic arteries leading from the villages to the cities also continues to be limited to select 
junctions” (UNOCHA 2011f).  
As a result traffic between urban areas and the villages around has to be rerouted to 
lower-quality roads. The Israeli settlements play an important role in terms of this 
restriction of movement, due to the protection of settlements or expansion of 
settlements as well as the improvement of the connection between the settlements and 
Israel. Main Palestinian traffic on the roads 60, 90, 443 etc. has been limited due to the 
administrative restrictions,“[…]transforming these roads into rapid ‘corridors’ used by 
Israeli citizens to commute between the settlements and Israel, and, in some cases, 
between various areas within Israel via the West Bank”(UNOCHA 2011f). 
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7.3. Tulkarm Governorate 
In the 3
rd
 millennium BC Tulkarm is supposed to have been settled by the Canaanites 
(Semplici 2009:3, Tulkarm Municipality 2011). In the 13
th
 century a village called 
Tulkarm was founded as a waqf (religious trust) by the Mamluksto support al-
Jawhariyya Madrasa which was administrated by elite families of Tulkarm. 
“This created a situation where administrative and taxation powers were held by local elites over a long 
span of time, unlike the normal case in the Ottoman Empire where these functions were held by outsiders 
for relatively short periods of time” (Al-Salim 2011:65). 
Even the great majority of the population was Sunni Muslim during the Ottoman 
periods, the village of Tulkarm was under control of the Zaydan family during the late 
Mamluk and early Ottoman periods, which was of Kurdish origin. Later on Tulkarm 
was registered as part of the property of the Ottoman Sultan in 1596 by the Defterler-
iMufassal of Sham Sharief Vilayet. During this time around 968 people lived in 
Tulkarm in around 176 families. That made it the village with the largest population in 
this district. Tulkarm was attacked a number of times during the following centuries by 
nomadic raiders and later on by the French (1799) and Egyptians. Farid al- Salim 
(2011:78) describes Tulkarm as a waqf village in his historical socio-economic features 
as a 
“[…] prosperous and self-governing village, with dense agricultural settlement and a level of 
agricultural productivity strikingly greater than elsewhere during the period of decline, which had 
frequently been extended to include to the whole of Ottoman Palestine and the Middle East”.  
During the reforms in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century Tulkarm was also 
subjected to central rule. The consequences were that the important local leaders lost 
their hold. In 1886 the municipality of Tulkarm was established (Al-Salim 2011:65ff). 
A major rail junction from Egypt and southern Palestine to Haifa and Akka in the 
northwest, Jerusalem, Nablus and Ramallah to the south, Lebanon to the north, and 
Syria and Jordan to the east was established and was running till 1948. Tulkarm was an 
important center of traffic and traveling during this time. During the First World War 
the municipality of Tulkarm was used as a military base by the Turkish army and was 
captured by the British in 1918. Later on during the Arab-Israeli War in 1948 it was 
under control of Iraq and became a part of Jordan. In 1995 it came under the control of 
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the PA during the Oslo process (Semplici al. 2009:3). After the second Intifada in 2005 
Tulkarm was given into PA hands and ended the Israeli military administration. 
Today Tulkarm lies in the western part in the north of the West Bank and it borders the 
Governorates of Jenin, Nablus and Qalqīliya and the state of Israel on the western side. 
Therefore it is just around 15 kilometers east of Netanya, Israel and around 15 
kilometers west of Nablus. Around 14,000 dunums are urban developed area today 
(Semplici 2009:3). The commercial importance of the Governorate is mainly due to the 
surrounding farmlands as well as its central location between the Nablus Mountains and 
plains (HWE 2008:12). The farmers mainly produce   olives, melons, citrus fruits, 
potatoes, wheat, sesame, olive oil, tomatoes, peanuts, eggplant, chili pepper, green 
beans etc... Tulkarm Governorate is one of sixteen Governorates in the West Bank. 
Generally these Governorates are sub-divided into 89 municipalities in the West Bank 
(UNEP 2003:17). The Tulkarm Governorate has an estimated population of 168, 973 
and around 33, 6 percent of it are refugees (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
2011:98). Around 41 percent are living in rural areas of Tulkarm. 33 villages are located 
in the Tulkarm Governorate. The villages around Tulkarm are mostly located in area B, 
e.g. Deir Al Ghusun and ‘Attil, though a few villages are located in area A, e.g. 
‘Anabta. The mountain area around the town of Tulkarm, parts of Far’un village are 
located in Area C (Tulkarm Municipality 2011, UNOCHA 2009b:36). 
The Separation Barrier in the Governorate of Tulkarm is around 40 kilometers long and 
78 % of the Barrier is constructed within the West Bank. The land is fertile, and farming 
takes a fundamental part of the economic and social life of the area (UNOCHA 
2009b:36). A huge part of the agricultural land is situated in the Seam Zone, which can 
only be accessed through permissions since 2003.The access to the Seam Zone is 
regulated through an “Agriculture Gate”. The permit is issued for a special gate, person 
and duration of time (UNOCHA 2009b:4f). There are also one village Jubara and 
several individual houses in the Seam Zone. Movement restrictions and the Separation 
Barrier influenced the economy of the Tulkarm area. Exports from the West Bank were 
restricted, many consumers could no longer reach Tulkarm, and therefore poverty began 
to grow. An important source of income for the people in Tulkarm is PA salaries, apart 
from agriculture and commerce. When the international community withheld funds 
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from the Hamas-led government in March 2006, the situation became very difficult for 
people dependent on government salaries. Furthermore the Geshuri factory and other 
pollutants have a negative impact on environment and health. A lot of difficulties in 
Tulkarm Governorate, such as the collapse of the economy due to the construction of 
the Separation Barrier, high dependence on PA salaries, high unemployment rate, 
expansion of settlements, army incursions, permit problems to access agricultural land 
etc., can also be seen in a lot of other places in the West Bank.  
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7.3.1. The Town of Tulkarm 
 
Figure 1: Town of Tulkarm
10
 
 
The City of Tulkarm has about 80,900 inhabitants including the people living in the two 
refugee camps with 85,332 males and 83,641 females and is situated in Area 
A(Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2011). The majority of the inhabitants are 
Muslims, just two families still belong to Christianity due to emigration into other cities 
in the oPt or to foreign countries (Interview 12). Tulkarm has two universities, al 
Khodori and Al-Quds Open University, as well as too campuses of the An-Najah 
National University, which is mainly located in Nablus. Furthermore there are four high 
schools located in the town, Al'adawiyya and Jamal Abd-Al-Naser (for girls) 
andAlfadeleyya and Ihsan Samarah (for boys). 11, 1% of the polled people in the 
questionnaire just completed primary school. 40, 5 % of the people completed 
secondary school. Even 44, 5 % were able to attend university
11
. The biggest hospital in 
town is Thabit Thabit Hospital, which most of the people, who filled out the 
questionnaire, are going to. 
Tulkarm camp and Nur Shams camp are the two refugee camps in Tulkarm under PA 
control. Tulkarm camp, which is the second largest refugee camp in the West Bank with 
                                                                
10 Wikimapia (2012): Town of Tulkarm http://wikimapia.org/#lat=32.3073457&lon=35.0638908&z=14&l=0&m=s 
[20.08.2012] 
11 3,9 % = no answer 
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approximately 18.0000 refugees on 0.18 square kilometers, was established in 1950. 
The refugees were mainly from villages or cities in the region of Haifa, Jaffa or 
Kissaria. Today the camp is connected to public water as well as electricity but lacks 
sewage infrastructure. Five schools are located in the camp, but still more than a third of 
the refugees in the camp are unemployed. UNRWA runs a health center and a women´s 
programme center.  
  
Figure 2, Figure 3: Tulkarm Refugee Camp
12
 
 
Nur Shams refugee camp has around 9.000 inhabitants (around 1760 families) and was 
established in 1952 on 0.23 square kilometers and is located around 3 kilometers east of 
the town of Tulkarm. Most parts of the main street from the town of Tulkarm to the Nur 
Shams camp lie in Area C. The people, living in the camp, are originally mainly from 
villages around Haifa. Before the establishment of the camp in Tulkarm, they lived in 
tents near Janzour (Jenin valley) until a devastating snowstorm. They also have a 
connection to public water and electricity. It has been under PA control since 1998 after 
the Wye River Memorandum. Two schools are located in the camp, as well as a health 
center, rehabilitation center and a women`s programme center etc. Around 220 people 
from the camp are working in the public sector. The unemployment is also high due to 
the lack of connection to the Israeli labor market (see UNRWA 2012, Zeitan 2007). 
 
                                                                
12 Zangl (2011):Tulkarm Refugee Camp. September 2011 
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Figure 4: IDF “flying CP” in town of Tulkarm 13 
 
7.4. Water situation in the West Bank 
Around 20 ground water basins, based on hydrogeological factors, are available in the 
whole Middle East. The most important aquifers are the Mountain Aquifer (western and 
eastern), Coastal Aquifer, and the Azraq Aquifer (Watercare 2004:25). In Quaternary 
sand and gravel in the Coastal Plain are the most productive Aquifer (Exact 1998:10).  
The Mountain Aquifer is the main source for drinking water in the West Bank (HWE 
2008:4). More than 50 % of the total water consumption in the Middle East comes from 
ground water from springs and wells. The largest water user is agriculture, followed by 
municipal and industrial use (Exact 1998:3).  
Israel established Mekorot, a national water carrier, before 1967, which transported 
water from the already existing sources to the agricultural, municipal and industrial 
customers. The situation changed after the war, a water supply network for settlements 
linked with the Mekorot network has been established and wells developed. Two 
aquifers lie under the oPt, which are the Mountain Aquifer and the Costal Aquifer.  
Israel took the main control of the water resources in the West Bank and Palestinian 
water rights were annulated. Today Israel’s fresh water per capita availability is about 
                                                                
13 Zangl (2011): IDF “flying CP” in town of Tulkarm. July 2011 
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for times as high as in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel was able to establish an efficient 
water infrastructure by contrast with the oPt (World Bank 2009:4). Today there are 
different water resources available for the Palestinians in the West Bank. Groundwater, 
springs and harvest rainwater are the main sources. The River Jordan, which cannot be 
used for the people in the West Bank, is a water resource used by Jordan and Israel 
(UNEP 2003:14f). The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, Appendix 1, Article 40, Principle 1 states the following: “Israel recognizes 
the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. These will be negotiated in the 
permanent status negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating 
to the various water sources” (UNEP 2003: 14). The calculated domestic consumption 
rate for Palestinians was rated 28.6 mcm/year and for the PA around 70-80 mcm/year of 
water in the interim period. Nowadays this leads to difficulties, because these rates were 
identified in 1995 and were not adapted to today’s needs. During the Oslo Accords the 
Palestinians requested 450 mcm/year of water, but the issue was not resolved as it was 
one of the five major issues in the Final Status negotiations (HWE 2008:31ff). The 
population growth and the limited water resources prove that water or its economic 
utilization can be seen as a very important key policy. “The projected demand […] 
would result in Municipal and Industrial demand almost quadrupling from 133 million 
Mcm/cr today [2000] to 472 Mcm/yr in the same period” (Palestinian National Water 
Plan 2000:4 quoted in UNEP 2003:181).  The situation in Area C is even more severe, 
because planning restrictions and required permits for all water constructions 
complicate the sustainable development of a Palestinian water sector: 
“Using the powers of the 1967 Military Order […], Israel monitors and intervenes to control all water 
related activities in Area C. There has also been use of military control in Area C to enforce Israeli 
authority over water resource. […] Even rainwater harvesting cisterns have been destroyed by the IDF” 
(World Bank 2009:54).   
Regardless of this fact, the PWA was not able to arrange an integrated water 
management system within the governance framework. The PA institutional weakness 
is contributing to the severe situation as well as the JWC, which is actually not working 
as a joint water resource governance institution. Combined with the power of the ICA 
and the physical M&A restrictions, “[…] the shortfalls in aid effectiveness have 
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reduced the development of water resources and services for Palestinian people below 
levels expected at the time of Oslo” (World Bank 2009:14).  
Nowadays Palestinian people have access to the Mountain Aquifer of approximately 
one fifth of the whole and the water withdrawals per capita have even decreased in the 
last ten years (World Bank 2009:5). Water level declines and changes in flow direction 
in the aquifer occurred due to heavy pumping in some areas of the region. In a few 
cases this led to a contamination of the aquifer, because saline water was induced from 
the sea into the aquifer. Moreover, the quality of the ground water gets affected by the 
industrial, municipal and agricultural sectors, especially in the recharge zone (Exact 
1998:13). The Wash Cluster stated in their monthly situation report in June 2012 that 
the overall water scarcity in the West Bank is “better” than in 2011, but further 
assessment is needed to focus on the remote, unconnected villages (EWASH 2012:4). 
The Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources Middle–East Peace Process 
propounded several imaginary ideas to solve the water problem in the region. They state 
that “[…] the imaginary ideas of today form the basis for tomorrow`s technological 
development” (Watercare 2004:114). One idea is the “Peace pipe”, where water gets 
imported from Turkey by means of a pipeline through all countries in the region. 
Another imaginary idea is to use giant tankers or huge plastic containers with water 
from Turkey or icebergs from Antarctica. With the help of desalination plants the 
seawater could be turned into fresh water. A Seas canal could use the hydroelectric 
energy that is produced for desalinization (Watercare 2004:114). 
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7.4.1. Water situation in the Tulkarm Governorate 
Tulkarm is in the recharge area on the northwestern strip of the Mountain Aquifer and is 
affected by heavy pollution from its municipality, other Palestinian regions, Israeli 
settlements as well as the Israeli Industrial Zone. The two main water resources are 
ground water and surface water, since springs do not exist in the municipality of 
Tulkarm (26 wells). A number of wadis, e.g. Wadi Abu Nar, Wadi Ammar, Wadi 
Hawwatut, Wadi AlSham, Wadi Masseen, Wadi Al Teen, and Wadi Zeimar stream 
through the governorate, which lead to the Mediterranean Sea. Wadi Zeimar, which 
flows within the municipality of Tulkarm, contains raw domestic and industrial 
wastewater during the summer from the areas of Nablus, Anabta, Tulkarm and Israeli 
settlements (HWE 2008: 4ff, Arij 1996:2ff). Furthermore the untreated wastewater flow 
into Wadi Al Zeemer left heavy damages. 
The water consumption is around 85 Liters per day per person and the municipality 
usually uses  
“[…] the water municipal well no. 1 with production capacity of 180 m3 / hour, well no. 2 with 
production capacity of 100 m3/hour, well no. 3 with production capacity of 65 m3/hour and Shwekeh well 
with production capacity of 110 m3/hour and they are 90 meters deep”. (PWEG 2004:17). 
 During summer time a few agricultural wells are used in addition for the demanding 
need of water due to the weather and the higher production in agriculture. The sewage 
system is around 60 kilometers long, very old and covers only 70 percent of the town in 
2004 (PWEG 2004:17). Tulkarm is vulnerable in terms of pollution, also because the 
groundwater is very close to the land surface and “[...] some of the most abundant water 
extractions from the Mountain Aquifer occur in this area” (HWE 2008:12). The ground 
water is under pressure in Tulkarm due to several reasons. Insufficient sewage 
infrastructure, the inadequate funding for waste and sewage as well as improper 
disposal of waste is causing the current stressed situation. Moreover public education in 
terms of environmental issues is not well established within the public school sector or 
in the civil society. To complete the vicious circle, institutional problems are still 
superabound, due to the lack of enforcement (HWE 2008:14). 
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Figure 5: Risk Map of Tulkarm
14
 
 
Al Khatib (2003:199ff) and other researchers of the Birzeit University conducted a 
study for the year 1999 about quantitative and qualitative determinants of drinking 
water in the Tulkarm Governorate, as well as the effect of water pollution on the health 
of people. They used 500 drinking water samples collected from the Public Health 
Department/Ministry of Health and were examined for free chlorine residual 
concentration, total coliforms and fecal coliforms. The dispersal of water-related 
diseases is higher in regions with contaminated and nonchlorinated drinking water.  
Many of the examined samples were not acceptable according to WHO standards (Al 
Khatib, et al. 2003:1999). 
 “60.6% of the samples have concentrations of free chlorine residual less than 0.2 ppm, which is the 
minimum concentration, recommended by WHO. Out of these samples, 34% and 9.2% were contaminated 
with total coliforms and fecal coliforms respectively” (Al-Khatib, et al. 2003:199ff).  
Just 39 percent of the drinking water in the Governorate of Tulkarm is acceptable within 
the standard limits, and a few chlorinating pumps emerged as faulty or not correctly 
operated. Not only was the contamination of groundwater and springs a serious problem 
in Tulkarm, but also the pollution of rain–fed cisterns in villages as Attil, Baqa 
Alsharkia, and Nazlat Isa. Despite existing chlorinating pumps in Attil the water 
contamination from wastewater was distressing. Nazlat Isa had the same problems as 
                                                                
14 HWE (2008:8): Risk Map of Tulkarm 
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Attil, because all samples were severely contaminated.  The contamination of water, 
especially in drinking water can lead to several health problems. In 1999 approximately 
5,924 cases of gastrointestinal (GI) and worm infection were detected in Tulkarm. The 
infections can also result from many other factors like low quality of housing, 
malnutrition or bad sanitation, “[…] was the total number of GI infections and worm 
infections [sic!] in the studied communities […] about 4,208 cases. Those represent 
71% of the cases in the Tulkarm [sic!] district“(Al Khatib, et al. 2003: 203). The exact 
infection rate for GI and worm infections in Tulkarm district could not be identified for 
2011, due to the lack of exact figures. PHIC (2011) published a report for the year 2011, 
where the numbers if different worm infections can be checked up. In 2012 Lina 
Mahmmoud Ali Hamarshi (2012:81f) identified that the highest nitrate concentrations 
can be found in wells and springs in Jenin, Tubas, Tulkarm and Nablus area and the 
cesspits are the main sources for pollution in groundwater wells in Tulkarm 
Governorate. Nevertheless, the situation has improved in the last ten years, but still 
needs to be an issue of focus of the municipality, the PA and the population itself. For 
example at the Anabta well no. 3 a new well pump (60m3/hr) was installed in 2007, 
including a booster pump with accessories and a balancing tank of 200m3 (World Bank 
2009:125). 
The conceivable solutions for the threat to the ground water by pollution will be 
discussed in the next section of this paper. 
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7.5. Israeli Industrial Zone in Tulkarm and  
environmental problems in the region 
 
The environment of the oPt and its natural resources are under huge pressure, especially 
after the division of the West Bank during the Oslo Accords.  An increase in traffic, 
unclean fuels, an increase in stone-cutting and quarry factories, superannuated 
processing in the industry and a deficit of environmental regulations are just a few 
factors which contribute to the worsening of the air pollution in the Governorate 
Tulkarm. Growing cities concatenate with the rising need of energy and the pollution 
from the liquid and solid waste of the settlements, industrial zone, factories and 
Palestinian population centers makes the situation more severe (Qasem 2001:22f). 
During the 1980s the Israeli Government moved several industries close to residential 
areas in Tulkarm (Qasem 2001:25). In addition to this, Israeli factories, which were 
constructed within the West Bank at the west side of the town Tulkarm, stress the 
environment, as well as water resources, agriculture and human beings. 
“The factories continue to spread and dispose internationally forbidden toxic effluents [...], which causes 
cancer, asthma, and pneumonia due to inhalation of contaminated air or digestion of crops planted 
around the factories, as proven in various medical tests” (Arij 2011:26).  
Qasem (2001:24) points out, that the industries in Tulkarm Governorate, except stone-
cutting factories, are not enough developed to play an important role in the deterioration 
of the air qualities in the district. However, from a Palestinian viewpoint, the location of 
the Tulkarm district close to Israel and its industrial areas and villages, determine the 
problem of air pollution.  
One industrial factory is always in the center of discussion when it comes to the 
environmental pollution in Tulkarm. In 1987 the Geshuri factory was moved from Kafr 
Saba, located inside the state of Israel, which manufactures fertilizers, acids and 
pesticides (Lamour 2005:3).  
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Figure 6, Figure 7: Zangl (2011): Fayyaz farm with Geshury Factory  
and Separation Barrier in the background
15
 
 
Lamour, who wrote a report about environmental issues in Tulkarm Municipality in the 
year 2005, reported three key issues around environmental problems in Tulkarm. The 
effects on the health of the local people are one of the main problems in the town, 
especially in vulnerable age groups. Residents of Tulkarm claim, that noxious fumes are 
carried with the wind into local housing areas thereby causing adverse health problems. 
The effect of effluent on local land use is in particular the decay of trees close to the 
Geshuri factory and a slow grow rate of the trees. Furthermore, approximately 2, 5 
dunums
16
 of the nearby land were not usable anymore for cultivation due to effluent 
including Sulfamic Acid in 1991. Lamour explained that the situation clearly improved 
in 2005 and the land around the factory was cultivated with extensive green housing. It 
is not clear though, if this land is the same as mentioned above. The confiscation of 
agricultural land is a result of the construction of the factories, e.g. the Geshuri factory 
and others in the West Bank. Mr. Shakr Hamdan Haweli’s land was confiscated because 
of the construction of Dixon Gas (Lamour 2005:4ff, Qumsieh 2000). The local 
economy has been dependent on this land and the profits were reduced by 
approximately 22 percent in 1997 as around 144,100 square meters or 17 percent of 
Tulkarm agricultural land was affected by pollution. According to Lamour this 
information is obsolete though, because of the missing accurate data. For this reason the 
                                                                
15 Zangl (2011): Fayyaz farm with Geshury Factory and Separation Barrier in the background. August 2011 
16 1 dunam is around 1000 sq. meters 
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problems with the Geshuri factory must be seen in the context of the other 
environmental problems in the Tulkarm region. There is also a need for further evidence 
of the hazard for public health coming from the Geshuri factory (Lamour 2005:3ff).  
A number of people (Qasem 2001:22, Isaac 2000:2, Safieh 2012) also claim that there is 
illegal transfer of toxic waste from Israel to two dumping sites in Tulkarm. According 
to Qasem (2001:22) one dumping site is supposed to be on the south eastern border of 
the Tulkarm Municipality, in Area C, with citrus trees, irrigated vegetable crops, and 
including two groundwater wells. In the vicinity of the residential area of A`zoun 
Municipality there is the location of the second dumping site. It is located just 50 meters 
from the drinking groundwater well of the borough. 
The two municipal waste sites for the residents of the governorate are situated in Anabta 
and one outside the town of Tulkarm close to Jubara. Due to the rise in population 
numbers and the lack of implementation of waste treatment techniques solid waste 
remains largely untreated and unsorted, which leads to health risks for the local people 
and a threat to groundwater resources (Lamour 2005:6ff).  
According to a number of interviewed people environmental issues are not the first 
priority for the municipality, when it comes to Tulkarm. In the end the politically tense 
situation and the socio-economic situation make their contribution to the decision of 
priorities (HWE 2008:29). Nevertheless, Lamour recommends a clear environmental 
plan for the Tulkarm region as well as the treatment and disposal of municipal sewage. 
Approximately 80 percent of the people in the town of Tulkarm and 90 percent of the 
people in the refugee camps are connected to the sewer system. For the villages around 
Tulkarm there are no clear numbers available, however “[…] all of the sewer water 
from Anabta and surrounding villages drains directly to the Wadi Zaimer (e.g. Nur 
Shams Camp” (Lamour 2005:15).  Hence environmental priorities need to be developed 
with local and regional targets. Lamour recommends focusing on Wadi Zaimer, the 
dumpsites, a public awareness education Programme, water quality and the 
identification and elimination of pollution sources (Lamour 2005:20ff). In 2008 HWE 
published guidelines for Palestinian municipalities, focusing on Tulkarm Governorate. 
The key recommendations for Tulkarm from HWE are based on short, medium and 
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long term solutions, e.g. improving infrastructure, solid waste collection and sewage 
treatment. “Increasing the municipality's institutional capacity to conduct inspections 
and monitoring of infrastructure and of businesses and its capacity to enforce against 
environmental violations […]” is important; as well as local financing for upgrading the 
water system and the development of a strategic plant against groundwater pollution 
(HWE 2008:3). HWE recommends the principles of the Integrated Water Resources 
Management and promotes a holistic approach and GIS (HWE 2008:3ff). 
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8. Restriction of Movement and Access 
in the Governorate of Tulkarm  
 
Article 12(1) of the ICCPR states that, “[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a 
State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to 
choose his residence” (OHCHR 2007). The restriction of movement in the Tulkarm 
region is mainly influenced by the Separation Barrier. This is of particular concern 
because this restriction affects the Palestinian communities in various ways. In my 
conducted analysis 19, 6 percent of the people, must pass through an obstacle on the 
way to work. People, living in the town of Tulkarm most often filled in that they have to 
pass any kind of obstacle on the way to work
17
. The average travel time to work and 
from work for people which were polled is 30-60 minutes. Just 34 people answered that 
they have a full time job. Most people walk to their work or use public transport as bus 
service or taxi.  
 
The impact on the economy and the increase in unemployment and poverty leads to a 
struggle on a daily basis for the Palestinian community. According to the ICRC (2011), 
the income of Mohammad Tawiq of Far’un Village dropped by 75 percent, due to the 
construction of the Separation Barrier. Restrictions on access for farmers to their lands 
in the Seam Zone have severely harmed the farming sector in the Tulkarm Area. Permits 
are always required. This leads to intensive bureaucratic involvement for the farmers. 
Since May 2011 a decrease in the approved permits by the Civil Administration has 
been seen on a large scale in the northern part of the Tulkarm Area (Interview 4). 
According to the secretary of the Qaffin village council Omar Ajoleh, just 40 out of 300 
requests in the last 4 months were approved (EAPPI 2011b). Additionally, this permit 
system creates a situation of constant uncertainty for Palestinian farmers regarding their 
ability to carry out every day work. Abdul Karim Dalba (Interview 5), a freelance 
                                                                
17 16, 3 percent of the 153 people didn´t fill in an answer. Places of residents/Number of people, who have to pass an 
obstacle: Sweika:1; Attil:3; Shufa:5; Tulkarm:9; Nazlat Isa:3; Deir Al-Ghusun:1; Beit Lit:1; Tubas:1;No Answer of 
place of residence:7 
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journalist and activist in the Tulkarm Area states: 
 
“The whole system of the wall around Tulkarm, and also the system of checkpoints and roadblocks, which 
are sometimes easy to pass or in using alternatives, did not change the idea or the feeling we are still in a 
prison. The rules of permissions, no matter if it is easy to pass or not, aren`t changing the system of 
control. The impression that you see open gates and can be closed at any time is a feeling what makes it 
difficult for people to live”.  
 
The Separation Barrier in the Governorate of Tulkarm is around 40 kilometers long and 
approximately 22 percent of it is built on the Green Line (UNOCHA 2009b:36). Talal 
Dweikat, Governor of Tulkarm stated that “[…] about 40,000 dunums from Tulkarm 
Area was isolated to the west side of the wall” (Interview 1). The first phase of the 
construction of the Separation Barrier was completed in July 2003 and had a total length 
of 157 km in the northern districts of the West Bank. Five de facto enclaves were 
created in Tulkarm Governorate, where four communities with around 11,749 residents 
were living. The villages in the first enclave are Baqa ash Sharqiyya, Nazlat Isa and 
Nazlat Abu Nar. Khirbet Jubara, in the second enclave, is located on the west side of the 
Separation Barrier. 26 agricultural gates were planned along the stretch of the first phase 
of the Separation Barrier. In October 2003 only four gates were installed in Tulkarm and 
Qualqillia districts (HDIP 2004:31ff). 78 percent of the Barrier lie within the West Bank 
and there is one community of the name of Khirbet Jubara and two families of Ar Ras 
located inside the Seam Zone. The re-routing process of the Separation Barrier will 
return the people from the Seam Zone to the Palestinian side of the Barrier. Moreover, 
one family from Shweika is also living in the closest area but the gate usually opens all 
the time (UNOCHA 2009b:36).   
 
The impact of the construction of the Separation Barrier on access to health care 
services in Tulkarm region is discussed by the report of the Health Development, 
Information and Policy Institute (HDIP) in 2004. The HDIP (2004:24) claim that in the 
first phase of the construction around 14, 680 dunums of land were confiscated, 102,320 
olive trees uprooted, 36 groundwater wells and 200 cisterns confiscated (HDIP 
2004:11ff). One interviewed persons points out, that there is just one part of the society 
in Tulkarm, who are suffered from the construction of the Separation Barrier: 
109 
 
“[…] Israel always uses security issue. They even they can talk about peace, security is a high issue for 
Israel. For the Palestinians I should be honest with you. For the people, who lost their land, they 
suffered. But let´s say like myself, I didn´t lose some land […] so not me, but some people for example, I 
will not feel really with those Palestinians. […]. Most people from suffering from the wall, are the people 
living close to the wall or who lost their land. For example let´s go to Ramallah. Do you think Ramallah 
is similar to Tulkarm? […] Of course not,[…] Ramallah is small and […] full of clubs, full of 
international presents, […] full of different ideologies.[…]. So for me, the people, who lost land or going 
to the field or Israel, are the only one, who are affected by the wall. You will feel the difference between 
A. and someone who opens a clothes shop in Tulkarm. He was never affected by this. The second Intifada 
is really different from the first Intifada. […]The Palestinian were more united. But now, not at all!” 
(Interview 6). 
 
88 people out of 153 polled people wrote that the construction of the Separation Barrier 
influenced/influences their personal life. 28 people stated that there is no influence from 
the Separation Barrier on their personal life. 37 people didn´t answer this question. It 
was an open question. Therefore the people were able to write about different aspects 
and I put the answers into different categories. 35 people mentioned that the Separation 
Barrier influenced their possibility to work in Israel negatively and 20 people wrote 
about the negative influence on their work in the West Bank. 15 people mentioned the 
exclusion from the possibility to swim in the sea. Other aspects people wrote about in 
the questionnaire are: the possibility to pray in Jerusalem; visiting family and friends in 
Israel, limited access to the Seam Zone and agricultural land, freedom of movement, 
freedom, psychological problems, problems to get a permission, changing of free time 
activities, imprisonment during the second intifada etc.  
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8.1. Checkpoints 
 
Without actually drawing a line, Palestinian and Israeli Oslo peace negotiators designed 
one of the most complicated creations of the occupation, which were called “passages” 
(Weizman 2008:151). Annex I, Article X, called “passages” of the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement states:  
“a. [….] These arrangements aim at creating a mechanism that facilitates the entry and exit of people and 
goods, reflecting the new reality created by the Declaration of Principles, while providing full security for 
both sides. […]d. The two sides are determined to do their utmost to maintain the dignity of persons 
passing through the border crossings. To this end, the mechanism created will rely heavily on brief and 
modern procedures” (PLO, The Government of Israel 1994). 
 
These “passages” had a significant importance for the developing self-determination of 
the Palestinians and the security needs of the Israelis. The specific architecture of the 
CPs serves as a figure for the new power relationships, which were developed during 
the whole Oslo Process. The security logic behind the CPs is that the room of the CP is 
safer, when as few Palestinians as possible actually are in there. The system of control 
points is so omnipresent that it controls the daily life of the Palestinians under 
occupation in every aspect. Palestinians are used to control points in their daily life. The 
term “normalization” is often used in this context in the oPt (Weizman 2008:151ff, 
Segal et al 2003). 98 CPs were operating in February 2012 in the West Bank, whereof 
41 are leading into Israel (Btselem 2012b).  
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8.1.1. The workers’ Checkpoint Taybe/Irtah -Sha'ar Efrayim 
 
The CP is located south of Tulkarm on the Green Line and north of the route 557. Taybe 
Checkpoint opens daily around 4 am for Palestinians with workers permit only. The CP 
also operates as a transit point for commercial goods by a back-to-back method and is 
operated by a civilian manpower company. GROUP4SECURICOR (G4S), respectively 
their Israeli subsidiary, G4S Israel (Hashmira) are providing the CP with the security 
systems including luggage scanning machines and full body scanners (Machsom Watch 
2012, Who Profits 2012)
18
.  
 
Figure 8, Figure 9: Taybe CP at night
19
 
 
The CP doesn´t have an extra queue for women. The women are led through by opening 
a small door on the side, at the opening of the checkpoint.  Later on (around 5 minutes 
after the opening) they have to queue with the men in the same line, which can be quite 
stressful for the women due to cultural circumstances. Around 50 to 100 women are 
passing this CP every morning. The checkpoint is monitored by EAPPI around two 
times a week and by Machsom Watch on an irregular basis. Organizations which 
monitor the Checkpoint are not able to pass through or interact with the responsible 
                                                                
18 “G4S Israel is one of the major security systems providers to the Israeli government, including the Ministry of 
defense building ("Hakiria") in Tel Aviv. It also provides security systems to the Israeli armored corps base of 
Nachshonim, which was donated by the US army in accordance with the Wye River Memorandum. The company 
operates security patrol units which secure oceanic facilities, vehicles and transport routs, buildings and equipment 
of the security and finance industries. These units, as the company states, are manned by `worriers who graduated 
elite combat units in the Israeli army`" (Who Profits 2012) 
19 Zangl (2011): Taybe CP at night. August 2011 
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people working inside the Checkpoint. In August an average of 3,272
20
 Palestinian 
workers passed the Taybe CP between 4:00 -7:00 am (Sunday, Thursday) to get to their 
work in Israel. The busiest day is Sunday morning, because a lot of workers are staying 
in Israel for the working week and are just returning back to their homes in the West 
Bank for the weekends. 3900 people passing through the CP was the highest number 
recorded by EAPPI (2012a, 2012c) in August. Around 300 people were waiting in a 
queue by the opening hour of the CP on a regular basis, but could enter the CP shortly 
after 4 am.  
“The number of people entering the CP per minute was on average 18.2 for the whole morning, but while 
dealing with the rush between 4:00-5:00 am a flow rate of over 30 people per minute was frequently 
achieved. Another queue started forming from 6 am onwards for people with a permit for 7:00 am” 
(EAPPI 2012c:4). 
 
A protest against the “mistreatment by Israeli soldiers” at the CP was held in the 
beginning of October by hundreds of Palestinian. There is a demand for earlier opening 
hours due to constant overcrowdings at the CP (Maannews 2012c). 
  
 
                                                                
20 3,482 people in July 
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8.1.2. The Case of Jubara- a village in the Seam Zone 
 
Jubara, 5 kilometers south of Tulkarm, is a village located in the `Seam Zone` with 
around 52 families or 350 people living in it. The settlement of Sal’ it, with a population 
of approximately 400 residents, and the Green Line are close to the small village 
(Seifert et al. 2009:61ff).  
UNOCHA predicted in 2011 that around 25,000 Palestinians (plus the majority of the 
Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem) will have their residents in the closed area, 
when the construction of the Separation Barrier is completely finished. Now 
approximately 6500 people are living in the Seam Zone (UNOCHA 2011a:3).  
Isolated lands in a district seam zone like Jubara are facing difficulties on a daily basis. 
In general Palestinians over the age of 16 living in the ‘Seam Zone’, the closed area 
between the Green Line and the Separation Barrier, need a permanent resident permit to 
stay in their own houses (also overnight) The registration process in 2004 of the 
residential permit in Jubara led to problems, because only people, who were staying in 
the village on a particular day, were able to receive such a permit. The residents were 
not given notice in advance and therefore some people were just given a visitor permit 
and had to stay outside the village during the night. One woman of the village was not 
given a residential permit for four years, although she had been living in the village her 
whole life and her house was in Jubara (Seifert et al 2009:61).  
People living in the ‘Seam Zone’ usually have limited access to health, education and 
social services. Social Networks are difficult to keep up for relatives and friends living 
in the West Bank (UNOCHA 2009b:4) due to the restriction of access permissions to the 
‘Seam Zone.’ One family of Jubarah got a visit from a relative living in Germany. 
Although they had organized a huge meal for the visitor he was not allowed to pass the 
CP. The food had to be taken to the village of Ar Ras (Seifert et al 2009:62).   
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In general the residents of Jubarah are able to enter or leave the village through a CP, 
which is open for 24 hours. “On 4 March 
[2009], the Israeli authorities removed the 
Ar Ras / Kafriat checkpoint, including all 
related infrastructure.  The checkpoint 
controlled all traffic to and from seven 
villages in the southern Tulkarm district 
(approximately 12,000 people) to Tulkarm 
city” (UNOCHA 2009a:1). According to 
Gordon et al. (2009:61) it was only 
allowed to bring small quantity of goods 
into the village and it was closely 
inspected by the soldiers at the CP. The 
21consequences were a rundown of the 
local economy and especially chicken farming suffered extremely due to the fact that 
the import of feed and fertilizers was not allowed. Even worse the poultry flock has 
been reduced from 120,000 to 20,000 due to the denial of access of a veterinarian.  
According to Foad Jubarah, a farmer from Jubarah 7,000 chickens have died in the past 
few months of an unknown disease, representing a year loss of USD100,000.00, 
although he has been trying to bring a veterinarian into Jubarah to check it, but 
applications were denied 5 times by the DCO (UNOCHA 2009b:37, EAPPI 2011). 
The situation for the school children has improved in the last few years due to the 
construction of a school within the village. Medical service is available in the town of 
Tulkarm, even though UNRWA provides a mobile medical clinic once a month in 
Jubara itself (Seifert et al 2009:62f). 
The Separation Barrier is being rerouted to the west this year as a result of an Israeli 
HCJ decision. The village will be located within the West Bank in the future. “Some 
522[587] dunums would be confiscated as part of the realignment of the Wall but 90 
percent of the villagers` land would be returned to the villagers of Jubarah” (Seifert et 
                                                                
21  UNOCHA (2011): Tulkarm Closure Map.  
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al 2009:62). This means a great improvement for the daily life of the residents of 
Jubarah and the local economy. The agricultural land will be taken from fifty families of 
the village of Far’un (UNOCHA 2011a:5). 
  
Farmers, whose agricultural land is located in the ‘Seam Zone’, also face difficulties to 
reach their land for cultivation. Especially the farmers in the northern part of the West 
Bank have needed permission or a visitor permit to be able to reach and cultivate their 
land since October 2003.  The Access to the ‘Seam Zone’ is regulated through an 
‘Agriculture Gate’. The permit is issued for a special gate, person and duration of time 
(UNOCHA 2009b:4f). “Restricted allocation of these visitor permits and the limited 
number and opening times of the Barrier gates have severely curtailed agricultural 
practice and undermined rural livelihoods” (UNOCHA 2009b:4). A typical example of 
the difficulties which arise in this closed zone is the following case: four fires in 2008 
were reported to the fire brigade which were not allowed to pass into the Seam Zone. 
On that account 500 dunums of olive trees were destroyed (UNOCHA 2009b:37). 
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8.1.3. Nazlat Isa 
 
   
Figure 11, Figure 12: Nazlat Isa- Separation Barrier
22
 
 
Nazlat Isa, now a quiet village far up north (around 17 kilometers from the town of 
Tulkarm) in the Governorate of Tulkarm has changed a lot since the construction of the 
Separation Barrier. The Barrier runs on the Green Line, which is not illegal, but 
separated a lot of families from each other. To be able to visit each other the families 
have to take a detour via Tulkarm (around 40 kilometers), although they only live 
around 50 meters from each other. The demolition of more than 300 shops conducted by 
the IDF in preparation of the construction of the Separation Barrier caused a huge 
impact to the economic situation of the inhabitants of Nazlat Isa. Nazlat Isa was a 
vibrant place before the construction of the Separation Barrier. Due to the shop closings 
a big economic center in the Governorate moved away and Nazlat Isa lies now lies in 
the peripheral outskirts of Tulkarm. The Barrier also isolated around 500 dunums of the 
land (Interview 12).  
  
The Separation Barrier also completely isolated 6 houses, whose entrance is organized 
by a checkpoint. The checkpoint in the south of Nazlat Isa opens on a daily basis from 
06.00-24.00. Around 84 people are passing this checkpoint on a regular routine. 14 of 
them are school children, who are crossing the checkpoint two times a day (UNOCHA 
2009a:37). Health care is provided in two local governmental clinics in Nazlat Isa, 
                                                                
22 Zangl (2011): Nazlat Isa- Separation Barrier separating a Palestinian House. August 2011 
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which open weekly from 08:00 until 14:30 and a third level clinic in Baqa Ash-
Sharqiyeh (HDIP 2004:59).  
 
8.2. Agricultural Gates 
 
The Separation Barrier features three capacious incursions into the West Bank. On these 
grounds a huge amount of tracts of agricultural land is isolated. The communities of 
Akkaba, Qaffin, Deir al Ghusun, Far `un, Ar Ras, Kafr Sur, Kafr Jammal and Kafr 
Zibad  are especially confronted with the disconnection to their agricultural land. In 
Qaffin approximately 12,000 olive trees are located in the closed area and in Far´un 
“[…] hundreds of dunums of citrus & guava have died due to lack of access. Only 149 
out of the population of 3,100 have permits as of May 2009” (UNOCHA 2009a:37).  
 
There are a total of nine agricultural gates in the district of Tulkarm to access the 
farming land. One of them is seasonal and four are seasonal/weekly agricultural gates. 
Four out of nine Gates open on a daily basis (UNOCHA 2009a:36). In total there are 80 
agricultural gates leading into the Seam Zone where the agricultural areas are separated 
by the Separation Barrier, but the majority of these agricultural gates only open for a six 
week period in fall during the olive harvest season. They are not open all day (usually 
2-3 times a day) and the opening time is restricted mostly to 45 minutes (UNOCHA 
2012b:1f). “During the 2011 olive harvest, about 42% of applications submitted for 
permits to access areas behind the Barrier were rejected citing ‘security reasons’ or 
lack of ‘connection to the land” (UNOCHA 2012b:1). UNOCHA also claims that the 
numerous fires which are annihilating trees and crops in the Seam Zone are a recurring 
problem. The cause of these fires is mainly the unchecked undergrowth (UNOCHA 
2009a:36). 
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8.2.1. The system of permissions 
 
To be able to reach the agricultural land in the Seam Zone it is necessary to obtain a 
permit from the ICO. The security standards have to be fulfilled to apply or renew this 
permit. Farmers must be able to prove a valid ownership or present a land taxation 
document which shows a connection to their land. In reality a huge part of the 
permissions are rejected due to the failing proof of the connection to the land and the 
strict permit and gate regime. According to UNOCHA around 150 communities in the 
West Bank suffer from the negative consequences and their agricultural livelihood is 
gravely undermined.  
 
Farmers who were able to get a permit were forced to shift from labor-intensive to 
rained and low–value crops or even stop cultivation completely due to the limited 
opening of the agricultural gates (UNOCHA 2012b:1f). Meanwhile, these permissions 
are only valid for a few months for a few family members. The valid duration of the 
permission has decreased in many cases from 6 months to 1-2 months. Even more 
problematic are the opening hours of the gate, which can be reduced any time. In the 
last year, especially since April 2001, there have been more complaints about the denial 
of permissions from farmers with their crops in the Seam Zone (Btselem 2012c:46f, 
EAPPI 2011a).  
 
“The Civil Administration reported that in 2010 it issued 30,985 permits to enable Palestinians to enter 
the seam zone. Some 70 percent of permit requests were granted. Of the permits that were issued, 61 
percent were for short periods of up to three months. Since 2007, the Civil Administration has imposed a 
quota – it does not grant more than 70 percent of the requests for a permit, regardless of the number of 
requests submitted” (Btselem 2012c:46). 
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Another obstacle for the farmers is that the gate opens 2 or 3 times a day. When they have to for instance 
water the plants for an hour, they have to stay inside the Seam Zone until the Agricultural Gate opens 
again in the evening and are not able to obtain work at home or inside the West Bank.  
 
“For example you have a land […], it will be no nice to go to your land through the gate, the soldier 
check you, check your donkey, stay in line like the animals, waiting until the soldiers come and open the 
gate. No one wants to do this […] These is my land, I wanna go there anytime. Maybe I am free today, 
and I wanna go there and it with my family there. This situation is really difficult for the farmers […]” 
(Interview 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Rate of Approvals of Permit Application 23 
 
                                                                
23 UNOCHA (2012b:2): The humanitarian impact of the Barrier. Factsheet July  
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_barrier_factsheet_july_2012_english.pdf [02.08.2012] 
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8.2.2. Deir Al-Ghusun Gate - Analysis of the collected data 2007-2011 
 
Deir Al – Ghusun is located about 8 km north of Tulkarm city with about 11,000 
inhabitants.  Thus, Deir Al-Ghusun is one of the most populated centers in Tulkarm 
governorate. More than 60% of residents are dependent on agricultural income. 
According to the World Food Programme at least 400 persons of Deir Al-Ghusun are 
totally dependent on international aid and up to 150 families are dependent on payments 
from UNRWA (see LRC 2007). The total area of Deir Al Ghusun was 27000 dunums, 
51% of it was annexed in 1948. The remaining 13 000 dunums were divided as follows: 
 "2868 dunums are built up zone, 2000 dunums are cultivated flatland with vegetables in greenhouses, 
300 dunums are destroyed under the path of the Segregation Wall, 2400 dunums are separated behind the 
Wall; 5432 dunums are cultivated with olive and almond trees "(LRC 2007). 
The research question for the case study at the Deir Al-Ghusun gate is the following: Is 
a tendency to decrease in the number of farmers / farm women and children that pass 
through the gate Deir Al-Ghusun ascertained? 
 
Figure 13: Tulkarm Closure Map 
24
 
 
                                                                
24 UNOCHA (2011b): The CLOSURE MAP Tulkarm 
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The objective is to determine whether a trend can be observed with regard to the 
number of border crossers. I put the number of border crossings for each of the 
categories overall, ‘men’, ‘women’ and ‘children’ in the dependency of the time period. 
The regression analysis considers the relationship between two or more metric scaled 
features (Benesch 2008:115). A distinction is made between the dependent variable Y, 
which in my case, is the number of border crossings, and the independent variable X, 
which represents the time in calendar weeks. Therefore the number of border crossings 
depends on the cause variable “time” (Benes 2008:115). Other factors, such as the 
number of issued permits from the DCO will not be observed in this case. 
 
In the following line graph the regression line was drawn for all categories (total, men, 
women and children). First, it shows that especially men pass the Deir Al-Ghusun gate, 
thus more men are working on the fields. And each case shows that there is a clear trend 
towards the reduction of border crossings. 
 
 
Table 3: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Total 
 
The average number of daily border crossings decreased from about 66 to about 40 
people, for all groups (category total), which means a reduction by more than a third. 
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Table 4: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Men 
 
The average number of men, who crossed the Deir Al-Ghusun gate on a daily basis 
decreased from around 58 to around 35 people, representing a decrease of more than a 
third. 
 
 
Table 5: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Women 
 
 
According to the regression line, the number of average daily border crossings of  
women at the Deir Al-Ghusun gate decreased from about six to about two people. This 
corresponds to a reduction by two thirds.  
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Table 6: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Children 
 
The average number of children who passed the Deir Al-Ghusun gate on a daily basis 
decreased in accordance to statistical calculation of approximately three children to 1 
child, and therefore declined by two thirds. 
 
One reason for the general decline of the border crossings is the denial of the 
permission request.  "Some 40% of applications for 'visitor permits' to access olive 
groves behind the Barrier, submitted by Palestinians on the eve of the 2010 harvest 
season, were rejected"(UNOCHA 2011e:1). Out of safety reasons or because of the 
impossibility to prove the ownership according to Israeli requirements, it often comes to 
denials of applications in the Seam Zone (UNOCHA 2011f:2). Another reason for the 
decrease in border crossings is the decline in applications in general: “Many 
Palestinians are discouraged from applying for permits as they have been refused in the 
past, and others refuse to apply as a matter of principle“(UNOCHA 2011f:2). 
 
However, the coefficient of determination (R2) also shows that the regression line only 
reflects the curve to a very limited extent. Thus, the regression line for the category total 
only explains about 5.5% of the shape of the curve. For the category men it can be 
explained by around 8%, because the number of border crossings as a total is more 
balanced over the period of time than in the category women and children. That means, 
is has proportionally less steep peaks. Therefore, the coefficient of determination is also 
lower for the category women and children: The regression line for the category women 
can only be explained by 4.4% of the scattering of data points and for the category of 
children only 1.4%.  
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One reason for the sometimes large variations from the regression line is seasonal 
fluctuations: even though it was not possible to prove it via time series analysis, it 
becomes evident by the maxima of the individual years that most border crossings were 
in the years 2007 to 2011 in the months of October and November. 
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
103 (October)185 (October)71 (October) 111 (October)130 (October)
Maxima of the border crossings - Total
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
89 (Oct./Nov) 119 (October) 61 (October) 78 (October) 107 (October)
Maxima of the border crossing- Men
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
4 (November) 33 (October) 8 (October) 17 (October) 3 (October)
Maxima of border crossings - Children
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
14 (October) 33 (October) 11 (October) 25 (October) 17 (October)
Maxima of border crossings - Women
 
Table 7: Maximas of border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate 
 
The increased border crossings in the months of October and November can also be 
well understood in the radar charts with monthly averages. It also very clearly shows 
how much the category  men is dominated by the cross-border workers in total: They 
pass the Deir Al-Ghusun gate more often over the year than women and children, and 
have therefore - as mentioned above - proportionally less steep peaks . 
 
 
 
Table 8: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Total 
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Table 9: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Men 
 
 
Table 10: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Women 
 
In the period from late September to mid-November more permissions are issued by the 
DCO, because the olive harvest takes place at that time. As many as 44 of the 66 
Agricultural Gates open only during the harvest season. Thus, an increase in border 
crossings at the Deir Al-Ghusun gate is observed during this time period (UNOCHA 
2011f).Both the line charts and the radar charts, as the tables with the maximum values, 
show that the number of border crossings - from 2009 rapidly declined, especially 
during the olive harvest, but in the year of 2010 the peaks increased during the olive 
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harvest and showed higher values in the category Men (and thus also in the category 
overall) over the year. 
 
According to UNOCHA (2009c:1), the Israeli authority has implemented different 
measures to improve the free movement of Palestinians between the Palestinian urban 
centers in the West Bank from May to October 2009. However, during the same period 
there was no significant improvement in access to agricultural land in the Seam Zone 
ascertainable. Instead it is evident: "Attorney to the HCJ indicated that the number of 
permits issued to Palestinians farmers to access the ‘Seam Zone’ in the northern West 
Bank between 2006 and mid-2009 has sharply decreased" (UNOCHA 2010b:18). Our 
data from the Deir Al-Ghusun gate confirms this. It was made even more difficult for 
the Palestinian farmers: In early January 2009 there was a change in the licensing 
system. From this point on a "visitors permit" was often necessary for entering the 
agricultural land. “Prior to that, farmers were only required to register with the Israeli 
authorities and show their IDs at the relevant gate (also known as the ‘prior 
coordination’ system)“ (UNOCHA 2010b:18). A key factor for the decrease in border 
crossings were also the additional requirements of the permission system (UNOCHA 
2010b:18). The extreme drop in applicants for permissions (70% at some gates) can 
partly be explained by the poor harvest in succession of cold and rainy weather in 2009 
(see Data Matrix). 
 
In March 2010, there were incidents with Israeli soldiers at the Deir Al-Ghusun gate.  A 
dispute emerged between the farmers and the soldiers after the farmers were asked to 
undress. The farmers accused the soldiers of a more restrictive treatment at the gate: 
“Farmers who must pass through the agricultural gates near the Jubarah [sic!] checkpoint south of 
Tulkarm, as well as farmers working West Bank lands beyond the wall in the Qalqiliya district have 
reported an increase in restrictions and checks. At two gates, farmers said Israeli forces had installed 
metal detectors” (Maannews 2010). 
In the data series more minima and maxima are included and can be explained with the 
weather and with holidays (Ramadan: about 31 July to 31 August - exact date varies). 
The bad weather explains the following weeks: CW 44 (2009) - only 7 border crossings 
because of the cold and rainy weather, CW 8 (2010) - only three border crossings due to 
storm (see Data Matrix 2010), CW 8 (2011): 18 border crossing due to heavy rain. 
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My unambiguous answer to the question whether there is a determined tendency of 
decrease in the number of men, women and children who pass through the gate Deir Al-
Ghusun is yes. 
The regression line shows that the average number of cross-border commuters per day 
has decreased among men by more than one third, and among women and children by 
two thirds. In this context, the male domination at the gate and its distribution over the 
year is well and much more balanced than that of women and children. The peaks of the 
last two groups are proportionally significantly higher. Thus, the significance of the 
percentage decline for the group of men is also higher than for the group of women or 
children. 
Even if they were not detected by the time series analysis, seasonal fluctuations can be 
seen graphically and by means of the annual maxima. This is one reason why many of 
the values deviate from the regression line. Because of the olive harvest (September-
November) strong peaks are visible especially among the groups of women and 
children. 
 
In order to calculate the seasonal fluctuations, but above all to get an overall, less 
distorted result, it is important that EAPPI or similar organizations will document all 
border crossings on a regular and uninterrupted basis. For data analysis, it would also be 
helpful if this unified data collection would be made consistent and structured. In 
principle, it would also be desirable if the north gates, e.g. the Quaffin gate, stood more 
under observation since the opening hours are problematic and difficulties at the border 
crossings arise (EAPPI 2011b). The practical implementation is thought to be extremely 
difficult based on factors like distance, time and personnel resources. 
 
129 
 
8.3. Roadblocks 
 
The number of roadblocks in the West Bank has decreased since the second Intifada. 
But still “[…] 522 roadblocks and checkpoints obstruct Palestinian movement in the 
West Bank, compared to 503 in July 2010” (UNOCHA 2011:1). Roadblocks are used to 
control, limit or block the traffic along a certain road. A lot of roadblocks in the West 
Bank are located close to main streets of Israeli settlements. Another way to block the 
access to certain roads used in the West Bank by the Israeli military is earth mounds.  
 
8.3.1. Shufa and Avnei Hefetz 
 
 
Figure 14: Roadblock Shufa
25
 
 
Shufa, a Palestinian Village close to Tulkarm city, was separated into two parts, Lower 
and Upper Shufa, with a roadblock on the main street. Shufa has around 1250 
inhabitants, with a lot of people working in Israel before the second Intifada (Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics 2011, Interview 11). People from Upper Shufa were not 
able to use their main road to Tulkarm city for years, because of a roadblock on the 
junction to Tulkarm and Netanya, Israel. This street was only used by an Israeli military 
base and the inhabitants of the Israeli settlement of Avnei Hefetz, with around 1500 
inhabitants, mostly born in Israel or “olim” from France (see Amana 2012). The 
settlement was established in 1990 by Hesder Yeshiva students from Karnei Shomron. 
The settlement today has four neighborhoods in the community: 
                                                                
25 Zangl (2011): Roadblock Shufa, View from Tulkarm site. September 2011 
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1.    “Neve Hefetz – urban style housing in apartment buildings 
2.    Avnei Shoham – rural style, single-family dwelling houses 
3.    Mitzpe Hefetz – built onto the hillside with a mountain view 
4.     Avnei Chen – the newest neighborhood, still in its growing stages” (Amana 2012). 
  
Many people living in the settlement have to commute to towns like Netanya, Kfar Saba 
or Hadera to work in fields like law, computer science, finance, education etc. There is a 
girl and a boy elementary school (till grade 8) located in Avnei Hefetz. The 
infrastructure in the community is well developed. A community center, a library, post 
office, grocery store, dental clinic, gym, a Beit Midrash, six synagogues etc. are located 
within the settlement
26
 (see Avnei Hefetz 2011, Amana 2012). 
 
The roadblock was a huge obstacle in terms of freedom of movement for the people 
living in Upper Shufa. A minibus was operating between Upper Shufa and the 
roadblock and the roadblock and the town of Tulkarm. People were not able to use their 
own transportation to go to Tulkarm and needed a lot of extra time to be able to go to 
work or school or buy basic products. 
 
“It costs a lot of money and time. Students are losing a lot of time for walking. This influences the 
students of being consequent. […]The farmers also, they don´t have access to their fields, for example 
me. I used to go to my field by car. Not it is impossible for me to go there. I have to walk for 3 or 4 
kilometers in the morning to get to my field.[…] Imaging working in your field for 5 or 6 hours and 
coming back in the afternoon by foot.[…] and sometime you have the whole things to carry […] on your 
shoulders […].This is because the settlers have closed the road leading to your farm. The road was ours; 
we build it […]. ”Then, because of the expansion of the settlement, the confiscated the road. Now it is in 
the middle of the settlement. At first they told us, it is ok, we can pass through. After some time, they told 
us, it is not good for our security, you can´t pass anymore” (Interview 11). 
 
The relationship between the residents of Shufa and Avnei Hefetz is better than in a lot 
of other areas in the West Bank. However, there is still a certain level of mistrust 
between the people. Both sites argue that the land belongs to their side. A resident of 
Avnei Hefetz takes up an argument often used by Israeli settlers:  
 
“[…] Again, if we are talking about the land, and we spoke about the Palestinian people. There was not 
such a thing as Palestinian people. They came from Jordan, they came from Syria, they came from 
Lebanon, from Egypt, from all around the place”.  […] But again […], I came here, because I truly 
believe, that this is, what my god gave me. This is a promised land. This is land, what is always ours […]. 
We have an […] agreement with god […]. I am ..years old, […] I am not a fanatic, I am not crazy guy. I 
                                                                
26 house of interpretation, house of learning 
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am a normal guy […]. I go to pubs,[…] listen to music ACDC, I go out, speak with people […], read 
books. I am not a fanatical settler from Samaria and no one is here and again we are looking for peace. 
[…] We are speaking about 10000s of years this land belongs to us […]” (Interview 10). 
 
 
During the month of Ramadan in 2011 the Israeli Authority removed the roadblock at 
the main entrance to Shufa. According to the residents of Shufa the roadblock was put 
back after the end of Ramadan. During this spring the roadblock was removed 
permanently. Therefore the residents of Shufa are now able to use the main road to 
Tulkarm without using a long detour. Military controls still occur on a sporadic basis. 
The removal of the roadblock means a huge improvement of the freedom of movement 
and access of the people there.  
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9. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The restrictions of movement in the West Bank were slightly reduced by the Israeli 
Military in 2011. A number of the main obstacles like CPs had already been removed in 
2009 (for the main roads between Palestinian cities) (Btselem 2012c:56). The freedom 
of movement is still heavily restricted in significant areas for the Government of Israel, 
e.g. the Jordan Valley, East Jerusalem, the Seam Zone, the city of Hebron etc.  “[…] 
Palestinians are still unable to move about the West Bank freely, and Israel continues to 
view the Palestinians’ free movement as a privilege it may grant or deny at its 
discretion” (Btselem 2012c:56). But overall the obstacles within the Governorate of 
Tulkarm have been reduced since the second Intifada. Samir S. describes the situation 
as follows: 
 
“We are separated from other families. For us to go to Hebron it is a dream. I know, Hebron is in the 
South and we are in the North. […] Of course, in one country, in any normal state, you can go from the 
South to the North. […] But in our case it is difficult, because how many CPs I will face, first of all 
[…]Anab, Zatara, Atar etc. […]. These are 4 Cps before I reach Hebron. This is the main, let´s say 
permanent Cps. Could anybody guess if there are there any flying Cps? So maybe it will reach 6 or 7. So I 
said, ok, why should I go to Hebron? Instead to spend 2 or 3 hours from Tulkarm, I spend 5. So when I 
return back, maybe I should sleep in Hebron. It happened with me. So I decided I will not go. So it affects 
our social life […]. Also for the families who are separated behind the wall as Nazlat Isa for 
instance.[…] There social life with their neighbors, with their friends is cut off. They just can contact 
each other by talking from the roof […]” (Interview 6). 
 
She also points out the different situation in the center of the West Bank as compared to 
that in Ramallah and Tulkarm: 
 
“People in Ramallah, it`s different to feel. […] Sometimes, people, who are living in Ramallah, they don´t 
feel the occupation. When they return back to Tulkarm, […]. I mean, there is a woman, working in 
Ramallah, living in Ramallah, she can live her life in Ramallah, […] going hanging out, have friends. But 
when she leaves Ramallah, start to pass the first checkpoint Antara, she can feel the occupation, […] the 
settlements around. So yes, of course the wall influenced the social life of the families” (Interview 6). 
 
With reference to a criminal case (463/09) in March 2009 Judge Nehama Netzer of the 
Kiryat Gat Magristate`s Court wrote: “It is time the State of Israel realizes that no 
punishment, regardless of its severity, will cause Palestinian Authority residents to stop 
seeing Israel as their first, if not main, source of work and livelihood” (Machsom Watch 
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2010:20). This statement shows the significance of Israel for the people in Tulkarm as a 
working place. The salary in Israel is much higher. A lot of the people polled in the 
questionnaire complained about the impact of the Separation Barrier in terms of 
freedom of movement, visiting families and friends, swimming in the sea, but mainly of 
the reduced working opportunities in Israel. The PA is still unable to eliminate 
corruption and to build up a sustainable working environment for Palestinians. Nazlat 
Isa and Jubara, examples used in this thesis, clearly show the negative impact of the 
Separation Barrier in economic and cultural terms. Tulkarm lies in the periphery of the 
oPt due to its geographic and economic situation. Talal Dweikat points out the strength 
of the Tulkarm area for the future of the oPt as follows: 
 
“Most of the rich and the business people were abroad, […] we will work on that, because it would be a 
good investment for Palestinian people to come back to improve the situation […]. I think Tulkarm Area 
is very important for a Palestinian State…[…]We are rich in land, we are rich in water, we are rich in 
educated people. All this figures are important for a future Palestinian state […]“ (Interview 1). 
 
The analysis for the Deir Al-Ghusun gate showed that one reason for the decline in 
border crossings is due to the fact that more applications for permissions are being 
rejected and the numbers of applications are also decreasing. A decline in numbers for 
the year 2009 has been monitored. The stricter permission system as well as the bad 
harvest influenced the number in a negative way. My hypothesis that the number of 
border crossings of farmers, women and children at the Deir Al-Ghusun gate has tended 
to decrease since 2007 has proved to be right. The hypothesis that the so called 
“normalization” process is one key factor that the permission system at agricultural 
gates is widely accepted and that it also has a huge negative impact on the income of the 
farmers could not be proved in this thesis.  
 
However, the term “normalization” was used on a frequent basis by the interviewees 
and seems to play a significant role in accepting the general situation of the occupation. 
The farmers complained about the permission system, but did not see an opportunity to 
be able to change the situation on a sustainable basis (Interview 9). Yehuda Shaul from 
Breaking the Silence pointed out an important aspect of the phenomenon of 
“normalization” when asked if the actual concrete wall or the fence make a difference in 
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the way the soldiers see the occupation when they go to work in the West Bank: 
 
“I don´t think so. […] I think, what really really impacts the way soldier think and see things, is the fact 
that the security situation is calm. And, the fact they don´t have political perspective on thinks, so they 
actually see the status quo as something that was there ever and is going to be forever. […] And that is 
different than like you know, when I go to Hebron now and I see people like leftwing soldier who serve 
their; and it is difficult for them to understand what´s the problem. But in my time it was very easy to see 
what the problem was. And it that sense, I think more soldiers came out from Cast Lead with bad feeling 
of their behavior than from a regular tour […]of Hebron. So it´s like Normalization? Yeah, that´s what 
impacts. It is only the peaks. When your normal life is shaped, that you start to asked question sand thinks 
seem to start wrong. I think in the long run Cast Lead would be like what Operation Defensive Shield was 
for my generation. The peak of 2002 for my generation was, the one thing that was to understand was, we 
are not the victims, and I think for this generation of soldiers it is Cast Lead. Slowly slowly you see it. I 
am not saying you see it in terms of 80 percent of the military thinks this way, I am saying it is 5 percent 
of the military thinks this way, that would be their turning point […]. When things change slowly slowly, 
it doesn´t seem like they are changing, you need this[…], down the cliff, to reunderstand, that something 
is different, something is moving, we are in a different reality. What I thought till now needs to be 
rethought“(Interview 3). 
 
But the environmental challenges arising in the Tulkarm Governorate tied to the 
political tense situation and the socio-economic situation also present opportunities for 
joint projects like an olive mill or waste disposal in the municipality of Tulkarm and in 
Emek Hefer in Israel. Both sites are affected by the consequences of the waste problem 
as the Mountain Aquifer is a trans-boundary resource. 
Consequently, cooperation could not only help to solve the environmental issues in a 
more sustainable way, but could also contribute to a better cross-border understanding 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis. A “Pro-Aquifer” project in Tulkarm and in 
Umm el Fahem, supported joint training and study tours to create common knowledge 
concerning sewage treatment, GIS and a network. The creation of awareness and new 
jobs in the field of environment are just other positive aspects of the joint projects (HRE 
2008:29). 
 
Seen from a Palestinian view the Israeli Government still uses both the threat scenario 
as well as the constant emphasis on the threatening anti-Semitism to secure the almost 
unconditional support of the USA and the countries of Europe. “Dabei wird nicht 
bedacht, dass Israels Regierungspolitik an sich, auch ohne Bezug zum Judentum, 
Anstoß erregen kann“ (Maier 2011:15).  
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Seen from an Israeli perspective the PA seems to be totally overwhelmed by the current 
situation in the West Bank. The idea of using History as a tool to learn for the future - 
for a long- lasting peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, needs to be taken up by both 
sides, the citizens of Israel as well as the Palestinian people.  
 
The effects of the ceasefire which ended the “Operation Pillar of Defense” and the 
upgrade to a non-member observer state at the UN will bring new developments in the 
deadlocked peace process.  
 
 
“If you think you are too small to make a difference, try sleeping in a closed room with a mosquito” 
(Old African Proverb) 
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Appendix 
 
Data matrix Deir Al-Ghusun 
T = Total 
M = Men 
W = Women 
C = Children 
CW = Calender week 
 
Date CW year T M W C 
31.10.07 44 2007 103 89 14 0 
07.11.07 45 2007 95 89 6 0 
27.11.07 48 2007 87 77 6 4 
05.12.07 49 2007 60 55 5 0 
11.12.07 50 2007 79 70 7 2 
23.12.07 51 2007 59 51 7 1 
27.12.07 52 2007 55 52 3 0 
04.01.08 1 2008 35 31 2 2 
09.01.08 2 2008 73 69 4 0     
16.01.08 3 2008 71 67 4 0 
06.02.01 6 2008 63 60 3 0 
12.02.08 7 2008 60 56 4 0 
05.03.08 10 2008 70 65 5 0 
12.03.08 11 2008 67 61 6 0 
20.03.08 12 2008 69 56 13 0 
26.03.08 13 2008 77 69 7 1 
02.04.08 14 2008 59 52 7 0 
14.04.08 16 2008 62 56 6 0 
30.04.08 18 2008 55 49 6 0 
12.05.08 20 2008 43 35 7 1 
19.05.08 21 2008 46 42 4 0 
26.05.08 22 2008 48 45 3 0 
04.06.08 23 2008 44 40 3 1 
18.06.08 25 2008 46 41 5 0 
02.07.08 27 2008 64 54 9 1 
08.07.08 28 2008 65 56 7 2 
14.07.08 29 2008 75 63 7 5 
26.09.08 
 37 2008 58 56 0 2 
13.09.08 38 2008 67 67 0 0 
20.09.08 39 2008 54 54 0 0 
27.09.08 40 2008 92 80 11 2 
04.10.08 41 2008 149 104 32 13 
11.10.08 42 2008 151 107 23 21 
17.10.08 43 2008 185 119 33 33 
25.10.08 44 2008 126 108 17 1 
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29.10.08 45 2008 140 104 16 20 
01.11.08 46 2008 98 84 8 6 
08.11.08 47 2008 77 60 4 13 
22.11.08 49 2008 80 69 10 1 
06.12.08 50 2008 60 56 1 3 
13.12.08 52 2008 57 54 2 1 
27.12.08 1 2009 34 31 2 1 
03.01.09 2 2009 34 33 0 1 
11.01.09 3 2009 42 37 4 1 
24.01.09 4 2009 28 26 1 1 
14.03.09 11 2009 33 31 1 2 
21.03.08 12 2009 33 31 1 1 
28.03.09 14 2009 56 55 0 1 
11.04.09 15 2009 33 31 1 1 
18.04.09 16 2009 42 37 2 3 
25.04.09 17 2009 37 35 1 1 
02.05.09 18 2009 26 26 0 0 
09.05.09 19 2009 45 44 1 0 
16.05.09 20 2009 34 3 1 0 
30.05.09 22 2009 52 44 6 2 
06.06.09 23 2009 61 53 6 2 
11.06.09 24 2009 47 47 0 0 
20.06.09 25 2009 55 50 4 1 
25.06.09 26 2009 43 42 0 1 
22.08.09 34 2009 20 18 0 2 
29.08.09 35 2009 36 33 1 2 
05.09.09 36 2009 19 19 0 0 
12.09.09 37 2009 34 34 0 0 
19.09.09 38 2009 16 16 0 0 
03.10.09 40 2009 71 52 11 8 
10.10.09 41 2009 70 61 1 8 
17.10.09 42 2009 47 40 2 5 
24.10.09 43 2009 60 52 5 3 
31.10.09 44 2009 7 7 0 0 
07.11.09 45 2009 57 51 3 3 
14.11.09 46 2009 41 34 3 4 
19.11.09 47 2009 52 52 0 0 
26.11.09 48 2009 17 17 0 0 
05.12.09 49 2009 39 38 0 1 
26.12.09 52 2009 27 27 0 0 
02.01.10 53 2010 23 23 0 0 
09.01.10 1 2010 18 18 0 0 
23.01.10 3 2010 29 25 4 0 
30.01.10 4 2010 17 17 0 0 
06.02.10 5 2010 12 11 0 1 
13.02.10 6 2010 34 31 2 1 
27.02.10 8 2010 3 3 0 0 
06.03.10 9 2010 27 24 0 3 
13.03.10 10 2010 27 25 2 0 
20.03.10 11 2010 28 26 2 0 
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03.04.10 13 2010 26 26 0 0 
10.04.10 14 2010 27 24 3 0 
18.04.10 15 2010 17 15 1 1 
22.04.10 16 2010 29 26 3 0 
29.04.10 17 2010 23 20 3 0 
15.05.10 19 2010 19 16 1 2 
29.05.10 21 2010 23 23 0 0 
05.06.10 22 2010 20 20 0 0 
14.08.10 32 2010 29 27 0 2 
21.08.10 33 2010 23 22 0 1 
27.08.10 34 2010 24 21 1 2 
08.09.10 36 2010 18 17 0 1 
13.09.10 37 2010 29 29 0 0 
09.10.10 40 2010 111 71 23 17 
16.10.10 41 2010 111 78 25 8 
30.10.10 43 2010 95 78 15 2 
06.11.10 44 2010 84 69 9 6 
13.11.10 45 2010 79 70 2 7 
20.11.10 46 2010 48 48 0 0 
27.11.10 47 2010 75 68 2 5 
04.12.10 48 2010 69 66 3 0 
11.12.10 49 2010 36 25 1 0 
15.12.10 50 2010 69 66 3 0 
22.12.10 51 2010 61 56 5 0 
31.12.10 52 2010 62 59 1 2 
11.01.11 2 2011 35 35 0 0 
22.01.11 3 2011 60 57 3 3 
02.02.11 5 2011 47 46 1 0 
08.02.11 6 2011 24 24 0 0 
16.02.11 7 2011 33 33 0 0 
26.02.11 8 2011 18 16 2 0 
07.03.11 10 2011 46 45 1 0 
16.03.11 11 2011 49 46 3 0 
23.03.11 12 2011 31 31 0 0 
28.03.11 13 2011 28 26 2 0 
13.04.11 15 2011 43 41 2 0 
19.04.11 16 2011 47 45 2 0 
24.04.11 17 2011 43 41 2 0 
03.05.11 18 2011 37 36 1 0 
10.05.11 19 2011 34 32 2 0 
12.07.11 28 2011 39 36 2 1 
20.07.11 29 2011 41 39 2 0 
02.08.11 31 2011 42 42 0 0 
10.08.11 32 2011 43 40 1 2 
24.08.11 34 2011 38 37 1 0 
19.09.11 38 2011 52 50 2 0 
08.10.11 40 2011 89 80 9 0 
15.10.11 41 2011 104 84 17 3 
22.10.11 42 2011 130       
29.10.11 43 2011 125 107 16 2 
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For the calender week 42 2011 there is only total data available and not breakdown between men, women and children 
 
Data calender week: category total 
 
 
CW Total Month Average/Month n=135 
2007 44 103 10 103,00 
 
 
45 95 11 
  
 
48 87 11 91,00 
 
 49 60 12 
  
 
50 79 12 
  
  51 59 12 
  
 
52 55 12 63,25 
 
2008 1 35 1 
  
 
2 73 1 
  
  3 71 1 59,67 
 
 
6 63 2 
  
  7 60 2 61,50 
 
 
10 70 3 
  
 
11 67 3 
  
 
12 69 3 
  
 
13 77 3 70,75 
 
 
14 59 4 
  
 
16 62 4 
  
 
18 55 4 58,67 
 
 
20 43 5 
  
 
21 46 5 
  
 
22 48 5 45,67 
 
 
23 44 6 
  
 
25 46 6 45,00 
 
 
27 64 7 
  
 
28 65 7 
  
 
29 75 7 68,00 
 
 
37 58 9 
  
 
38 67 9 
  
 
39 54 9 59,67 
 
 
40 92 10 
  
 
41 149 10 
  
 
42 151 10 
  
 
43 185 10 
  
 
44 126 10 140,60 
 
 
45 140 11 
  
 
46 98 11 
  
 
47 77 11 105,00 
 
 
49 80 12 
  
 
50 60 12 
  
 
52 57 12 65,67 
 
2009 1 34 1 
  
 
2 34 1 
  
 
3 42 1 
  
 
4 28 1 34,50 
 
 
11 33 3 
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12 33 3 
  
 
14 56 3 40,67 
 
15 33 4 
 
 
16 42 4 
 
 
17 37 4 37,33 
 
18 26 5 
 
 
19 45 5 
 
 
20 34 5 
 
 
22 52 5 35,00 
 
23 61 6 
 
 
24 47 6 
 
 
25 55 6 
 
 
26 43 6 51,50 
 
34 20 8 
 
 
35 36 8 27,50 
 
36 19 9 
 
 
37 34 9 
 
 
38 16 9 23,00 
 
40 71 10 
 
 
41 70 10 
 
 
42 47 10 
 
 
43 60 10 
 
 
44 7 10 51,00 
 
45 57 11 
 
 
46 41 11 
 
 
47 52 11 
 
 
48 17 11 41,75 
 
49 39 12 
 
 
52 27 12 33,00 
2010 53 23 1 
 
 
1 18 1 
 
 
3 29 1 
 
 
4 17 1 21,75 
 
5 12 2 
 
 
6 34 2 
 
 
8 3 2 16,33 
 
9 27 3 
 
 
10 27 3 
 
 
11 28 3 27,33 
 
13 26 4 
 
 
14 27 4 
 
 
15 17 4 
 
 
16 29 4 
 
 
17 23 4 40,67 
 
19 19 5 
 
 
21 23 5 21,00 
 
22 20 6 20,00 
 
32 29 8 
 
 
33 23 8 
 
 
34 24 8 25,33 
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36 18 9 
 
 
37 29 9 23,50 
 
40 111 10 
 
 
41 111 10 
 
 
43 95 10 105,67 
 
44 84 11 
 
 
45 79 11 
 
 
46 48 11 
 
 
47 75 11 71,50 
 
48 69 12 
 
 
49 36 12 
 
 
50 69 12 
 
 
51 61 12 
 
 
52 62 12 59,40 
2011 2 35 1 
 
 
3 60 1 47,50 
 
5 47 2 
 
 
6 24 2 
 
 
7 33 2 
 
 
8 18 2 30,50 
 
10 46 3 
 
 
11 49 3 
 
 
12 31 3 
 
 
13 28 3 39,25 
 
15 43 4 
 
 
16 47 4 
 
 
17 43 4 44,33 
 
18 37 5 
 
 
19 34 5 35,50 
 
28 39 7 
 
 
29 41 7 40,00 
 
31 42 8 
 
 
32 43 8 
 
 
34 38 8 41,00 
 
38 52 9 52,00 
 
40 89 10 
 
 
41 104 10 
 
 
42 130 10 
 
 
43 125 10 112,00 
Note.: For CW 6 2008 were two different data available  
 
 
 
Data calender week: category men 
 
CW Men Month Average/Month n=134 
2007 44 89 10 89,00 
 
45 89 11 
 
 
48 77 11 83,00 
 
49 55 12 
 
 
50 70 12 
 
154 
 
 
51 51 12 
 
 
52 52 12 57,00 
2008 1 31 1 
 
 
2 69 1 
 
 
3 67 1 55,67 
 
6 60 2 
 
 
7 56 2 58,00 
 
10 65 3 
 
 
11 61 3 
 
 
12 56 3 
 
 
13 69 3 62,75 
 
14 52 4 
 
 
16 56 4 
 
 
18 49 4 52,33 
 
20 35 5 
 
 
21 42 5 
 
 
22 45 5 40,67 
 
23 40 6 
 
 
25 41 6 40,50 
 
27 54 7 
 
 
28 56 7 
 
 
29 63 7 57,67 
 
37 56 9 
 
 
38 67 9 
 
 
39 54 9 59,00 
 
40 80 10 
 
 
41 104 10 
 
 
42 107 10 
 
 
43 119 10 
 
 
44 108 10 103,60 
 
45 104 11 
 
 
46 84 11 
 
 
47 60 11 82,67 
 
49 69 12 
 
 
50 56 12 
 
 
52 54 12 59,67 
2009 1 31 1 
 
 
2 33 1 
 
 
3 37 1 
 
 
4 26 1 31,75 
 
11 31 3 
 
 
12 31 3 
 
 
14 55 3 39,00 
 
15 31 4 
 
 
16 37 4 
 
 
17 35 4 34,30 
 
18 26 5 
 
 
19 44 5 
 
 
20 3 5 
 
 
22 44 5 29,25 
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23 53 6 
 
 
24 47 6 
 
 
25 50 6 
 
 
26 42 6 48,00 
 
34 18 8 
 
 
35 33 8 25,50 
 
36 19 9 
 
 
37 34 9 
 
 
38 16 9 23,00 
 
40 52 10 
 
 
41 61 10 
 
 
42 40 10 
 
 
43 52 10 
 
 
44 7 10 42,40 
 
45 51 11 
 
 
46 34 11 
 
 
47 52 11 
 
 
48 17 11 38,50 
 
49 38 12 
 
 
52 27 12 32,50 
2010 53 23 1 
 
 
1 18 1 
 
 
3 25 1 
 
 
4 17 1 20,75 
 
5 11 2 
 
 
6 31 2 
 
 
8 3 2 15,00 
 
9 24 3 
 
 
10 25 3 
 
 
11 26 3 25,00 
 
13 26 4 
 
 
14 24 4 
 
 
15 15 4 
 
 
16 26 4 
 
 
17 20 4 22,20 
 
19 16 5 
 
 
21 23 5 19,50 
 
22 20 6 20,00 
 
32 27 8 
 
 
33 22 8 
 
 
34 21 8 23,33 
 
36 17 9 
 
 
37 29 9 23,00 
 
40 71 10 
 
 
41 78 10 
 
 
43 78 10 75,67 
 
44 69 11 
 
 
45 70 11 
 
 
46 48 11 
 
 
47 68 11 63,75 
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48 66 12 
 
 
49 25 12 
 
 
50 66 12 
 
 
51 56 12 
 
 
52 59 12 54,40 
2011 2 35 1 
 
 
3 57 1 46,00 
 
5 46 2 
 
 
6 24 2 
 
 
7 33 2 
 
 
8 16 2 29,75 
 
10 45 3 
 
 
11 46 3 
 
 
12 31 3 
 
 
13 26 3 37,00 
 
15 41 4 
 
 
16 45 4 
 
 
17 41 4 42,33 
 
18 36 5 
 
 
19 32 5 34,00 
 
28 36 7 
 
 
29 39 7 37,50 
 
31 42 8 
 
 
32 40 8 
 
 
34 37 8 39,76 
 
38 50 9 50,00 
 
40 80 10 
 
 
41 84 10 
 
 
43 107 10 90,33 
 
 
Data calender week: categorie women 
 
CW Women Month Average/Month n=134 
2007 44 14 10 14,00 
 
45 6 11 
 
 
48 6 11 6,00 
 
49 5 12 
 
 
50 7 12 
 
 
51 7 12 
 
 
52 3 12 5,50 
2008 1 2 1 
 
 
2 4 1 
 
 
3 4 1 3,33 
 
6 3 2 
 
 
7 4 2 3,50 
 
10 5 3 
 
 
11 6 3 
 
 
12 13 3 
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13 7 3 7,75 
 
14 7 4 
 
 
16 6 4 
 
 
18 6 4 6,33 
 
20 7 5 
 
 
21 4 5 
 
 
22 3 5 4,67 
 
23 3 6 
 
 
25 5 6 4,00 
 
27 9 7 
 
 
28 7 7 
 
 
29 7 7 7,67 
 
37 0 9 
 
 
38 0 9 
 
 
39 0 9 0,00 
 
40 11 10 
 
 
41 32 10 
 
 
42 23 10 
 
 
43 33 10 
 
 
44 17 10 23,20 
 
45 16 11 
 
 
46 8 11 
 
 
47 4 11 9,33 
 
49 10 12 
 
 
50 1 12 
 
 
52 2 12 4,33 
2009 1 2 1 
 
 
2 0 1 
 
 
3 4 1 
 
 
4 1 1 1,75 
 
11 1 3 
 
 
12 1 3 
 
 
14 0 3 0,67 
 
15 1 4 
 
 
16 2 4 
 
 
17 1 4 1,33 
 
18 0 5 
 
 
19 1 5 
 
 
20 1 5 
 
 
22 6 5 0,67 
 
23 6 6 
 
 
24 0 6 
 
 
25 4 6 
 
 
26 0 6 2,50 
 
34 0 8 
 
 
35 1 8 0,50 
 
36 0 9 
 
 
37 0 9 
 
 
38 0 9 0,00 
 
40 11 10 
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41 1 10 
 
 
42 2 10 
 
 
43 5 10 
 
 
44 0 10 3,80 
 
45 3 11 
 
 
46 3 11 
 
 
47 0 11 
 
 
48 0 11 9,33 
 
49 0 12 
 
 
52 0 12 4,33 
2010 53 0 1 
 
 
1 0 1 
 
 
3 4 1 
 
 
4 0 1 1,00 
 
5 0 2 
 
 
6 2 2 
 
 
8 0 2 0,67 
 
9 0 3 
 
 
10 2 3 
 
 
11 2 3 1,33 
 
13 0 4 
 
 
14 3 4 
 
 
15 1 4 
 
 
16 3 4 
 
 
17 3 4 2,00 
 
19 1 5 
 
 
21 0 5 0,50 
 
22 0 6 0,00 
 
32 0 8 
 
 
33 0 8 
 
 
34 1 8 0,33 
 
36 0 9 
 
 
37 0 9 0,00 
 
40 23 10 
 
 
41 25 10 
 
 
43 15 10 20,33 
 
44 9 11 
 
 
45 2 11 
 
 
46 0 11 
 
 
47 2 11 3,25 
 
48 3 12 
 
 
49 1 12 
 
 
50 3 12 
 
 
51 5 12 
 
 
52 1 12 2,60 
2011 2 0 1 
 
 
3 3 1 1,50 
 
5 1 2 
 
 
6 0 2 
 
 
7 0 2 
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8 2 2 0,75 
 
10 1 3 
 
 
11 3 3 
 
 
12 0 3 
 
 
13 2 3 1,33 
 
15 2 4 
 
 
16 2 4 
 
 
17 2 4 2,00 
 
18 1 5 
 
 
19 2 5 1,50 
 
28 2 7 
 
 
29 2 7 2,00 
 
31 0 8 
 
 
32 1 8 
 
 
34 1 8 0,67 
 
38 2 9 2,00 
 
40 9 10 
 
 
41 17 10 
 
 
43 16 10 14,00 
     
 
Data calender week: categorie children 
 
CW Children Month Average/Month n=134 
2007 44 0 10 0,00 
 
45 0 11 
 
 
48 4 11 2,00 
 
49 0 12 
 
 
50 2 12 
 
 
51 1 12 
 
 
52 0 12 0,75 
2008 1 2 1 
 
 
2 0 1 
 
 
3 0 1 0,67 
 
6 0 2 
 
 
7 0 2 0,00 
 
10 0 3 
 
 
11 0 3 
 
 
12 0 3 
 
 
13 1 3 0,25 
 
14 0 4 
 
 
16 0 4 
 
 
18 0 4 0,00 
 
20 1 5 
 
 
21 0 5 
 
 
22 0 5 0,33 
 
23 1 6 
 
 
25 0 6 0,50 
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27 1 7 
 
 
28 2 7 
 
 
29 5 7 2,67 
 
37 2 9 
 
 
38 0 9 
 
 
39 0 9 0,67 
 
40 2 10 
 
 
41 13 10 
 
 
42 21 10 
 
 
43 33 10 
 
 
44 1 10 23,33 
 
45 20 11 
 
 
46 6 11 
 
 
47 13 11 13,00 
 
49 1 12 
 
 
50 3 12 
 
 
52 1 12 1,67 
2009 1 1 1 
 
 
2 1 1 
 
 
3 1 1 
 
 
4 1 1 1,00 
 
11 2 3 
 
 
12 1 3 
 
 
14 1 3 1,33 
 
15 1 4 
 
 
16 3 4 
 
 
17 1 4 1,67 
 
18 0 5 
 
 
19 0 5 
 
 
20 0 5 
 
 
22 2 5 0,25 
 
23 2 6 
 
 
24 0 6 
 
 
25 1 6 
 
 
26 1 6 1,00 
 
34 2 8 
 
 
35 2 8 2,00 
 
36 0 9 
 
 
37 0 9 
 
 
38 0 9 0,00 
 
40 8 10 
 
 
41 8 10 
 
 
42 5 10 
 
 
43 3 10 
 
 
44 0 10 4,80 
 
45 3 11 
 
 
46 4 11 
 
 
47 0 11 
 
 
48 0 11 1,75 
 
49 1 12 
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52 0 12 0,50 
2010 53 0 1 
 
 
1 0 1 
 
 
3 0 1 
 
 
4 0 1 0,00 
 
5 1 2 
 
 
6 1 2 
 
 
8 0 2 0,67 
 
9 3 3 
 
 
10 0 3 
 
 
11 0 3 1,00 
 
13 0 4 
 
 
14 0 4 
 
 
15 1 4 
 
 
16 0 4 
 
 
17 0 4 0,20 
 
19 2 5 
 
 
21 0 5 1,00 
 
22 0 6 0,00 
 
32 2 8 
 
 
33 1 8 
 
 
34 2 8 1,67 
 
36 1 9 
 
 
37 0 9 0,50 
 
40 17 10 
 
 
41 8 10 
 
 
43 2 10 10,67 
 
44 6 11 
 
 
45 7 11 
 
 
46 0 11 
 
 
47 5 11 4,50 
 
48 0 12 
 
 
49 0 12 
 
 
50 0 12 
 
 
51 0 12 
 
 
52 2 12 0,40 
2011 2 0 1 
 
 
3 3 1 1,50 
 
5 0 2 
 
 
6 0 2 
 
 
7 0 2 
 
 
8 0 2 0,00 
 
10 0 3 
 
 
11 0 3 
 
 
12 0 3 
 
 
13 0 3 0,00 
 
15 0 4 
 
 
16 0 4 
 
 
17 0 4 0,00 
 
18 0 5 
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19 0 5 0,00 
 
28 1 7 
 
 
29 0 7 0,50 
 
31 0 8 
 
 
32 2 8 
 
 
34 0 8 0,67 
 
38 0 9 0,00 
 
40 0 10 
 
 
41 3 10 
 
 
43 2 10 1,67 
 
Average month tabular form 
 
Border crossings Total Deir al Ghusun (2007-2011) 
Month 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
January   59,67 34,50 21,75 47,50 
February   61,50 37,59 16,33 30,50 
March   70,75 40,67 27,33 39,25 
April   58,67 37,33 40,67 44,33 
May   45,67 35,00 21,00 35,50 
June   45,00 51,50 20,00 37,75 
July   68,00 39,50 22,66 40,00 
August   63,84 27,50 25,33 41,00 
September   59,67 23,00 23,50 52,00 
October 103,00 140,60 51,00 105,67 112,00 
November 91,00 105,00 41,75 71,50   
December 63,25 65,67 33,00 59,40   
CW 42 2011 data deleted due to missing individual data for the categories M, W,C 
 
08/08 arithmetic average from 07/08 and 09/08 
   02/09 arithmetic average from 01/09 and 03/09 
   07/09 arithmetic average from 06/09 and 08/09 
   07/10 arithmetic average from 06/10 and 08/10 
   06/11 arithmetic average from 05/11 and 07/11 
    
 
 
 
Border crossings Men  Deir al Ghusun (2007-2011) 
Month 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
January   55,67 31,75 20,75 46,00 
February   58,00 35,38 15,00 29,75 
March   62,75 39,00 25,00 37,00 
April   52,33 34,30 22,20 42,33 
May   40,66 29,25 19,50 34,00 
June   40,50 48,00 20,00 35,75 
July   57,67 36,75 21,66 37,50 
August   58,34 25,50 23,33 39,67 
September   59,00 23,00 23,00 50,00 
October 89,00 103,60 42,40 75,67 90,33 
November 83,00 82,67 38,50 63,75   
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December 57,00 59,67 32,50 54,40   
CW 42 2011 data deleted due to missing individual data for the categories M, W,C 
      08/08 arithmetic average from 07/08 und 09/08 
   02/09 arithmetic average from 01/09 und 03/09 
   07/09 arithmetic average from 06/09 und 08/11 
   07/10 arithmetic average from 06/10 und 08/10 
   06/11 arithmetic average from 05/11 und 07/11 
    
Border Crossings Women Deir al Ghusun (2007-2011) 
Month 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
January   3,33 1,75 1,00 1,50 
February   3,50 1,21 0,67 0,75 
March   7,75 0,67 1,33 1,33 
April   6,33 1,33 2,00 2,00 
May   4,67 0,67 0,50 1,50 
June   4,00 2,50 0,00 1,75 
July   7,67 1,50 0,17 2,00 
August   3,83 0,50 0,33 0,67 
September   0,00 0,00 0,00 2,00 
October 14,00 23,20 3,80 20,33 14,00 
November 6,00 9,33 9,33 3,25   
December 5,50 4,33 4,33 2,60   
CW 42 2011 data deleted due to missing individual data for the categories M, W,C 
      08/08 arithmetic average from 07/08 and 09/08 
   02/09 arithmetic average from 01/09 and 03/09 
   07/09 arithmetic average from 06/09 and 08/09 
   06/11 arithmetic average from 05/11 and 07/11 
    
 
 
 
 
Border Crossings Children Deir al Ghusun (2007-2011) 
Month 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
January   0,67 1,00 0,00 1,50 
February   0,00 1,17 0,67 0,00 
March   0,25 1,33 1,00 0,00 
April   0,00 1,67 0,20 0,00 
May   0,33 0,25 1,00 0,00 
June   0,50 1,00 0,00 0,25 
July   2,67 1,50 0,83 0,50 
August   1,67 2,00 1,67 0,67 
September   0,67 0,00 0,50 0,00 
October 0,00 23,33 4,80 10,67 1,67 
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November 2,00 13,00 1,75 4,50   
December 0,75 1,67 0,50 0,40   
CW 42 2011 data deleted due to missing individual data for the categories M, W,C 
      08/08 arithmetic average from 07/08 and 09/08 
   02/09 arithmetic average from 01/09 and 03/09  
   07/09 arithmetic average from 06/09 and 08/09 
   07/10 arithmetic average from 06/10 and 08/10 
   06/11 arithmetic average from 05/11  and 07/11 
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Part 1/ Page1/ Questionnaire Data Matrix 
 
Nr Age Gender 
Place 
of 
birth 
Year of 
residents 
Place of 
residents  
Members 
of Family 
Members 
of 
Household 
Spending on 
transportation 
for the family 
in NIS/daily 
Family 
status 
Year of 
marriage 
Education 
1 28 1 0   0 7 0       1 
2 53 1 0/3   0 6 9 10 1 1983 1 
3 26 1 3   3 10 0   1   2 
4 40 1     3 5 3   1 1998 2 
5 20 1 0   0 8 4 0 0 1995 1 
6 52 1 3   3 5 3 10 1 1989 1 
7 23 0 3   3 10 0       2 
8 55 1     3 11 5 20 1     
9 48 1     1 8 8   1 1983 0 
10 47 1       8 8 3   1986 0 
11 28 1       9 0         
12 52 1   1996 3 5 5   1   2 
13 42 1 3   0 7 5 70 1 1989 1 
14 53 1 0   0 9 5 120 1 1985 2 
15 50 1     3 6 4   1 1999 2 
16 55 1 0   0 4 4 20 1 1980 1 
17 44 1     3 7 5 60 1 1997 1 
18 52 0     0 8 6 30 1 1989 1 
19 45 1   1967 0 6 4   1 1996 1 
20 57 1 3   3 5 3   1 1980 0 
21   0     3 2 0 0 0   2 
22 33 0 6   3 6 4   1 1998 2 
23 32 0       7 8 30 0   1 
24 29 1       4 2   1 2006 1 
25 30 1       3 0   1   1 
26 37 1       7 5   1 1996 1 
27 47 1       6 4 70 1 1990 2 
28 37 1       5 4 0 1 2001 1 
29 59 1       5 3 0 1 1962 2 
30 19 0             0   2 
169 
 
31 53 1       5 5 40 1 1987 1 
32 52 1       6 4 0 1 1990 1 
33 33 1       7 5 15 1 1998 1 
34 45 1       8 6 30 1 1990 0 
35 23 1       4 5 0 0   2 
36 23 1       11 0 25 0   2 
37 13 0       9   0     0 
38 32 1       6 2   1 2008 2 
39 45 1       6 4   1 1994 2 
40   0       10 6 40 1 1985 1 
41 50 1       10 8 20 1 1986 1 
42 20 1       10   60 0   2 
43 58 1       5 5 100 1 1982 1 
44 27 0       3 1   1 2009 2 
45 51 1       6 4   1 1991 1 
46 23 1       5 0 50 0   2 
47 53 1 3   3 5 3   1 1972 2 
48 47 1     3 5 3 35 1 1990 1 
49 23 1 3   1 10 0 38 0   2 
50   0     3 10 0 30 0   2 
51 25 0 3   0 6 0 0 1 2011 2 
52 31 0 8   1 4 3 0 1   2 
53 28 1 5   11 5 3   1 2006 2 
54 56 0 7   3 5 3 34 0   2 
55 25 1 5   12 5 0 35 0   2 
56 50 1 6   3 7 0 100   1979 1 
57 34 1 3   3 0 9 1 1   2 
58 40 1 7   10 6 4   1 2000 2 
59 52 1 2   2 7 5   1 1994 1 
60 43 1 9   10 7 4   1 1998 2 
61 39 1 3   2 7 4 15 1 1979 1 
62   1 2   2 4 2 40   1970   
63 44 0 1   1 12 10 70 1 1990 2 
64   1     3 2 0   1 2011 2 
65 23 1     3 8   5     2 
66 39 1 6   6 6 3   1 2005 1 
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67 35 1 1   1 6 3   1 2006 1 
68 28 1     1 14 4   1 2003 0 
69 36 1 1   1 >14 5 0 1 1997 2 
70 29 1 1   1 2     1 2011 0 
71 38 1       2     1 1999 1 
72 46 1 0,1   1 14 4   1 2000 1 
73 37 1 2   2 7 4 20 1 1990 1 
74 58 1 3   2 13 3 90     0 
75   1 3   3 4 4 0 1 1999 2 
76 17 0 3   2 4 4   0   0 
77 60 1 6   6 9     1 1962 0 
78 25 1     1 10 1   1 2007 1 
79 49 1     0 7 2 50   1983 1 
80 68 0 4   4 6 2   2   2 
81 59 1 4   4 6 4 25 1 1979 2 
82 68 1 4   4 6 4   1 1971 1 
83 23 1 3   0 4 2 20 1 2004 1 
84 46 1 4   4 6 4 50 1 1990 2 
85 52 1 0   0 6 4 40 1 1989 1 
86 55 1     1 3 0   1 84 2 
87   1     3 5 3   1 2001 1 
88 34 1     3 5 3   1 2005 2 
89 31 1 5   5 4 2 0 0   0 
90   1     3 4 2   1 2007 2 
91   1     10 3 1   1 2009 2 
92   0     10 5 3 x 1 2005 2 
93 55 1 3   0 5 3   1 1977 2 
94 45 0 3   3 7 5   1 1991 2 
95 31 1 0   0 7 5   1 2007 2 
96 20 1 13   0 4 3   1 1971 1 
97 62 1 3   4 6 9       2 
98 45 1     1 6     1 1990 2 
99 50 1 ?     14 12 100 1 1985 1 
100 33 1 3   0 5 3   1 2005 2 
101 40 0     10 3 0   0   2 
102 46 1     0 5 1 1 1 1995 2 
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103 53 1 14   0 1 2 70 1 1996 1 
104 20 1 1   1 1 2   1 199?   
105 25 0 0   0 5 3   1 2005 1 
106 46 1 3 1980 3 5 3 80 1 1992 2 
107 19 1 3   1 0 0   0   2 
108 22 0 6   6 0 0       2 
109 50 1     3 8   60 1 1982 0 
110 45 1 0   1 10 8 100 1 1996 0 
111 23 0     1 9 7 0 1 2007 1 
112 26 0 0   0 3 1   1 1999 1 
113 32 0 7   3 6 4   1 2000 2 
114 33 0 3   3 4 2   1 1999 2 
115 52 1 4   4 8 6 50 1 1984 0 
116 39 1 3   3 6 4 0 1 2003 1 
117 62 1 3   3 10 4 30 1 1976 2 
118 45 1 3   3 10 4   1 1994 2 
119 48 0 3   3 3 0   0   2 
120 60 1 2   2 8 6 20 1 1975 1 
121   1 3   2 9         0 
122 60 1 3   3 7 5 20 1 1976 1 
123 50 1 3   3 10 5   1 1990 2 
124 20 1 3   3   0   0   1 
125 43 1 3   3 7 5 5 1 1992 2 
126 43 1     3 8 5       1 
127 20 1 3   3 7     0   1 
128 19 1 7 2011 3 6 0   0   1 
129 52 1     3 8 3       1 
130 53 1 0   0 8 2 80 1 1985 2 
131 56 1 6   6 5 1 30 1 1974 0 
132 50 1 6   6 6   50 1 1990 1 
133 38 1 3   3 8 8 40 1 1990 1 
134 35 1     1 4 3   1 2001 2 
135 70 1 0   0 12 3 20 1 1975 1 
136 48 1 3   3 12 3 20 1 1988 1 
137 28 1 3   0 8 4 10 1 1991 1 
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138 61 1 4   4 9 5 100 1 1972 2 
139 29 1 8   0 >14 9   1 2004 1 
140 46 1   1980 15 4 2 o 1 1990 1 
141 31 1 3   3 4 2   1 2007 2 
142 58 1 4   4 7 7 30 1 1979 1 
143 69 1 0   0 8 3 0 1 1969 1 
144 26 0 0   0 6 4 0 1 2000 1 
145 54 1 0   0 7 5 25 1 1987 2 
146 61 1 4   4 7 5 0 1 1976 1 
147 36 1 3   0 6 4 0 1 2000 2 
148 70 1 3   3   4 30 1 1970 2 
149 31 0     0 2 4   1   1 
150 54 1       9 6 20 1 1979 0 
151 61 0 4   4 10 8         
152 22 1     3 8     0   2 
153 62 0     1 8 3   0     
 
 
 
Part 2/Page 1/Questionnaire Data Matrix 
Place of graduation 
Date of 
graduation  
Members of 
family with 
Income 
Monthly 
salary for 
family 
Field of 
profession 
Place of 
Work 
Travel 
time to 
work 
Travel 
time 
from 
work 
Return to 
home daily 
Time  
  
3 15 2 0 2 2 1 4 
   
1000   0     1 5 
 
2006 0 
 
3 0 0 0 1 7 
   
2000 2 0 0 0 1 5 
  
2 2500 
  
  
   
 
1989 1 300 16 0 0 0 1 6 
 
2011 2 2000 11 0 1 1 1 9 
 
    1500 26 0 0 0 1 6 
 
  1 1600 23           
 
  1 2000 27       1 5 
 
2002 2 1800 28   0 0 1 6 
 
  2 5000 20 0 0 0 1 5 
School of Shweika 1987 1 5000 24 0 0 0 1 5 
 
1985 1 2000 1 2 1 2 0 3 
 
1990 2 2000 16 0 0 0 1 5 
 
1974 1 2000 2 0 1 1 1 3 
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  1986 0 2500   2 2 2 1 3 
Literature School 1988 0       3 3 0 5 
 
  1 2000 3 0     1 6 
 
1971 3 900 3 0 0   1 8 
 
2003 2 3000 15 0 0 0 1 6 
 
1991 2 1000 11 0 0 0 1 7 
 
  0 1500 19 0   4 1 2 
 
1998     2 0 0 0 1 5 
School of Shweika   3 2000 2 0 1 0 1 6 
  1991 0 2600 16 0 3 o 0 0 
    1 4000 15 0 2 3 1 7 
School of Shuhan 1993 0 2800   1 6 4 0 2 
 
1982 0 3000 3 0 0 0   7 
 
  1 1700     0 0 0 6 
 
1972 0 1500 1 2 2 3 1 2 
 
  0 1500 1 2 1   1 3 
 
  0 1800 23 0 1 1 1 4 
 
    2200 1 2 4 4 1 2 
 
  1 2000             
 
2011 1 2500 6 1 6 5 1 1 
 
  1 2000             
 
2006   2300 8 0 1 1 0 5 
 
1991 1 2500 29 0 1 1 1 5 
 
1982 0 2000 1 0 2 2 1 4 
 
1978 1 3000 6 0 3 4 1 1 
Arabic American 
University Jenin 
  3 3000     2 2 1 4 
  1969 1 3000 5           
    1 not stable 8 0 0 0 0 6 
    0 2000 25 0 0 0 1 1 
  1979 2 3500 9 0 0 0 1 7 
Louisiana/US 1982 3 3000 8 0 0 0 1 7 
    1 2500   2 2 3 1 3 
University of Najar 2011 2 2300   1 6 5 0 1 
Nablus 2011 1 2700             
Technical Palestinian 
University 2009 2 2500 21 0 1 1 1 6 
Al Quds University 2010 2 0   0 1 1 0 5 
Technical University 
Tulkarm 2006 0 3200 8 0 1 1 1 5 
Najar University   2 5000 2 0 1 2 1 5 
Najar University   3 5000 21 0 3 3 1 4 
  1975 4 2500 20 2 2 3 0 2 
Najar University   1 2500     1 1 1 5 
Jamurk 1994 2 5800 8 2 1 1 1 5 
    0 1000 7 1 4 4 1 1 
    0 2800   2 1 2 1 4 
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Al Quds University   1   7 2 2 2 1 4 
    1 2500   0 1 2 1 3 
  2005 1 2500             
Al Quds University 2012 0 3000 5 0 0 0 1 6 
Khadoury 2010 1 2000 7 0 1 0 1 5 
 
1990 0 2000 1 0/2 2 2 1 2 
 
      28 0 1 1 1 4 
 
1996 0 2100 16   1 1 0 6 
 
2001 none 2400     1 1 0 5 
 
  0     0 2 2 1 3 
 
  0 1500   0 0 0 1 2 
 
  0   1 0 2 3 1 3 
 
1993 1 2000   0 3 3 1 2 
  1970 1 2000 2 0   1 1 0 
University of 
Bethlehem   2 6000   0 0 0 1 5 
Shufa School   1 3500 0           
 
1959 1   1 0 1 7 1 5 
 
                  
 
1981 0   2 0 0 0 0 5 
 
  3     2 1 1 1 5 
Beirut University 1975 2 1000 3 0 6 6   7 
 
1962 5 11700 9 0 0 0 1 6 
 
  2 2500 2 0 0 0 1 5 
 
1985 1 2000 9 0 0 0 1 6 
 
1985 1 1800   0 0 0 1 5 
 
1979 1 3300 8 0 0 0 1 5 
 
1996 1 2000 13 0 2 2 1 6 
Al Quds University 2008 1 4000 8 0 1 1 1 5 
    3 1000   1 1 1 1 4 
Kafr Sur 2004 2 5000 8 0 1 1 1 5 
Kafr Sur 2001 1 2000   0 1 2 1 4 
 
1998   3000 8 0 0 0 1 5 
 
1975 1 2000 2 0 0 0 1 3 
 
1984 2 4800 9 0 1 1 1 6 
 
1998 0 1500-2000 2 0 1 1 1 5 
 
        0 0 0 1 5 
 
  3 6000   0 0 0 1 4 
Kalil Institut   0 1500     0 0 1 4 
  1981 2 8000 13 0 1 1 1 7 
  1998 1 2000-2500     1 1 1 5 
Al Quds University   1 1600 9 0 2 0   5 
    1 1000-1500 9 0 0 0 1 6 
  1985 3 1000 19 0 0 0 1 5 
          0 1 1 1 3 
Shweika School   1 2000             
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  1987 0 2500 3 0 0 0 1 4 
Al Quds University   0       0       
Khadoury 2010 1 1600 20 0 2 2 1 5 
 
1975 3 4000 3 0 2 2 1 2 
 
1976 1 2000-2500 2 0 0 0 1 5 
 
2005 0 2000   0         
 
1985 0 2200 19 0 1 1 1 4 
Bizeit University 2000 2 9000 15 0 0 0 1 6 
An Najar University 2000 2 10000 15 0 0 0 1 5 
  1979 1 2000 12 0 0 0 1 6 
Shweika School 1986 1 3000   2 2 2 1 3 
 
1972 2 6000 3 0 0 0 1 5 
 
  1 5000 3 0/1/2     1 5 
 
1982 0 700 3 0 0 0 1 6 
 
  1 2500   0 2 2 1 4 
Fatalila School     2000             
 
1975 2 2600 3 0 1 1 1 7 
 
  2 4500 15 0 3 3 1 5 
Bizeit University   2 4500             
 
1989 2 4000-4500 9 0 0 0 1 6 
 
1984 1 2000-2500 3 0 1 1 1 4 
 
  1 1000   0 1 1 1 7 
 
  1 5000   0 0 1 1 7 
 
  1   21 0 2 2 1 5 
 
1980 1 2000 2 0 0 0 1 5 
 
1970 0 1000-1500 2 0 1 1 1 4 
 
1960 0 2000 0 0 0 1 u 5 
 
1971   1900 2 0 0 0 1 5 
University of 
Jerusalem Abu Dies   0 3000 21 0 1 1 1 5 
 
1972 2 2000-4000             
 
1981 0 6             
 
1990 0 1500   0 0 7 1 5 
 
1976 2 1500 30   0 0 1 5 
Shweika School 2001 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 5 
 
1982 1 3000-4000 3 0 0 0 1 6 
 
2003 1 2000   0 0 0 0 6 
 
  2 10000 1 0 0 0 1 3 
 
  2 2500 0 0 0 0 1   
 
2000 1 2000             
 
1981 1 2000 2 0 0 0 1 3 
 
1971 2 1000-1200 1 0 7 7 1 9 
 
1997 4 4500 2 0 0 0 1 5 
 
      17 3 0 0 1 6 
 
  3     0 2 1 1 5 
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  1969 2 2000   0 0 0 1 5 
          0 0 0 1 1 
  2008 4     0 0 0 1 1 
    2     0 0 0 0 1 
 
 
Nr 
Obstacles on 
the way to 
work 
Location of 
obstacle 
Means of 
transport  
Cost for public 
transport 
Travel 
time to 
station 
Impact of 
obstacle on 
work 
Kind of 
impact 
Influence of the 
Separation 
Barrier on the 
profession 
Influence 
1 0   1 3 0 1 4 0   
2     1             
3 0   3     0   0   
4 0                 
5 0     0 0 0   0   
6 0     5   0   0   
7 0   2 0 1 0   0   
8 0   0     1   0   
9     1     1   0   
10     1     1 4 1 4 
11 0 4 0 5 0 1   1 0 
12 0   3     0   1 11 
13 0   3 0 1 1 11 11 17 
14 0   3 5   1 11 1 17 
15 0   3     0 0 0   
16 0   3     1   1   
17                 4 
18       1   4   1   
19 1 4 4     1 4 1 0 
20 0   0     1 8 0   
21                   
22 0   0 5   0   0   
23       0           
24 0   3 5 4 1 4 1 17 
25 0   2   1 1   1   
26 1   1 4 2 0       
27 1 4 1 2 3 1   0   
28 0   0,2 4 4 1 7 0   
29 0   0 5   0   0   
30 0   1 0 0     0   
31 1 0 /1 0,4     1   1   
32 1 0 4             
33 0   0 5   1   0   
34 1 0 8 2 3 1   0   
35 0                 
36 0   0,1 4 1 1 4,12 0   
37 1 3               
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38 0   1 0 0 0   0   
39 0   2 1   0   0   
40 1 3 0,1 2 3 1 8 1 17 
41 0 3 0,2 1 1 1 16 1 17 
42 0     0 1 0   0   
43                   
44 0   3 0 1 1 11     
45 0   0     0 0 0   
46 0   1 0 0 0   0   
47 0   3 0 0 0   1 17 
48 1 1 0 5   1 4,14 1 17 
49 0     0,1 4 4 1 1 0 
50                   
51 0 2 0 2 0 2   0   
52   0 3 2   1 7,12 1 17 
53 1 4 1 0 0 0   1 17 
54 0   1 0 3 0 0 0   
55 1 4 1,2 2 2 0 0 0   
56 1 1 9     1 11 1 7 
57 1 4 2 1 0 0   0   
58 0   2 0   1 8 0   
59 1 2 2 3 3 1 8   1 
60 0   2 1 2         
61 1 3 1 2 2     1   
62 1 3 2 2 3 1   1   
63                   
64 0   0       0 1 12 
65 1 4 1 4 4     1 11 
66 1 0 4     1 7     
67 0   0     1 4 1 16 
68 0   3 5 1 0   1 17 
69 0   2 0 0 0 0 1 4 
70 0   4     1 6 1 6 
71 0   1 0 0 1 4 1 6 
72 1 0 4     1 7     
73 1 3 4 3   1   1 4 
74 0 3, 4 1 3 3 1   1 4 
75 0   3     1 12 0   
76 0                 
77 0   2 0 3 0   0   
78 1 0 0 5   1 4 0   
79 0   3 5   1 4 1   
80 1 4 7 5   1 6 0 1 
81 1 4 3 5 1 1 6,8 1   
82 0   0 5   0   0   
83 0   3 5   1   1 11 
84 0   0     0   0   
85 0   3 5   1   1   
86 0   0     0   0   
87 1 2 2 0 4 1   1   
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88 0   1 0 0 0   0   
89 0   1 1 0 0   0   
90 1 4 2 1 2 1   0   
91   4 2 0 2 1 6,1 0   
92 0   2 1 1 1   0   
93 0   2 5   1 4,12 1 17 
94 0   1,2 0   1 11 0   
95 0   1     1 4 1 17 
96 0   3 0 2 1   1   
97 0   2     1   1   
98 0   0 5 1 0   0   
99   4 3     1 4,11 0   
100       0 3 1       
101   4 1     1 7     
102 0   3     1 11 1 17,4 
103 0 4 0 5 1 0   0   
104 0   0     1   1   
105                   
106 0   2 0 0 0   0   
107 0   2 0 2         
108 0   1 0 2 0     0 
109 1 1 2 3 2 1 11 0   
110 1 3 0 5 0 1 7 1 4 
111 0         0   0   
112 0   0 5 0 1 11 0   
113 0   3     0   0   
114 0   3     0   1 7,17 
115 0   0     0   1 4 
116   4 8 5 3 1   1 11 
117 0   0 5 0 1   1 12 
118   4 3     1   1 12 
119 0   3     1 11 1 11,17 
120 1 3 8     1 11 1 6,11 
121                   
122 0   0     1   1 17 
123 1 4 1 1 1 1 11 1 17 
124                   
125 0   1,2 0 1 1 11 1 17 
126 1 2 0     1 6 1 6,17 
127                   
128 0     1           
129     1 1 2 1 7 1   
130 0   3     0   0   
131 0   1 1 3 1 4 1 17 
132 0   1 5   1 12 1 4,17 
133 0   2   1 1   1 17 
134 0   1 0 1 0   1 17 
135 0                 
136 0   3 0 1     1   
137 0   1 1 3 1   0   
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138 0   0 5 3 1   0   
139 0   1 5 1 1   1   
140 0   0             
141 0   3     0   0   
142 1 4 0 5 4 1   1 17 
143 0         0   0   
144                   
145 0   0     1   1   
146 0 4 0     1 6 3   
147     3 4   1 11 0   
148 0     3   0   1 11 
149 0   2 0 1 1   1   
150 0   2 5 0 0   0   
151                   
152 0   0 5   0       
153 0 0 0 0 0 0   0   
 
Part 2/ Page 2/ Questionnaire Data Matrix  
 
Place of shopping 
Travel 
time 
Obstacles 
Transportation 
with car 
Place 
of 
health 
care 
Travel 
time 
Nearest 
Hospital 
Travel 
Time 
Free time 
activities 
Place of 
free time 
activities  
3 0 0 1 3 0 3 0 3 2 
3 3   1 3 1 3 1 0 0 
3 1 0 1   1 1 1 11,12 0,1,3 
3 4 0 1 3 2 3 2 4 0 
3 1 0 1 3 0 3 0 3,5 0,9,13 
3 0 0 1 3 0 3 0 0   
3 2 0 0 3 2 3 2 4 1 
3   0   3 1   1     
        6 2 1 3 4 0 
3 1 0 1 3 2 3 2 0 0 ,2 
      0 3 3 3 1 4 9 
3 3 0 1 3 1   1 20 0 
3 1 0 1   4 15 2 6   
0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 4 0 
3 2 0 1 3 2 15 2 2,5 15 
3 1 0 1 3 2 3 2 7 0 
                    
0,3 2 0 1 3 2 15 2 0, 14 0 
0,3 2 0 1 3 2 3 2 6 2 
3 1 0 0 3 1 1 1 6 6 
                    
3 0 0 0 3 2 15 0 5 0 
3 0 0 1 3 0 3 0 0,2   
3 2 0 1   0 3 1 6   
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0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 6 6 
3 2 0 1   2   2     
3 3 0 0   2 3 3 2 14 
3 4 0 1 2 1 1 4 3,2 9 
3 0 0 0 3 0   1 7 0 
3 4 0 0     3 2 4 0 
3 4 0   6 2 3 3 4 0 
3 3 0       3 3     
3 2 0 0 3 2 3 2 6 0 
  3 1 0 1 2 3 3 6   
3 2 0   3 3 3 2 8   
3 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 5,9 9 
3 3 1 1 3 3 3 3 4   
3 1 0 0 3 1 3 1 0,2 0 
3 4 1 0     3 3   20 
3 3 1 1 3 3 3 3 14 14 
3 4 1 1 3 4 3   4 0 
3 1 0 1 3 2 1 2 16 0,9 
3 1 0   1 1 3 1 4 0 
3 0 1 1 3 1 3 1 0.2 1,5 
3 0 0 1 3 1 3 1 14 1 
3 1 0 0 3 1 3 1 3,5 0,9 
3 4 0 1   1 3 0 0, 1,2, 18,  2 
3 3 0 0 6 0 3 3 18,2 0.2 
3 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 7,12 0. 9,20 
3 1 0 1 3 0 3 0 5 0 
3 1 0 0 0 1 3 2 5, 7, 18 0 
3 3 1 1 3 3 1 3 0 0 
3 3 1 0 11 0 3 3 1 0 
3 3 0 1 3 3 3 3 18 0 
4 1 0 1 5 0 9 2 5 0,2 
6 2   2 3 2,3 3 4 20   
3 3 0 1 3 3   3 4 0 
3   1 1   1 3 3 14 0,2,14 
  4 1 0 10 1 3 4 2 14 
3 4 1 1   3 3       
3 3 1 1 3 4 3 3 0, 14 0 
3 3 1 1 2 1 3 3 14 14 
3 2   0 1 1 1 1 20 0,15 
3 1 0 1 3 2   2 8 0 
3 1 1   3 1 3 1 0   
3 4 1 1 6 2 3 3 20 0.5 
there is no domain for shopping, no money       3 2 15 2 4 3 
3 3 0 1 1 2 3 3 4 9 
3 4 0 1 3 4 1 4   0,7 
3 3 0 1 1 2 3 2 3 0 
3 2 0 0   0 3 2 18 0 
  3 0 0 1 1 15 3 3 3 
3 4 1 0 3 4 15 4   0 
  3                 
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  3 0 0 3 2 3 31 4 4 
3 3 1 0 3 3 3 3     
3 3 1   8 1 3 3 2, 18 0 
        1 3 15 3 4 12 
3 3 0 1 3   3 2 4 0 
4 1 0 1 5 1 3 3 4 0 
3,4 4 1 1 3 3 3 3 0,14 20 
3 3 0 1   0 3 3 0,14 0 
3 2 0 1 0 1 3 0 3,12 2 
3 3 0 1 3 3 3 3 5 0 
3 3 0 1 3 2 3 1   0 
3 2 0 1 3 2   2 14,18 0,14 
3,4 4 1 0,1 3 3 15 3,4     
3 1 0 1 3 1 3 1 5 0 
  4 0 0 5 1 5 1 6 6 
3 2 1 1   1   3 14 1,2 
3   1 1 3 4 3 4 8 0 
3 3 0 1 10 2 3 3 1 0 
3 2 1 2 3 0 3 0 6 0 
3 2 0 1 3 2 3 2 0 0 
3 1 0 1 3 2 3 2 6 6 
4 4 0 1   2   2   0 
3 3 0 1 0 2 3 3 4 9 
3 2 0   0 2 3 1 8 0 
3 3 1 1 3 2 3 2 0,14 0,1, 14 
3 2   1 3 3 3 1 4 0 
3 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 18 0 
3 1 0 1 3 3 3 2 4 0 
3 1 0 0 3 1 3 1 7 19 
3 3 0   3 1 3 3     
4 1 0 1 3 1 3 1 1 0 
3 0 0 1 3 0 3 0 14 1,2 
3 2 1 1 0 2   2 18 0 
4 3 0 2 6 1 3 3 18 0 
3 3 1 1 3 2 3 2 14 14 
3 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 6 20 
3 3 0 0 1 2 3 1 14 7 
3 1 0 0 3 1 3 1 1,18,8 0,1 
3 1 0 1 3 0 1 1 20 0,15 
4 4 0 1   1 3 2 17, 8, 20 0,15 
3 3 0 1 4 1 3 3 4 0 
3 2 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 
3 0 0 0   0 1 0 17,18,20 2,9 
3,4 3 1 1   1 1 1 20 0,1,2 
3 1 0 1   1 3 1 2 5,2 
3 4 1 0 3 3   4 1 1,2 
3 3 1 1 3 3 3 3     
3 1 0 2   2 3 2 1 0 
3 2 0 2   2 3 2 2, 14 2 
                4 2 
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3 1 0 1 3 1   1 9,1 9 
3 2 0 1 3 2 3 2     
3 4 0 1 3 1 3 2 18 0,15 
3,4 0 0 0 3 1   1 5 0 
3 3 0 0 3 3 3 3 4 0 
3 1 0 1   1 3 1 4 9 
3 3 0 1 3 3 3 3 6 6 
3 0 0 1 3 0 3 0 4 0 
3 0 0 1 3 0 3 1 6 0 
3 2 0 1   1 3 2 18 0 
3 2 0 1 3 2 3 2 0 0 
3 2 0 1 3 1 3 2 18 2 
0 2 0 1 3 2 3 1     
3 3 0 1 4 2 3 3     
3 1 0 1   1 3 1 12 12 
3   0 1 3 2 3 2 0,14 0,2 
3 4 0 1 3 1 1 1 17,9 17,9 
3 3 1 1 3 3 3 3 0,19 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 3 0 3 0 7 0 
3 1 0 1 3 1 3 1 10 0 
3 3 1 1 3, 4 1,3 3 3 14 0.2  
0 2 0 1 3 0 3 0 10 0 
3 3 0 0 3 2 3 2 8 0 
0 0 0 1   1   2     
3 0 0 0   0 3 0 4 0 
                    
3 3 0 1   1   0     
3 0 0 1   0   0     
 
 
Nr 
Visit of 
restaurants 
Place 
Number of 
visits 
Obstacles on 
the way to the 
restaurant 
Influence of the 
Separation 
Barrier  
1 1   1/week 0 2,9,10 
2           
3 1 
KFC, Abu 
Hable, 
Mansbakir, 
Abu Nedal 
Humus,  
3/week 0   
4 0         
5 0     0 2 
6 0     0 0 
7 1 
 
neighboring 
restaurants 
1/month 0 3 
8 0     0   
9         11 
10 0       11 
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11 1     0   
12 0       11 
13 0       4 
14 0     0 4 
15 1 
two public 
restaurants, 
and gardens 
such as 
waha or tel 
arabia 
3/month 0 10 
16 0     0 11 
17 0     0 4 
18    fast food  1/month 0 8 
19 0     0 4,7,11 
20 1   1/month 0   
21 0     0 2 
22 0     0 0 
23 1 Abu Hawha 1/month 0 5 
24 1 3 1/month 0 2,1 
25 0     0   
26 1     0   
27 1 3   0 0 
28 0     0 4 
29       0 0 
30 0         
31 0       4 
32         1 
33 0     0 13,14 
34 0       5,1 
35 0     0   
36 0     0 0 
37 0     1 0 
38 0     0 0 
39 0       0 
40 0       2,3,4 
41 0       3,4,5,6 
42 1     0 2 
43 0     0 4 
44 1 
there is no 
special 
place, 
sheifa 
sultan 
2/month 0 14 
45 0     0 4 
46 1     0 7,9 
47 1     0 5,9,10,12 
48 0     0 11,12 
49 0       0 
50 1 3 1/week 0 0 
51 1 3 1-2/week 0 0 
52 1     0 0 
53 1 5 1/month 1 0 
54 0     0 0 
55 1 5 2-3 /week 0 0 
56 0     0 4,7,12 
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57 0     0 0 
58 1   5/year 1   
59 0       4 
60 0     1 3,5,6 
61 0         
62 0         
63 0         
64 1 3 3/week 0 0 
65 0       0 
66 1 3 2/week 1 6,12 
67         4 
68 1 3 1/month 0 4 
69 0     0 4 
70 0       4 
71 0     0 6,11 
72 0       11 
73 0     1 2 
74 1 3,5 1/month 0 4 
75 1 3 2/week 0   
76 0         
77 0         
78 0       6 
79 0         
80 1     0 4,5 
81 0     0 11 
82 0     0 5 
83 0 3 1/year 0 2,4 
84 0     1 4,9 
85 0     0 4 
86 1     0 6 
87 0     0   
88 0     0 4 
89 0     0   
90 0     0 4 
91 0     0   
92 0     0 0 
93 0       4,5,9  
94 0     0 2,5,7,11, 
95 0     0 4 
96 1     0 4 
97 0     0   
98 0       2,3,5 
99 0     0   
100 0     0   
101 0     0 7 
102 0     0 4 
103 0     0   
104 1     0 9,12 
105 1     0   
106 1     0 13 
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107 1       3,9,10,11 
108 0     0 0 
109 0     0 0 
110 0     0 13 
111 0     0 0 
112 0       12 
113 0       8 
114 0     0 8 
115 0       5 
116 0       8 
117 0     1 4,8 
118 0     0 11 
119 0     0 11 
120 0     0 9,1 
121           
122 0     0 11 
123 1 
small 
restaurants, 
fast food 
1/week 0 4 
124 1   daily  1 11 
125 0     0 11 
126 0     0 4 
127 0     0 0 
128 1     0 4 
129 0       0 
130 0     0   
131 0     0 4 
132 0   seldom 0 0 
133 0     0 2,4 
134 0     0   
135 0     0   
136 0     0 8,11 
137 0     0   
138 0     0   
139 1 abu hable   0   
140 0       11 
141 1     0 2,9 
142 0 
Tulkarm 
cafe 
sometimes 0 ,5,8,14 
143 0     0 0 
144 0     0 2,9,12 
145       0 2,4,5 
146 0     0 11 
147 0     0 2,4,11, 
148 1     0   
149 0     0   
150 0     0 0 
151           
152       0 0 
153 0     0   
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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to analyze the transformation of movement and access to land and 
employment in Greater Tulkarm in the West Bank, which is influenced by a variety of 
factors such as the Separation Barrier, agricultural gates, roadblocks etc.; and the 
current situation of residents of Tulkarm living in it. Overall the obstacles within the 
Governorate of Tulkarm have been reduced since the second intifada.  Nazlat Isa and 
Jubara, examples used in this thesis, clearly show the negative impact of the Separation 
Barrier in economic and cultural terms. Tulkarm is in the recharge area on the 
northwestern strip of the Mountain Aquifer and is affected by heavy pollution from its 
municipality, other Palestinian regions, Israeli settlements and the Israeli Industrial 
Zone in Tulkarm.  
Before the actual development in the Tulkarm Governorate is shown, a part of the 
introduction illustrates the development and the complexity of the peace process 
between Israel and the Palestinians. Particular attention is given to the Oslo Accords and 
the developments to date. The legal situation in the West Bank is displayed with a focus 
on international law and IHL. Specific points of conflict, such as house demolitions, 
permits, etc., which arise especially in Area C of the West Bank are discussed in detail. 
In particular the numbers of pass overs and difficulties with the permission system at 
the Deir Al-Ghusun Gate to access agricultural land in the Seam Zone is analyzed with 
the help of a linear regression. The regression line shows that the average number of 
cross-border commuters per day has decreased among men by more than one third and 
among women and children by two thirds. The expert interviews and the questionnaires 
give an insight of the current situation in Tulkarm. The reduced working opportunities 
in Israel are named on a frequent basis as the main consequence of the Separation 
Barrier in the questionnaires, followed by reduced contact with family and friends and 
access to the sea.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der  Transformation von Bewegung 
und dem Zugang zu landwirtschaftlichen Flächen und Beschäftigungsverhältnissen im 
Großraum Tulkarm in der Westbank. Dies wird von einer Vielzahl von Faktoren wie 
der Sperranlage, landwirtschaftliche Tore, Straßensperren etc. beeinflusst. Es wird 
somit auch die aktuelle Situation der Bewohner von Tulkarm analysiert. Insgesamt sind 
die Hindernisse wie Straßensperren usw. im Gouvernement Tulkarm seit der zweiten 
Intifada reduziert worden. In den Dörfern Nazlat Isa und Jubara, die als Beispiele in 
dieser Arbeit verwendet werden, zeigen sich deutlich die negativen Auswirkungen der 
Sperrmauer in wirtschaftlicher und kultureller Hinsicht. Tulkarm liegt in der 
Grundwasseranreicherungsfläche im nordwestlichen Streifen des Bergaquifer und ist 
von starken Verschmutzungen seitens der eigenen Gemeinde, anderen palästinensischen 
Gebieten,  israelischen Siedlungen sowie von israelischen Industrieansiedlungen 
betroffen. Bevor konkret die Entwicklung im Gouvernement Tulkarm aufgezeigt wird, 
verdeutlicht ein Einführungsteil den Ablauf und die Komplexität des Friedensprozess 
zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern. Besonderes Augenmerk liegt dabei auf dem 
Osloer Abkommen und den Entwicklungen bis heute. Die rechtliche Situation in der 
West Bank wird beleuchtet mit dem Fokus auf Völkerrecht und Humanitären 
Völkerrecht. Spezifische Konfliktpunkte,  wie Hauszerstörungen, Genehmigungen usw., 
die vor allem in der Zone C der West Bank eine Rolle spielen, werden eingehend 
behandelt.  
Insbesondere die Zahl der Grenzübertritte zu den landwirtschaftlichen Flächen in die 
„Seam Zone“ und Schwierigkeiten mit dem Genehmigungen am  Landwirtschaftstor  
Deir Al-Ghusun, wird mit Hilfe einer linearen Regression analysiert. Die 
Regressionsgerade zeigt, dass die durchschnittliche Zahl der GrenzgängerInnen pro Tag 
bei Männern um mehr als ein Drittel und bei Frauen und Kindern um zwei Drittel 
zurückgegangen ist. Die Experteninterviews und die Fragebögen geben einen Einblick 
in die aktuelle Situation in Tulkarm. Die reduzierten Arbeitsmöglichkeiten in Israel 
werden am häufigsten als Folge der Sperranlage  in den Fragebögen genannt,  gefolgt 
von reduziertem Kontakt mit Familie und Freunden und Zugang zum Meer.
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